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Research suggests that citizens may experience ambivalence if they use multiple 
values or cues from various social groups that champion conflicting views in their attempt to 
provide structure to their political attitudes, or if they find themselves in information 
environments where diverse positions about political objects are discussed. While valuable, 
these explanations ignore the roles that personality traits may play in predisposing 
individuals to experience this attitudinal state. In this dissertation, I offer an individual-level 
theory of the antecedents of political ambivalence, and contend that ambivalent attitudes are 
likely caused by deeply rooted individual differences that systematically influence behaviors 
and attitudes, in addition to the external factors that have been addressed in past studies. 
Using the Five Factor Model of personality structure as my theoretical framework, I develop 
a set of hypotheses about the direct effects that the “Big Five” traits of Openness to 
Experience, Conscientiousness, Extraversion, Agreeableness, and Neuroticism have on the 
likelihood that a citizen will experience ambivalence. I test my hypotheses using data 
gathered from the 2008 Cooperative Congressional Election Survey (CCES) and a series of 
survey experiments administered to undergraduate students at the University of North 
Carolina at Chapel Hill between 2008 and 2011. I find some support for my theory that 
personality traits contribute to attitudinal ambivalence. However, variables such as group
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affect conflict and value conflict continue to exhibit a powerful influence on this attitudinal 
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 CHAPTER ONE 
INTRODUCTION 
 
During the 2004 Presidential election, reporters from the New York Times interviewed 
a number of Evangelical Christians to uncover their attitudes toward the issue of amending 
the Constitution to outlaw same-sex marriage. As expected, some strongly supported this 
amendment on “biblical” grounds. However, other Evangelical Christians and pastors alike 
were ambivalent on the issue. Even though they expressed some support for an amendment 
based on their faith and Christian values, they were opposed to the amendment because of 
their personal relationships with gays and lesbians and their opinions regarding the proper 
role of government in regulating individual behavior (Kirkpatrick 2004). Ambivalence 
toward this proposed amendment may have been even more pronounced among other voters 
who did not identify strongly as Evangelicals. Scholarly evidence suggests that the American 
public, broadly defined, demonstrates ambivalent attitudes on a number of other gay rights 
issues—particularly on issues that could be seen as violations of civil rights and liberties such 
as prohibiting gays from joining the Boy Scouts and allowing gays and lesbians to serve in 
the military (Craig et al. 2005). 
Attitudinal ambivalence is not limited to gay rights issues. Scholars have uncovered 
evidence of attitudinal ambivalence on a number of political issues such
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as social welfare, abortion, and immigration (Feldman and Zaller 1992; Craig, Kane, and 
Martinez 2002; Alvarez and Brehm 1995; Martinez, Craig, and Kane 2005). Other studies 
also suggest that individuals experience attitudinal ambivalence toward political candidates 
in the contexts of U.S. presidential and congressional elections and toward members of 
minority racial groups (Keele and Wolak 2008; Lavine 2001; Basinger and Lavine 2005; 
Katz and Hass 1988). The idea that “conflict is at the root of politics” is not a new one (Craig 
and Martinez 2005: xv). Conflict in the considerations that citizens hold about political 
objects has noteworthy consequences for political attitudes and behavior.  
Ambivalence is significant for a number of reasons. Political science and social 
psychological research suggests that attitudinal ambivalence likely plays an important role in 
mediating and moderating the relationships between political attitudes and behavior 
(Martinez, Craig, and Kane 2005: 10; Lavine 2001). Specifically, those citizens who are 
ambivalent about an issue or which political candidate they will support in a general election 
take significantly longer to express their opinions when compared to others who are not 
ambivalent (Lavine 2001; Lavine and Steenbergen 2005; Albertson, Brehm, and Alvarez 
2005). Since ambivalent citizens may recognize the merits of two opposing sides of a 
political debate, or like and dislike a political party or candidate at the same time, heuristics 
like partisan identification and ideological labels mean less and do not translate into reliable 
decision-making cues (Basinger and Lavine 2005). Over the course of a campaign, those 
voters who are ambivalent exhibit more instability in their candidate evaluations and voting 
preferences when compared to others with single-sided political attitudes (Lavine and 
Steenbergen 2005; Fournier 2005). Finally, ambivalent attitudes are held with “less 
confidence and clarity” when compared to one-sided political attitudes (Basinger and Lavine 
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2005: 171). As a result, ambivalent individuals may be more prone to persuasive attempts 
made by politicians than those who are not ambivalent about the same political object 
(Mendelberg 2001; Lavine 2001).  
If we examine some of the most far reaching and important studies of voting behavior 
and ideological identification in the American context, voters who are deemed the most 
“sophisticated” or politically thoughtful are those who possess a highly constrained set of 
beliefs and whose beliefs about political objects are not subject to much change much over 
time (Campbell et al. 1960; Converse 1964). An assumption that is implicit in much of this 
literature and one that is also present in classic psychological theories of cognitive 
consistency (e.g., balance theory or cognitive dissonance) is that cognitive conflict is an 
uncomfortable state of mind—and a quality that is not valued in the American voter (Heider 
1946; Festinger 1957).  
But if we take a closer look at the concept of ambivalence, it may actually cast 
citizens in a positive light, especially given the evidence that suggests that a considerable 
portion of the public is politically disinterested and/or ignorant (Meffert, Guge, and Lodge 
2004; Lavine 2001; Berelson, Lazarsfeld and McPhee 1954; Campbell et al. 1960; Converse 
1964; Smith 1989; Delli Carpini and Keeter 1996). From a normative standpoint, political 
ambivalence “suggests openness” (Keele and Wolak 2008: 654) and can be considered a sign 
of thoughtfulness among voters (Meffert, Guge, and Lodge 2004). Instead of relying solely 
on one-sided political beliefs, ambivalent individuals possess some of the qualities that we 
would like “ideal” democratic citizens to hold. Since they have multiple and conflicting 
thoughts about political objects, they may be likely to recognize that political debates are 
complex and consider multiple sides of an argument when faced with a decision (Green, 
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Visser, and Tetlock 2000; Nir 2005). Those who “easily take a position in an issue debate are 
less likely to be reflective in their decision making and resist consideration of relevant 
evidence” when compared to others who possess multiple and conflicting thoughts about 
political objects (Keele and Wolak 2008: 654).   
Yet, while we know a great deal about the consequences of ambivalence, we know 
comparatively little about its underlying causes (Martinez, Craig, and Kane 2005; Keele and 
Wolak 2008).  One of the key questions that remains unanswered is whether all citizens are 
equally likely to possess ambivalent attitudes toward political objects. If we examine the 
literature to identify those who are likely to make up this subsample of the American 
electorate, we do not find a satisfying answer. Since ambivalence has important implications 
for political attitudes and behavior, it is useful to identify the characteristics of individuals 
who are likely to experience it.  
In this dissertation, I examine a set of causal factors that are hypothesized to lead 
citizens to experience attitudinal ambivalence about political issues. Much of the existing 
research on the antecedents of ambivalence focuses on three explanations: the inherently 
conflicting nature of the values that structure individual attitudes within our political culture 
(Alvarez and Brehm 1995, 1997; Feldman and Zaller 1992; Katz and Hass 1988); the ties to 
multiple identity groups that conflict with regard to their stances on policies or toward 
candidates running for office (Lavine and Steenbergen 2005); and exposure to multiple 
points of view within an individual’s information environment (Huckfeldt, Mendez, and 
Osborn 2004; Keele and Wolak 2008). While valuable, these explanations all hinge on the 
assertion that if some sort of conflict exists within a citizen’s thought process or 
environment, ambivalence will be a more likely result. Furthermore, value conflict and 
5 
 
competing reference groups are not only conceptualized in the literature as causal factors 
contributing to ambivalence (Baek 2010; Alvarez and Brehm 1995; McGraw, Hasecke, and 
Conger 2003; Huckfeldt, Mendez, and Osburn 2004; Craig et al. 2005), but they are 
sometimes equated with forms of ambivalence as well (see, for example, Feldman and Zaller 
1992; Steenbergen and Brewer 2004; Lavine and Steenbergen 2005). It is therefore unclear 
whether these explanatory factors are truly antecedents of ambivalence or simply modified 
forms of ambivalence itself. 
At its most basic level, political ambivalence is an attitudinal state experienced by a 
citizen that is characterized by conflict in the considerations that the individual holds about 
an object. In the chapters that follow, I offer a theory about the antecedents of attitudinal 
ambivalence that is rooted in the personality traits of citizens. Most simply stated, some 
individuals, by virtue of their core dispositions or personality traits, may be more likely to 
experience attitudinal ambivalence than others. Furthermore, these traits may predict the 
likelihood of experiencing ambivalence across a range of political issues. 
Systematic research within the field of personality psychology strongly suggests that 
the structure of human personality can be broken down into five core traits: Openness to 
Experience, Conscientiousness, Extraversion, Agreeableness, and Neuroticism (Wiggins and 
Trapnell 1997; Digman 1990; McCrae and Costa 1996, 1997, 2003, 2008; Goldberg 1992, 
1993; Saucier and Goldberg 1996; Mondak 2010; Mondak and Halperin 2008). Importantly, 
these traits have well established links to attitudes and behavior—even in political contexts 
(Digman 1990; Schoen and Schumann 2007; Caprara et al. 2006; Mondak and Halperin 
2008; Gerber et al. 2010, 2011; Mondak 2010; Mondak et al. 2010). In line with current 
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research on the influence that personality exerts on political attitudes and behavior, I employ 
this model of personality structure in my research as well. 
In this dissertation, I first consider the concept of attitudinal ambivalence, its 
implications for politics, and past accounts of the conditions under which it may be 
experienced by individuals. I then move on to a discussion of the Five Factor Model, or “Big 
Five” framework, of personality structure and the effects that personality traits have on 
political behavior and attitudes. Next I employ this framework to offer a theoretical argument 
for how the five personality traits are expected to influence the likelihood of experiencing 
attitudinal ambivalence. Empirically, I test my hypotheses using data collected from 
undergraduate students at the University of North Carolina at Chapel Hill, and a random 
sample of adults in the American electorate with question space obtained on the 2008 
Cooperative Congressional Election Study. Finally, in my concluding chapter, I discuss the 
implications of my study for our understanding of political ambivalence and other political 
attitudes and behaviors. 
 




In his seminal article on the nature of belief systems of the mass public, Philip 
Converse (1964) noted the instability of attitudes when respondents were asked to report 
their beliefs on a variety of political issues at repeated points in time, suggesting that most 
citizens did not possess strongly held views on political issues at all. Only a small portion of 
the public—the most highly educated or political elites—appeared to pay careful attention to 
politics and hold consistent or ideologically “constrained” attitudes. The majority of 
respondents accepted information about political issues from elites in bundled packages, 
without a complete understanding of how those packages of issues “fit” together 
ideologically. Moreover, “nonattitudes” seemed to run rampant. Research that has been 
conducted since that time continues to find evidence of a lack of political interest and 
knowledge among the electorate (see, for example, Smith 1989; Delli Carpini and Keeter 
1996). However, Converse’s characterization of the American public has been challenged. In 
particular, research on attitudinal ambivalence questions the notion that ordinary individuals 
do not think much of, or carefully about, politics. Instead of lacking constrained attitudes 
about political issues, parties, or candidates, this newer line of work suggests that some 
citizens may hold a number of competing considerations about 
What is Attitudinal Ambivalence? 
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political objects at the same time (Meffert, Guge, and Lodge 2004; Lavine 2001; Yoo 2010).  
The grounds for this challenge stem, in part, from how one conceptualizes the 
structure of attitudes in political science research. Unidimensional attitude theory has 
strongly influenced the way scholars think about and measure political attitudes (Yoo 2010; 
Meffert, Guge, and Lodge 2004; Lavine 2001). According to this theory, as a citizen’s 
negative evaluation of a political issue, candidate, or party increases, the positive evaluation 
of the same political object decreases; likewise, an increase in the positive evaluation of a 
political issue, candidate, or party is met with a decrease in the negative evaluation of the 
object. To measure a political attitude, respondents are typically asked to indicate their stance 
toward the object on a bipolar scale. The midpoint of the scale indicates “neutrality,” which 
is supposed to be indicative of either a balance of negative and positive feelings or thoughts 
or indifference, which is a complete lack of any feelings or thoughts (Campbell et al. 1960; 
Yoo 2010; Lavine 2001). This is problematic because thinking about politics affects political 
behavior differently than not thinking about politics at all.1
Social and political psychologists have reevaluated the unidimensional 
conceptualization of attitudes. They recognize that the evaluations a person possesses about a 
political object may be consistent with one another (Eagly and Chaiken 1993): evaluations of 
 Grouping these distinct attitudinal 
states into the same “neutral” response category impedes our ability to understand the unique 
effects that different types of political attitudes have on behavior (Yoo 2010; Meffert, Guge, 
and Lodge 2004). 
                                                            
1Yoo (2010) finds that the attitudinal states of ambivalence and indifference have distinct effects on turnout.  
Ambivalent citizens are more likely to turn out in elections than indifferent citizens. Because they lack any 
affect or thoughts about political candidates or parties, indifferent citizens exhibit lower turnout levels when 
compared to all other citizens.  Ambivalent citizens, however, turn out to the polls in levels more similar to 
those with one-sided attitudes.  
9 
 
a political issue, candidate, or party may be marked by extremely positive or negative beliefs 
or feelings. But attitudes can also be more complex: some individuals can “simultaneously 
hold evaluatively inconsistent beliefs” about an object (Eagly and Chaiken 1993: 123; 
Meffert, Guge, and Lodge 2004; Cacioppo and Berntson 1994; Cacioppo, Gardner, and 
Berntson 1997). For instance, in a political context, citizens may recognize the pros and cons 
of a political issue stance, or find that they like and dislike a candidate or party at the same 
time (see, for example, Yoo 2010; Feldman and Zaller 1992; Zaller 1992; Lavine 2001; 
Meffert, Guge, and Lodge 2004; Basinger and Lavine 2005). Furthermore, these citizens may 
place similar weights on those positive and negative evaluations. This simultaneous existence 
of conflicting evaluations is known as attitudinal ambivalence (Martinez, Craig, and Kane 
2005; Steenbergen and Brewer 2004; Eagly and Chaiken 1993; Feldman and Zaller 1992; 
Zaller 1992; Cacioppo and Berntson 1994; Priester and Petty 1996, 2001; Lavine 2001; Yoo 
2010). 
More specifically, there is general agreement in both political science and social 
psychology regarding two “necessary and sufficient conditions” for the experience of 
attitudinal ambivalence (Thompson and Zanna 1995: 263; Basinger and Lavine 2005). First, 
the positive and negative evaluations that a person directs toward an object should be of 
analogous magnitude (Basinger and Lavine 2005: 197; see also, Thompson, Zanna, and 
Griffin 1995: 263; Meffert, Guge, and Lodge 2004; Priester and Petty 1996). Conflict in the 
thought process of an individual will decrease, and attitudes will become more single-sided, 
as the evaluations favoring one side of a political debate increase relative to the other side 
(Thompson and Zanna 1995). Second, the positive and negative evaluations about a political 
object should be of “moderate intensity,” such that ambivalence will increase when citizens 
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have stronger positive and negative evaluations, and decrease when they have weaker 
positive and negative evaluations directed at the same object (Thompson and Zanna: 1995: 
263; Thompson, Zanna, and Griffin 1995; Meffert, Guge, and Lodge 2004). 
Research and inquiry into attitudinal ambivalence in political contexts is relatively 
new, although social psychologists have been studying the concept since the late 1960s and 
early 1970s (Kaplan 1972; Eagly and Chaiken 1993; Martinez, Craig, and Kane 2005). The 
lack of ambivalence research in political science can be traced to a pair of complicating 
factors. First, research conducted by social psychologists studying cognitive dissonance and 
balance theory suggested that individuals prefer cognitive consistency to experiences like 
logical inconsistency and dissonance (see, for example, Heider 1946; Festinger 1957; 
Thompson and Zanna 1995; Meffert, Guge, and Lodge 2004; Eagly and Chaiken 1993). 
Instead of being willing to tolerate inconsistent thoughts or feelings about an object, citizens 
were expected to take whatever steps necessary to resolve their psychological discomfort, 
even if that meant denying or ignoring that any conflict existed or choosing to create a new 
“belief structure” about the attitude object (Eagly and Chaiken 1993). These expectations 
made their way into theories and expectations regarding political attitudes. 
Dissonance, or cognitive imbalance, may be a taxing psychological state. However, 
while cognitive imbalance can produce a motivational force for resolving evaluative 
discrepancy, evidence suggests that this force may be greater for some individuals than it is 
for others. For example, Thompson and Zanna (1995) found that individuals who score high 
on one aspect of personality (Need for Cognition) enjoy thinking through problems, dislike 
ambiguity, work to resolve conflict, and are less likely to be ambivalent about social issues 
than those who score low on this psychological need. Alternatively, scoring high on another 
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aspect of personality (Fear of Invalidity) is associated with a significant increase in the 
likelihood of experiencing attitudinal ambivalence on some social issues.2
 Second, the recent emergence of ambivalence research in political science also stems 
from the long standing assumption discussed previously that attitudes are bipolar in nature 
(Eagly and Chaiken 1993; Meffert, Guge, and Lodge 2004: 64-66; Thompson and Zanna 
1995; Yoo 2010; Feldman and Zaller 1992). Many influential survey techniques that were 
developed to measure attitudes among members of the public (e.g., Thurstone, Likert, and 
Semantic Differential scales) grew out of this assumption (Thompson and Zanna 1995; 
Meffert, Guge, and Lodge 2004). While there is now recognition, especially in social 
 Those who score 
high on Fear of Invalidity report being anxious about making decisions and fear making 
costly mistakes; but, they also enjoy thinking through problems, are more hesitant to resolve 
cognitive inconsistencies, and tend to value opposing arguments on social issues more 
equally (Thompson and Zanna 1995). Additionally, those who are motivated by accuracy 
goals when making political judgments and who are willing to devote more cognitive effort 
to a judgment task have been shown to be more likely to be ambivalent than others who do 
not share those motivations (Rudolph and Popp 2007). Thus, the overarching assumptions 
and expectations that have grown out of the existing literature on cognitive conflict may be 
too simple. A careful evaluation of existing evidence suggests that enduring individual 
differences may lead some individuals to be more tolerant of cognitive inconsistencies about 
political objects than others. Furthermore, cognitive inconsistency is not perceived by all 
people to be a negative attitudinal state.  
                                                            
2Thompson and Zanna (1995) utilized a small group of undergraduate students at the University of Waterloo as 
participants in their study, as inventories that measure psychological constructs like the Need for Cognition, 
Fear of Invalidity, or personality traits are typically absent from large-N surveys of political attitudes. 
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psychology, that individuals may hold both positive and negative evaluations of political 
objects concurrently, new measurement tools that are able to capture these separate 
evaluations are rarely included in survey instruments (Cacioppo and Bernston 1994; 
Cacioppo, Garner, and Bernston 1997; Thompson and Zanna 1995; Meffert, Guge, and 
Lodge 2004; Feldman and Zaller 1992).  
 This is especially true in the field of political science. Often times, respondents on a 
large-scale survey instrument, such as the National Election Study or the General Social 
Survey, are asked to report their summary stances on important political issues like same-sex 
marriage and stem cell research, among many others. It is useful to ascertain whether citizens 
support or oppose a particular issue, in addition to the strength of their evaluation(s). 
However, the response categories offered to survey respondents inevitably mask the 
complexity of their attitudes.  
For example, if some citizens have competing considerations about a political object, 
then they may simply average across the considerations that come to mind when they are 
taking the survey (Zaller 1992; Zaller and Feldman 1992). This process may result in a 
moderate or neutral response, which might also explain why attitudes held by some members 
of the mass public appear to be unstable if measured repeatedly over time. Meanwhile, other 
citizens may choose the same neutral response category on the survey instrument if they are 
indifferent toward that political object, since they lack any considerations about it at all 
(Meffert, Guge, and Lodge 2004; Yoo 2010).  
These are two entirely different attitudinal states, but they end up being grouped 
together in the same response category, and thereby cloud its meaning. Unless we ask 
specific questions that tap into citizens’ positive and negative evaluations of a political 
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object, we are unable to uncover empirical evidence of ambivalence because we cannot 
distinguish it from genuine absence of affect or thoughts toward an attitude object (Kaplan 
1972; Thompson, Zanna, and Griffin 1995; Meffert, Guge, and Lodge 2004). Thus, the lack 
of research on political ambivalence may be a function of the survey instruments we use in 
much of our work. Since ambivalence cannot be easily measured with existing data it is often 
ignored and perceived as an insignificant attitudinal state—even though research on the 
psychology of attitudes across a number of different political contexts would suggest 
otherwise (Eagly and Chaiken 1993; Thompson and Zanna 1995; Craig and Martinez 2005). 
 
Ambivalence is experienced by a significant portion of the American electorate 
across a variety of political issues and in partisan and candidate evaluations. In their study of 
cognitive reactions to presidential candidates during the 1980-1996 presidential election 
years, Meffert, Guge, and Lodge (2004) found that 25 percent of respondents simultaneously 
expressed positive and negative considerations about candidates. When they expanded their 
definition of ambivalence to include conflicting cognitions and feelings about candidates, 
they found that almost 40 percent of the public expressed ambivalence (70). Similarly, 
Basinger and Lavine (2005) found that voters who held ambivalent partisan attitudes 
constituted approximately 30 percent of the electorate. Clearly, a substantial portion of the 
public experiences ambivalence; it is not a trivial attitudinal state experienced by an 
insignificant number of Americans in the mass electorate. 
Political Consequences of Ambivalence 
Moreover, ambivalence about political objects has serious consequences. 
Specifically, attitudinal ambivalence can mediate and moderate relationships between 
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attitudes and behavioral intentions. In their examination of House elections, Basinger and 
Lavine (2005) found that ambivalence mediated the extent to which some voters relied on 
partisanship and ideology when making vote choice decisions. Specifically, those voters who 
were politically informed but ambivalent about their partisan identification used ideology, 
while those who were politically uninformed but partisan ambivalent used retrospective 
economic evaluations, to guide their vote choice decisions. Similarly, in their examination of 
attitudes toward gay rights policies, Craig et al. (2005) found that ambivalence in this policy 
area weakened the relationship between attitudes toward gay rights and overall evaluations of 
the incumbent governor. Lavine (2001) found that ambivalence moderated the relationship 
between one’s expressed intent to vote for a Democratic or Republican candidate and actual 
vote choice. Those who were less ambivalent were more likely to vote for their “intended 
candidate” (926). 
There are other attitudinal implications of ambivalence as well. Compared to those 
with single-sided attitudes, people experiencing attitudinal ambivalence tend to take longer 
when deciding which candidate they will support in a general election contest (Lavine 2001; 
Lavine and Steenbergen 2005), which may make them more open to political ads and other 
persuasive messages expressed by politicians during the course of a campaign. Lavine and 
Steenbergen (2005) also found that compared to those with one-sided attitudes toward 
candidates, voters who were ambivalent exhibited more instability in their presidential 
candidate evaluations over the course of the electoral campaign and were more likely to split 
their tickets at the polls. In his analyses of a number of different voting decisions in the 
United States, Great Britain, and Canada across nine different surveys, Fournier (2005) found 
that the voting preferences of ambivalent individuals were more likely to change when 
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compared to the voting preferences of individuals who were not ambivalent. Mendelberg 
(2001) suggested that those who experience ambivalence about policies dealing with race 
(i.e., experience conflict between the value of equality and racial resentments) may be more 
prone to implicit appeals made by politicians. In their study of ambivalence toward 
presidential candidates between 1980 and 1996, Meffert, Guge, and Lodge (2004) discovered 
that those who were ambivalent showed less polarized attitudes and a greater aptitude to 
make more balanced and accurate political judgments compared to those who held one-sided 
and indifferent attitudes. Most recently, using data from the 1980-2004 National Election 
Studies, Yoo (2010) found that compared to those who were indifferent about presidential 
candidates, ambivalent individuals were more likely to turn out at the polls and participate in 
campaign activities (173). Interestingly, ambivalent voters also had similar turnout levels 
when compared to those who held more polarized views about political candidates (173). 
Thus, while the experience of political ambivalence may be more cognitively taxing 
for citizens than simply holding univalent political attitudes, evidence suggests that it is 
nonetheless experienced by a substantial portion of the electorate. Furthermore, the 
experience of attitudinal ambivalence has noteworthy consequences for political attitudes and 
behavior. Making the assumption that all citizens possess univalent political attitudes, and 
that indifference and ambivalence can be included within the same attitudinal response 
category, leads us to develop incomplete—and inaccurate—expectations about the political 
behavior and attitudes of voters. 
 
Gaps in Our Understanding 
Past research suggests that attitudinal ambivalence is experienced by members of the  
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American electorate across a variety of political issues, elections, and partisan evaluations. 
Ambivalence has important consequences for our study of political behavior and attitudes. 
However, while we know many of the consequences of attitudinal ambivalence, we know 
much less about its underlying causes (Martinez, Craig, and Kane 2005, Thompson and 
Zanna 1995; Keele and Wolak 2008). Our understanding of ambivalence is restricted and 
incomplete if we cannot identify the characteristics and conditions that cause individuals to 
possess multidimensional political attitudes. As such, the broad research question that my 
dissertation will address is: “What are the antecedents of political ambivalence?” 
 
Before I move on to a more in depth discussion of my theory regarding the 
personality trait antecedents of attitudinal ambivalence, it is important to summarize the 
findings of a few key approaches that scholars have taken in their attempts to answer this 
research question. A small number of studies have examined the association between 
demographic and other individual-level variables commonly used in studies of political 
attitudes and various forms of ambivalence. For example, those who have strong partisan or 
ideological ties are typically less likely to experience ambivalence than those who have 
weaker ties (Rudolph and Popp 2007; Steenbergen and Brewer 2004). Older Americans are 
more likely to be ambivalent than younger Americans, while those who are more politically 
sophisticated are less likely to be ambivalent than others who are not as sophisticated 
(Steenbergen and Brewer 2004). Those who score high on Personal Fear of Invalidity and 
fear making mistakes are more likely to experience ambivalence than those who score low on 
this characteristic (Thompson and Zanna 1995). But, Need for Cognition and liberal 
Potential Causes of Attitudinal Ambivalence 
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ideological identification have been shown to be both positively associated with ambivalence 
in some studies (Rudolph and Popp 2007; Feldman and Zaller 1992), and negatively 
associated with ambivalence in others (Thompson and Zanna 1995; Steenbergen and Brewer 
2004).  
Much of the remaining research that has been conducted on the antecedents of 
ambivalence focuses on three factors:  
• the experience of value conflict toward a specific policy issue; 
• the exposure to a wide variety of viewpoints on an issue or toward a candidate in 
a particular information environment (e.g., in a heterogeneous discussion group or 
general election); and 
• the individual’s favorable evaluation of multiple social groups that are relevant to 
a political judgment, but that conflict with regard to the stance(s) they take on key 
political issues or candidates.  
These explanatory accounts have done a great deal to advance our knowledge in this area. 
The explanations are logical and make intuitive sense. Further, they are complimentary in 
that they offer an internal, value-based account of the source(s) of ambivalence (i.e., value 
conflict) as well as an account stemming from external or situational factors (e.g., exposure 
to diverse viewpoints in the information environment). However, weaknesses in these 
explanations also exist. I will present, and evaluate, each of these three explanations in turn. 
 
Explanation I:  Value Conflict 
 There is a fairly extensive literature on the experience of value conflict. The premise 
of this work is that a set of core values—equality of opportunity, individualism, and self 
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reliance—shape citizens’ policy and candidate preferences and form the basis of ideology 
(Feldman and Zaller 1992; Feldman 1988; McClosky and Zaller 1984; Rokeach 1973). 
However, when these core values are applied to concrete policy areas, they often conflict, 
which can lead citizens to experience ambivalence. For example, Feldman and Zaller (1992) 
and Gainous and Martinez (2005) examine attitudes toward social welfare policies in the 
United States, and find that both conservatives and liberals experience some ambivalence as 
a result of value conflict. Other evidence suggests that individuals experience value conflict 
on racialized policy issues and abortion (Katz and Hass 1988; Alvarez and Brehm 1995). 
 The value conflict explanation has merit. If people use more than one value to 
structure their views on issues or toward political candidates, it is possible that those values 
could come into conflict. For example, on the issue of same-sex marriage, the application of 
the value of egalitarianism might push a citizen to support the policy; however, if moral 
traditionalist values are also important, then that individual may be pushed to oppose the 
policy. This value conflict may lead that person to hold an ambivalent position on the issue 
due to the competing considerations that are brought to bear based upon the values used to 
structure the attitude. 
While insightful, the value conflict explanation accounts for one form of conflict in 
considerations with another. While this may be a partial explanation, it still does not address 
the underlying mechanism for why this may occur. Several questions remain unanswered. 
Are all individuals equally likely to experience value conflict when evaluating their position 
on an issue? Or, can some individuals more easily order the relative importance of two 
competing values, and thereby avoid internal conflict in their considerations? Are some 
people simply more comfortable with inconsistency or conflicting considerations when 
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evaluating their position(s) on policies when compared to others? Furthermore, value conflict 
is not only conceptualized in the literature as a causal factor contributing to ambivalence 
(Baek 2010; Alvarez and Brehm 1995; McGraw, Hasecke, and Conger 2003), but it is also 
sometimes characterized as a form of ambivalence as well (Feldman and Zaller 1992; 
Steenbergen and Brewer 2004). It is therefore unclear whether value conflict is an antecedent 
of ambivalence, or simply another form of ambivalence itself. 
 
Explanation II:  Overabundance of Information in the Environment 
Another explanation for the origins of attitudinal ambivalence focuses on factors that 
lie outside of an individual’s psyche—specifically, the information environment. Scholars 
contend that citizens who are exposed to a two-sided and concentrated flow of information 
will be more likely to consider multiple viewpoints when formulating political judgments 
(Huckfeldt, Mendez, and Osborn 2004; Mutz 2002; Keele and Wolak 2008; Nir 2005). 
Ambivalence may be experienced by those citizens who find that they value multiple, 
opposing beliefs about the same political object following exposure to diverse viewpoints.  
A two-sided information environment can take different forms. For example, a 
general election may provide a “two-sided flow of persuasive information” intended to 
convince voters to support one candidate over another (Lavine 2001: 926). Consequently, 
some voters may be likely to accept messages from both sides, which can lead to 
ambivalence over which candidate the voter will support in an election (Lavine 2001; Keele 
and Wolak 2008). Heterogeneous political discussion networks also have the potential to 
create a diverse information environment for individuals. Mutz (2002) contends that if 
individuals participate in heterogeneous discussion networks, they inevitably will be exposed 
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to arguments that challenge their existing views.  If this exposure leads them to equally value 
opposing arguments relating to an object or issue, then the likelihood that an individual will 
experience ambivalence may increase as a result (840).  
In a similar study, Huckfeldt, Mendez, and Osborn (2004) examined the role that 
political discussion partners can play in creating ambivalence about political candidates. 
Using data from the National Election Study, they found that ambivalence toward political 
candidates—in this study Bush or Kerry—was highest among those whose discussion 
partners included supporters of both presidential candidates. Alternatively, ambivalence was 
lowest amongst those whose discussion partners shared the same presidential candidate 
preferences. 
Again, this theoretical account for the origins of attitudinal ambivalence is logical. 
When citizens are exposed to a wider variety of considerations with regard to a political issue 
or candidate, some citizens may come to hold and value beliefs that conflict. However, this 
explanation leaves some questions unanswered as well. First, people may be able to cite a 
number of apparently conflicting considerations (likes/dislikes, pros/cons) after engaging in 
conversation with others who hold dissimilar attitudes, or after being exposed to campaign 
information from politicians. But simply being aware of multiple competing considerations, 
and being able to report them when answering a question on a survey instrument, does not 
necessarily constitute evidence of evaluative conflict. If the positive considerations are not 
held with the same passion or fervor as the negative considerations, then attitudinal 
ambivalence is unlikely.  
Second, the assumption that engaging in political discussions with others who are 
dissimilar will lead one to experience conflict in the considerations used to evaluate a 
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political issue or candidate is probably overstated. Cass Sunstein’s research on the “Law of 
Group Polarization” speaks to this point. Drawing on past work that examines heterogeneous 
discussion groups in the medical field, he contends that participants often value the views of 
members perceived to be of “high status” groups, and discount the viewpoints offered by 
“low status” group members (e.g., women, African Americans, and those who are not well 
educated). He also questions the implicit assumption that all individuals enter group 
discussions without particular “pre-deliberation tendencies”—preexisting preferences about 
the position that they would like to take on the issue. Because people enter group discussions 
with these preferences, they are more likely to actually intensify their preexisting view(s) as a 
result of discussion and exposure to alternative viewpoints offered by group members. He 
finds that this is especially likely to occur when a more “dominant” group member holds a 
similar attitude,3 and if the persuasive appeals offered by group members with opposing 
views are not convincing. Like Huckfeldt, Mendez, and Osborn (2004), Sunstein (2002) 
concedes that attitude moderation (perhaps due to ambivalence) may occur if the discussion 
group consists of members who equally oppose and favor the political object (i.e., issue or 
candidate).4
                                                            
3If that dominant group member also shares the same sense of identity or “common fate” with the individual 
making a political judgment, the movement of the individual’s attitude toward that of the group member(s) 
perceived to be similar will likely be even more pronounced (Sunstein 2002). 
 However, this simply may not be a realistic discussion situation. Moreover, even 
when convincing competing viewpoints are made public in heterogeneous discussion 
networks, it does not follow that all individuals will carefully consider these conflicting 
 
4Similar findings have been uncovered in social psychology research.  For example, Visser and Mirabile (2004) 
found that individuals who were a part of heterogeneous social networks held weaker attitudes toward issues 
when compared to others who were a part of “attitudinally congruent” social networks.  They were also more 
able to be persuaded. Levitan and Visser (2009) found that social networks significantly influence attitude 
strength, in that those who were in attitudinally diverse social networks had less stable and more malleable 
attitudes than those who were in attitudinally congruent social networks. 
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views, and subsequently experience ambivalence. In sum, this account of the origins of 
ambivalence still does not help us to predict “who,” amongst those who are exposed to 
competing viewpoints, will experience attitudinal ambivalence over a political object as a 
result. 
 
Explanation III – Multiple, Competing Identities or Ideologically Inconsistent Group Affect 
Finally, another plausible explanation for the origins of attitudinal ambivalence stems 
from the idea that individuals possess ties, or felt affect, toward multiple social identity 
groups. When an issue or candidate emerges on the political agenda, and citizens are asked to 
indicate their positions in relation to that attitude object, a person may use “likes” and 
“dislikes” of social groups to inform their political judgments (Converse 1964; Conover and 
Feldman 1981; Lavine and Steenbergen 2005). According to a “group centrism hypothesis,” 
individuals may use felt affect toward social groups as relevant cues for formulating 
judgments because “social groups are central organizing elements of political belief systems” 
that introduce “order to what might otherwise be largely haphazard collections of cognitively 
isolated opinions” (Lavine and Steenbergen 2005: 7; see also Eagly and Chaiken 1993: 141; 
Converse 1964; Campbell et al. 1960; Brady and Sniderman 1985; Conover and Feldman 
1981). However, when a person holds positive affect toward social groups that stand in 
opposition to one another on a particular issue or candidate, those social group cues may not 
be useful to the individual making the political judgment. Instead, the groups that were 
initially perceived to be relevant information sources may expose the person to competing 
considerations on the issue or candidate in question (Lavine and Steenbergen 2005).  
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This idea has its roots in the “cross pressures” hypothesis, which was first put forth by 
Lazarsfeld, Berelson, and Gaudet (1944) in The People’s Choice. In this book, the authors 
examined a panel of potential voters in the 1940 Presidential election to understand better 
how people formulate their political judgments. They found that individuals may be faced 
with two or more social affiliations (like race and religion, or class and religion) that tend to 
pull them in opposing directions. In this type of situation, those voters faced with conflicting 
identities, or cross pressures, are more likely to split their tickets at the polls, have lower 
levels of interest or information about elections and politics in general, and hold disparate 
attitudes with regard to political objects due to the contradictory positions espoused by their 
social groups. There is additional empirical evidence that complements this notion.  Lavine 
and Steenbergen (2005) uncover similar findings when they examine citizens’ affective 
evaluations of multiple social groups. Their empirical results show that potential voters who 
hold positive (or negative) feelings toward both liberal and conservative social groups 
experience significantly more ambivalence toward choices involving policies and candidates 
than individuals who do not hold similar “ideologically inconsistent” group feelings (24).  
Like the other two approaches to studying the origins of attitudinal ambivalence, the 
competing identities explanation has merit. This idea is seemingly supported by a major 
implication that stems from tests of Heider’s balance theory in numerous social situations: 
individuals are prone to “agree with people [and groups] that they like, and disagree with 
people [and groups] that they dislike” (Eagly and Chaiken 1993: 141). Thus, if a person has 
positive affect for more than one social group, and perceives their cues to be of roughly equal 
relevance to the decision at hand, that person may experience some psychological, or 
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internalized, conflict in considerations if those groups take opposing positions on a particular 
political object (e.g., an issue, presidential candidate, etc.).   
But while these empirical accounts focus on felt affect toward social groups, they do 
not consider factors such as identity group salience and status, which may minimize the 
likelihood of ambivalence stemming from conflicting reference groups. Identifying as a 
member of a social group provides a person with a cognitive foundation for interpreting 
experience and appropriate role behaviors (Stryker and Burke 2000), just as felt affect 
towards social groups can serve as judgment cues. Identity theorists (Mattis et al. 2008; 
Shapiro et al. 2010) acknowledge that individuals possess multiple cross-cutting identities. 
For example, a woman may identify as African American, while simultaneously thinking of 
herself as an Evangelical Christian who is a member of the middle class. If such a woman 
were faced with taking a position on an issue like abortion, these identities could potentially 
pull her in opposing directions. Her identity as an Evangelical might lead her to oppose 
abortion rights, while her identity as a woman might simultaneously lead her to support 
abortion rights. However, evidence suggests that people are relatively adept at ordering the 
salience of their identities when making political judgments; the higher the “salience of an 
identity relative to other identities…the greater the probability of behavioral [or attitudinal] 
choices in accord with the expectations attached to that identity” (Stryker and Burke 2000: 
286). Individuals are also aware that some social identities are perceived to be of higher 
status than others. Thus, in order to preserve a positive sense of self, individuals may often 
defer to the higher status identity group when making a decision, and this tendency is even 
more pronounced in situations that make the relative group status rankings apparent 
(Sunstein 2002).  
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Others who study the effects that social identity can exert on political decision-
making note that rather than assuming that social categories are independent entities that act 
alone to shape the choices that individuals make, it is important to recognize that these 
categories (e.g., race or ethnicity, gender, and class) “intersect” and “interact” to form 
different meanings and experiences for individuals that cannot be explained by each identity 
on its own (Warner 2008: 454; Shields 2008; Purdie-Vaughns and Eibach 2008; Hancock 
2007; Crenshaw 1994). The academic study of “dueling” identities and their influence on 
political judgments produces an artificial choice dichotomy (Hancock 2007; Crenshaw 
1994). Examinations of personal narratives support the notion that identities are not discrete 
entities (Bowleg 2008). Take, for example, Maya Rupert, an African American woman who 
was asked to discuss how her sense of identity influenced her decision about whether she 
would support Barack Obama or Hilary Clinton in the democratic presidential primary race 
in 2007. She stated that her “dual identities” as an African American and a woman could 
produce some psychic conflict. But, she also urged the public to acknowledge that the 
decision for whom to vote for is not solely a “symbolic” choice. She states, 
…of course identity doesn’t work like that. Women of color are not “women who 
happen to be racial minorities” and we’re not “racial minorities who also happen to be 
female.” We’re women of color. And both of those identities inform our decisions, 
along with many other identities we happen to embrace…Dividing the issue…[forces] 
an artificial ranking of identities in which no one wants to engage (Rupert 2007: E-3, 
emphasis added). 
 
When we think of organized identity groups as “coalitions” (e.g., reconceptualize “race” as a 
coalition of “men” and “women” or as a coalition of members of the working, middle, and 
upper classes) we recognize that the intersection of these different group identities creates 
unique perspectives on political issues (Bowleg 2008; Warner 2008). 
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Thus, while individuals may often have multiple, conflicting identities, this state may 
not necessarily lead to attitudinal ambivalence. While some individuals may experience 
attitudinal ambivalence as a result of these competing identities, others may not. For 
example, if some people evaluate multiple social groups positively and perceive those groups 
to be of roughly equal status, then competing cues regarding political issues taken from those 
groups may lead them to experience attitudinal ambivalence. But this may not always be the 
case. Some may be able to rank the relative salience of one identity group cue over another, 
while others may use their collective identities to formulate a unique and strongly held 
viewpoint. Simply focusing on the affective evaluations of multiple social identity groups 
and their potential for causing psychological conflict in considerations does not provide us 
with information regarding what makes someone systematically less able to rank the relative 
salience of ideologically inconsistent social reference groups.   
 
Drawing Connections 
 The three explanations outlined above provide us with plausible accounts of the 
conditions under which individuals may experience attitudinal ambivalence. These accounts 
share the common premise that attitudinal ambivalence is likely to occur only when the 
potential for conflict in considerations exists in a person’s choice set—whether that be in the 
inherently conflicting nature of the values that structure the political decision in question, or 
in the social setting in which the choice is made. But while valuable and logical, each of the 
explanations is also lacking. More specifically, the three overarching accounts address the 
value bases and environmental factors that contribute to the experience of political 
ambivalence. But, they fail to provide us with a satisfying psychological explanation for why, 
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all else constant, some individuals are more likely than others to consider and place value on 
the merits of two competing sides of a debate and experience political ambivalence as a 
result.   
Each of the approaches leads us to ponder the following question: Are we 
overlooking systematic differences among individuals when we try to identify those who will 
be most likely to experience attitudinal ambivalence toward a political object, such as a 
policy or candidate? I contend that the answer is yes, and in this dissertation, I provide a 
personality trait explanation for why some citizens are more likely to entertain competing 
considerations and experience attitudinal ambivalence than otherwise similar individuals. In 
doing so, I apply McCrae and Costa’s (1996, 1997, 2003, 2008) Five Factor Model of 
Personality to the study of ambivalence, and contend that broad, non-conditional dimensions 
of personality, in combination with environmental factors and values, contribute to the 
experience of this attitudinal state.  
In the chapters that follow, I apply this framework of personality structure to the 
study of attitudinal ambivalence. Systematic research on the structure of human personality 
within the field of personality psychology over the past forty years strongly suggests that it 
can be broken down into five basic traits: Openness to Experience, Conscientiousness, 
Extraversion, Agreeableness, and Neuroticism (Digman 1990; Pervin 1996; McCrae and 
Costa 2008, 2003, 1997, 1996; Mondak 2010; Mondak et al. 2010; John, Naumann, and Soto 
2008; John and Srivastava 1999; Gerber et al. 2010, 2011). This framework consists of 
personality traits that are “nonpolitical” in nature, though it has been employed in studies of 
partisanship and political behavior in Italy, Germany, and most recently in the United States 
(Digman 1990; Schoen and Schumann 2007; Caprera et al. 2006; Mondak and Halperin 
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2008; Mondak 2010; Mondak et al. 2010; Gerber et al. 2010, 2011; Hibbing, Ritchie, and 
Anderson 2011). By considering the direct effects that personality traits have on attitudinal 
ambivalence, I will supplement existing causal explanations and formulate a more complete 
understanding of this phenomenon. 
 
Personality and Political Science Research 
Before I present my theory and hypotheses on the personality trait antecedents of 
attitudinal ambivalence, it is useful to examine the model of trait structure that I employ, as 
well as some of the key findings of how personality traits influence political behavior and 
attitudes. On a daily basis, we come into contact with others whom we may perceive to be 
patient, social, tolerant of ambiguity, and/or intellectually curious. We also come into contact 
with people we would describe as being generally nervous across social settings, quick to 
make judgments, and relatively intolerant of ambiguity. Research in personality psychology 
suggests that these individual differences, which are known as personality traits, “provide 
coherence and continuity in behavioral [and thought] patterns across different settings” in our 
everyday lives (Caprara and Zimbardo 2004: 582).  They also “create, foster, and preserve a 
sense of personal identity” (582; see also, McCrae and Costa 2008, 2003, 1996).5 They are 
“enduring dispositions” and help us to describe “what people are like” (Roccas et al. 2002).6
                                                            
5Similarly, McCrae and Costa (1995) define personality traits as “dimensions of individuals in tendencies to 
show consistent patterns of thought, feeling, and action.”  
 
If we can come to understand better the psychological tendencies of individuals, we should 
 
6Thus, traits are different from another important type of construct that we study in political science—values. 
Roccas et al (2002) define values as cognitive representations of desirable, abstract goals. 
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be better able to predict their attitudes and behaviors (Mondak 2010; Mondak et al. 2010; 
Gerber et al. 2010, 2011; McCrae and Costa 1996; Hibbing, Ritchie, and Anderson 2011). 
Importantly for political science research, personality traits exert significant effects 
on political attitudes and behavior (Mondak et al. 2010; Mondak 2010; Gerber et al. 2010, 
2011; Hibbing, Ritchie, and Anderson 2011; Mondak and Halperin 2008: 335; see also 
Adorno et al. 1950; Altmeyer 1987, 1996, 1998; Ekehammar et al. 2004; McFarland 1998; 
Feldman and Stenner 1997; Sidanius and Pratto 1999; Sidanius, Pratto, and Bobo 1994; 
Pratto et al. 1994).  In political psychology, we can find numerous examples where scholars 
use personality traits to explain the actions and judgments of political leaders (Winter 1987, 
2004; Barber 1977, 1988, 1992; Choiniere and Kiersey 1992; Post 1993). Political 
psychologists have also published studies examining the connection between personality 
traits and political tolerance, authoritarianism, social dominance, and political ideology 
(Gerber et al. 2010; Adorno et al. 1950; Stenner 2005; Altmeyer 1987, 1996, 1998; Feldman 
and Stenner 1997; Sidanius and Pratto 1999; Pratto et al. 1994; Ekehammar et al. 2004; 
McFarland 1998; McClosky 1964). But even though there has been an increase in interest in 
such topics and evidence of significant political implications, political scientists continue to 
be unlikely to employ personality traits as variables in their analyses of the general political 
attitudes and behaviors of members of the mass American electorate (Mondak 2010; Mondak 
et al. 2010; Mondak and Halperin 2008; Gerber et al. 2010, 2011; Hibbing, Ritchie, and 
Anderson 2011). Why is this the case? 
 The relative lack of personality research in political science does not mean that 
studying traits is unimportant for gathering a more complete understanding of political 
behavior and attitudes (Mondak et al. 2010; Mondak 2010; Mondak and Halperin 2008). 
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Instead, the lack of research focusing on personality traits and political science research 
stems from a number of other factors. First, and perhaps most importantly, political scientists 
prefer to use large-scale (“big N”) surveys to explain political attitudes and voting behavior. 
There is great appeal in generalizing findings across samples that are representative of the 
American electorate. However, utilizing these surveys as a primary data source for 
explaining political attitudes and behavior comes at a cost. More often than not, personality 
inventories are too long to be included on these instruments (Mondak et al. 2010; Gosling, 
Renfrow, and Swann 2003). Thus, while appealing, using these surveys may lead researchers 
to fall victim to the “law of the instrument” (Kinder and Palfrey 1992), wherein data 
collection and measurement drives theorizing. That is, researchers tend to neglect studying 
interesting and plausible research questions since data on the personality traits of members of 
the general electorate may not be readily available.7
Second, when we think of how personality may affect political behavior and attitudes, 
there are a large number of potentially applicable personality traits. This has led some 
scholars to “pick and choose” traits that could perhaps be of most interest to the phenomena 
they wish to explain (Mondak 2010; Mondak and Halperin 2008). For example, among those 
who do attempt to use personality traits to more completely understand the political attitudes 
and behavior of members of the general public, their works tend to focus on a very limited 
number of personality characteristics (such as the Need for Cognition, Self Esteem, Social 
Dominance Orientation, or Right Wing Authoritarianism) rather than on traits that have been 
demonstrated to be part of a comprehensive model of personality structure (Sniderman 1975; 
  
                                                            
7These surveys are expensive, and time is of the essence when collecting data. Therefore, extensive personality 
trait inventories are not included on the survey instruments, and as a result, we are left with large-N datasets that 
do not provide us with any information regarding the personality traits of members of the electorate. 
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Thompson and Zanna 1995; Mondak and Halperin 2008; Mondak 2010). This is especially 
evident in research that focuses on the role(s) that particular personality factors, such as 
Social Dominance Orientation (SDO) or Right Wing Authoritarianism (RWA), play in 
explaining deviant, undesirable, or negative behaviors like political intolerance or prejudice 
toward social groups (see, for example, Altmeyer 1997, 1998; Pratto et al. 1994; Akrami and 
Ekehammar 2006; Ekehammar and Akrami 2007; Ekehammar et al. 2004; McFarland 1998). 
While these personality factors are powerful predictors, a focus on select factors or 
traits has led some to argue that the study of personality and politics is a field with a “jerry 
built appearance” (Sniderman 1975; quoted in Mondak and Halperin 2008; Mondak 2010). 
But from a more practical standpoint, the approach of picking and choosing only some 
personality traits for study—while simultaneously ignoring others that could be important—
limits our understanding of how traits can influence political attitudes and behavior, because 
it is difficult or impossible to generalize findings both within the broad field of political 
behavior and across different academic disciplines as well (Mondak 2010; Mondak and 
Halperin 2008).   
 
Personality Structure and the Application of the Five Factor Model of Personality 
 While personality psychologists largely agree that traits are important to study, the 
quest to identify, in a systematic manner, a useful taxonomy of traits to apply to studies of 
behavior and attitudes has been ongoing since the 1930s (Digman 1996, 1990). Over the 
course of the past two decades, however, the field of personality psychology has largely 
reached a consensus on a framework for studying the composition of human personality 
(Digman 1996, 1990; Pervin 1996; Gosling, Renfrow, and Swann 2003; John, Naumann, and 
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Soto 2008; Mondak 2010; Mondak and Halperin 2008; Mondak et al. 2010; Gerber et al. 
2010). Since the 1990s, the leading approach to studying the effects that personality has on 
behavior and attitudes has been the trait-based approach (Schoen and Schumann 2007).8
A relatively “new” conceptual framework for studying the effects that personality 
traits have on individual behavior and attitudes emerged in the 1980s, and is called the “Big 
Five” or Five Factor Model (FFM) of personality (Digman 1996: 1; McCrae and Costa 1987, 
1996, 1997, 2003, 2008; Goldberg 1993; Wiggins 1996; Wiggins and Trapnell 1997). Over 
2,000 articles that use this model of personality structure have been published (John, 
Naumann, and Soto 2008; John and Srivastava 1999). This framework for studying 
personality traits has a long history and might actually be a “rediscovery” (Digman 1996: 
12). In his Presidential Address at the American Psychological Association meeting in 1933, 
Thurstone discussed a factor analysis that he conducted on 60 adjectives that were used by 
his subjects to rate acquaintances, and noted that “it is of considerable psychological interest 
to know that the whole list of [60] adjectives can be accounted for by postulating only five 
 The 
underlying premise of this research is the idea that behaviors and attitudes that appear to be 
random in specific settings are actually quite systematic if similar behaviors and/or attitudes 
are studied across different domains or contexts (Thompson and Zanna 1995; McCrae and 
Costa 1982, 1995, 1996, 1997, 2003, 2006, 2008). Enduring individual dispositions, or 
personality traits, underlie those systematic patterns of behavior and attitudes (Gerber et al. 
2010; McCrae and Costa 1996). 
                                                            
8This agreement follows the “skepticism” of the 1960s, in which behaviorists dismissed the importance of traits 
and argued for psychologists to focus on the more “objective” task of counting responses to stimuli. Others 
questioned the importance of studying traits and argued that they were “figments of observers’ imaginations” 
with “little practical value in the real world of behavior prediction and management” (Digman 1996: 12).  This 
skepticism has since been dismissed by most scholars in the field of personality psychology (Digman 1996; 
Schoen and Schumann 2007). 
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independent common factors” (quoted in Digman 1996: 1). A few years later, Allport and 
Odbert (1936) examined all adjectives found in the dictionary to identify the language 
markers that individuals use to identify personality traits. Using the traits identified by 
Allport and Odbert, Cattell then conducted three separate factor analytic studies of bipolar 
ratings scales in the 1940s, and he identified 16 primary factors (De Raad 2000; Digman 
1996). Scholars have since reexamined Cattell’s work and have been unable to replicate the 
16 factor findings. Instead, they find robust evidence for a five factor structure for human 
personality traits (Tupes 1957; Tupes and Christal 1992; Norman 1963; Borgatta 1964; 
Eysenck 1970; Guilford 1975; Goldberg 1993, 1992, 2006; McCrae and Costa 2008, 2006, 
2003, 1997, 1996, 1987). 
Five common personality traits have repeatedly emerged across different studies 
conducted over time (refer to footnote 8, or see Digman 1996; John, Naumann, and Soto 
2008; John and Srivastava 1999; Wiggins and Trapnell 1997; McCrae and Costa 1996, 2006, 
2008; Goldberg 1992, 1993; Tupes and Christal 1992). This “Big Five” framework or FFM 
provides an encompassing taxonomy that serves to organize the myriad trait concepts (or 
adjectives) examined in past research into a single classification framework (John and 
Srivastava 1999; Mondak and Halperin 2008; Mondak 2010; McCrae and Costa 1996; 
Caprara and Zimbardo 2004). In this framework, traits are viewed as “dimensions of 
individuals in tendencies to show consistent patterns of thought, feeling, and action” 
(McCrae and Costa 1995). They have been shown to have some basis in genetics and are 
quite stable over the course of the life cycle (Bouchard 1997; Van Gestel and Van 
Broeckhoven 2003; Costa and McCrae 1988, 2006; McCrae and Costa 2003, 1996; 1982; 
Gosling, Renfrow, and Swann 2003; Mondak 2010). As such, these core, or dispositional, 
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traits are theorized to be “causally prior” to characteristic adaptations and previously formed 
attitudes and behaviors (McCrae and Costa 1996; Gerber et al. 2011: 113). The five 
personality factors that have materialized are Agreeableness, Conscientiousness, 
Extraversion, Neuroticism, and Openness to Experience.9
Those who are high in the trait of Agreeableness tend to be more “trusting,” 
“empathetic,” and “sensitive,” while those who are low on this trait are more “suspicious” 
and “demanding” (Caprara et al. 2006; Mondak and Halperin 2008; John and Srivastava 
1999). Individuals who are Conscientious like to avoid uncertainty, and tend to be 
“dependable,” “responsible,” “organized,” and “resourceful;” those who are low on this trait 
are marked by impulsiveness, impatience, and carelessness (John and Srivastava 1999; 
Mondak and Halperin 2008). Extraverts are described as “assertive,” “talkative,” “warm,” 
“outgoing,” and “energetic,” while those low on this trait dimension (i.e., introverts) tend to 
be more reserved or shy in social situations (Mondak and Halperin 2008; McCrae and Costa 
1996; John and Srivastava 1999). Those who score high on the Neuroticism trait tend to be 
more “anxious,” “depressed,” and self conscious, while others who score low on this trait are 
typically more positive in their outlooks, “calm,” and relaxed across different settings 
(McCrae and Costa 1996; John and Srivastava 1999). Finally, those who are high on the 
Openness to Experience trait appreciate diversity, and they are inquisitive and imaginative; 
   
                                                            
9Personality psychologists often use an acronym (OCEAN or CANOE) to represent the five factors. “N” stands 
for Neuroticism or Emotional Instability. That factor title unfortunately conveys some negative, normative 
connotations to some people. Many of the personality studies also use “loaded” or judgmental adjectives to 
describe the other four factors as well. Some might even argue that the labels are either too broad or too 
restrictive to be appropriate labels of the five broad personality dimensions.  However, to keep in line with 
current research on the FFM in both political science and psychology, and to avoid confusion in the application 
of the model and the interpretation of the findings across disciplines, I will employ similar language in my 
description of the traits. However, in this dissertation, I will not make any claims about whether it is “better” or 
“worse” to possess high levels of certain traits over others. In addition, when measuring these traits in my 




those low on this trait are typically described as more “cautious” in their actions and 
“conventional” or “dogmatic” in their beliefs (Mondak and Halperin 2008; Gerber et al. 
2011). 
The “Big Five” framework of personality structure, or Five Factor Model (FFM), 
draws on two different approaches—lexical and conceptual—to determine which personality 
traits are relevant for study, but both lines of work reach very similar conclusions (Saucier 
and Goldberg 1996; Costa and McCrae 1996; Mondak 2010; Goldberg 1990). The lexical 
approach contends that all the personality traits that are important in personal relationships 
will be represented in language (Saucier and Goldberg 1996; Gerber et al. 2010; John and 
Srivastava 1999).  Accordingly, since personality differences can be captured by language, 
indicators of personality traits can be created through the use of associated adjective markers 
(Mondak et al. 2010; Goldberg 1992). Questions designed to measure the traits of interest 
may use a semantic differential or unipolar response format in which individuals rate how 
closely an adjective describes them (Barbaranelli et al. 2007; Mondak 2010; Goldberg 1992, 
1993). Alternatively, the conceptual approach uses theory about the distinctiveness of 
personality traits to create questionnaires to measure them (McCrae and Costa 2008, 2006, 
2003, 1996; Costa and McCrae 1992). These questionnaires consist of a series of phrases that 
describe a wide array of behaviors. Such personality inventories, like the proprietary NEO-
PI-R, International Personality Item Pool (IPIP) scales, or other publicly available inventories 
designed to measure the “Big Five” factors (Costa and McCrae 1992; Goldberg et al. 2006; 
Goldberg 1992, 1993) are administered to samples of respondents who rate how well the 
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statement fits them. Then, their answers are factor analyzed.10 With both approaches, five 
common factors emerge. Furthermore, the five factors appear to include the major 
dimensions of personality measured in most independent personality scales, across different 
response formats (e.g., observer ratings and self report) and different cultures (Costa and 




While the Five Factor Model or “Big Five” framework is generally accepted as an 
encompassing taxonomy that can organize personality research, its application to research in 
political science has been quite limited, and until very recently was largely ignored in the 
study of political behavior and attitude formation in the American political context (Gerber et 
Application of the Five Factor Model to Political Science and Public Opinion Research 
                                                            
10The proprietary NEO-PI (revised) was originally created by Costa and McCrae to measure the five factors of 
personality structure. The long version consists of 240 balanced questions designed to describe behavior with 
the purpose of measuring the five personality dimensions. There are two possible response formats: self report 
and observer report and both take approximately thirty to forty minutes to administer to participants. There is 
also a shorter, sixty item, instrument called the NEO-FFI designed to measure the five domains when time is a 
factor in gathering data. Given the renewed interest in personality studies, scholars recognize the need to 
develop valid and reliable personality inventories of varying lengths that can be made accessible to researchers 
to facilitate the incorporation of personality traits into their questionnaires (Goldberg 1992). Multiple “Big 
Five” inventories and response formats are now used, including those that ask respondents to rate how well a set 
of statements describes them (Goldberg 1993; Costa and McCrae (1992)), univocal adjective scales (Goldberg 
1992), and biopolar scales (Mondak et al. 2010).  No one response scale is “better” than another.  Rather, 
researchers who are interested in studying the effects of the five broad traits and who face the task of choosing 
amongst alternative sets of Big-Five markers “must decide between markers based on a reasonably 
representative sampling of variables and those that provide roughly equal coverage of each of the Big Five 
domains” (39). Researchers will also “face the inevitable compromises between increasing reliability by using 
larger marker sets and decreasing subject testing time by using smaller sets” (Goldberg 1992: 39). 
 
11The five factors encapsulate key traits measured in other major personality questionnaires like the Myers-
Briggs Personality Inventory, Wiggin’s Circumplex, and the California Q-Set, among others. For a 
comprehensive list of the personality instruments that converge with the five-factor/”Big Five” model of 
personality, see McCrae and Costa (1996: 63).  Individual personality constructs employed in other works also 
correlate quite highly with the five factors (e.g., Openness is negatively correlated with Authoritarianism) (see 
McCrae, Costa, and Busch 1986; McCrae and Costa 1989a; McCrae and Costa 1988b; Harvey, Murry, and 
Markham 1995). These factors have been subjected to cross-cultural validation (see, McCrae and Allik 2002; 
McCrae and Costa 2006). Furthermore, the same findings in these studies hold for both self report and expert 
rating response formats (McCrae and Costa 1987, 1982). 
37 
 
al. 2010, 2011; Mondak and Halperin 2008; Mondak 2010; Mondak et al. 2010; Carney et al. 
2008). To be sure, some scholars have focused on the relationship between personality traits 
and partisan support. For example, in their study of voters in Germany, Schoen and 
Schumann (2007) investigate how personality traits influence voter attitudes and vote choice 
at the polls. They rely on the “attraction paradigm”—that an individual will hold a more 
positive opinion of a stranger (or political party representative) when that person thinks the 
stranger is like him/herself—as a basis for their theory (475). They find that voters who are 
higher in the Openness trait are more likely to support parties that endorse social liberalism, 
and voters high on the Neuroticism trait support parties that purport to guard “against 
material and cultural challenges” (492). Finally, those who are high on Agreeableness and 
voters who are low in Conscientiousness are more likely to support parties that subscribe to 
economic or social liberalism. Similarly, in their analysis of Italian voters, Caprara et al. 
(2006) found that center left voters scored higher than center right voters on the traits of 
Friendliness (Agreeableness) and Openness. Center left voters also scored lower on 
Extraversion and Conscientiousness than center right voters. 
In the context of American politics, Mondak and Halperin (2008) employed the “Big 
Five” personality framework to examine the direct effects of personality traits on a wide 
variety of variables of interest to the study of American political behavior and attitudes. 
Using two telephone surveys, and a “paper and pencil” survey conducted between 1998 and 
2005, they take a first glance at the effects Openness, Conscientiousness, Extraversion, 
Agreeableness, and Neuroticism on a laundry list of familiar dependent variables such as 
partisanship, ideology, presidential approval, trust in government, political discussion, and 
political knowledge. The “Big Five” were measured with a 10-item trait inventory that the 
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authors developed. No personality trait consistently influenced every political behavior and 
attitude variable, but they did find significant evidence of trait effects across each of the 
dependent variables, and argue that more attention should be paid to studying the effect(s) of 
personality traits on political behavior.   
Mondak and Halperin’s (2008) study was largely exploratory in nature and helped to 
lay the groundwork for new, theory-driven research that investigates how the “Big Five” 
personality traits influence American political behavior and attitudes. Using a 10-item 
personality inventory on the 2006 Congressional Elections Survey that they devised, Mondak 
et al. (2010) conducted a more focused analysis in which they examined the relationship 
between personality traits and civic engagement. They found that the traits of Extraversion 
and Openness exerted strong and positive effects on indicators of political engagement (e.g., 
contact with a House/Senate member in the past two years; attendance at a public meeting 
with a House/Senate member in the past two years; work for a party or candidate). 
Conscientiousness, however, was negatively associated with the majority of political 
engagement indicators.   
In another recent study, Gerber et al. (2010) used data from the 2007-2008 
Cooperative Campaign Analysis Project, an internet-based survey, to examine how 
personality traits influence attitudes toward economic policies (i.e., role of government in 
health care and support for raising taxes), social policies (i.e., abortion and support for civil 
unions), and ideology. The authors used the Ten-Item Personality Inventory (Gosling, 
Renfrow, and Swann 2003) to measure the “Big Five” traits. Overall, they found that 
Conscientiousness was associated with conservative attitudes in economic and social policy 
areas. Openness was associated with liberal attitudes in economic and social policy areas. 
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Agreeableness was associated with liberal economic attitudes and conservative social 
attitudes, and Emotional Stability was associated with economic conservativism. Importantly, 
the magnitude of the effect sizes of Conscientiousness and Openness were similar to other 
predictors such as income and education. 
In their most recent work, Gerber et al. (2011) used data from the 2007-2008 
Cooperative Campaign Analysis Project and a telephone survey of a random sample of 1,800 
Connecticut residents conducted in 2008 to demonstrate that personality traits significantly 
influence different measures of political participation. They found that Extraversion and 
Emotional Stability were positively associated with voter turnout.  Emotional Stability was 
also positively associated with donating money to candidates. Conscientiousness and 
Agreeableness were negatively associated with voter turnout, although the effect for 
Agreeableness was not significant in the sample of Connecticut voters. Openness did not 
exert a statistically significant effect on political participation. Once again, they found that 
the effects of two traits in particular—Extraversion and Emotional Stability—were 
comparable to income and education. 
Personality traits significantly improve our ability to predict and understand political 
attitudes and behavior. When the traits are examined individually, empirical evidence 
suggests that they exert systematic and significant direct effects on a wide variety of political 
variables of interest. Scholars are just beginning to “view personality within the broader 
context of the various forces that combine to influence political behavior” (Mondak et al. 
2010: 87; Gerber et al. 2010, 2011; Hibbing, Ritchie, and Anderson 2011). The idea 
motivating this research is that personality traits may affect political behavior and attitudes 
differently depending upon contextual or situational factors (Mondak et al. 2010; see also 
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Gerber et el. 2010).  
Personality traits may interact with a multitude of situational factors to influence 
political attitudes and behaviors. Mondak et al. (2010) and Gerber et al. (2010) take a first cut 
look at possible interactions to demonstrate how the effects of traits may vary across 
situations or contexts. For example, Mondak et al. (2010) interact Conscientiousness with 
perceived importance of political involvement and find that when political involvement is 
viewed as important, those who are high on this trait are more likely to get involved in 
politics; but when political involvement is viewed as unimportant, those who are 
Conscientious are hesitant to participate politically (97). In their examination of the effects of 
Openness on political engagement, they find that 40% of the effect of this trait on political 
engagement is mediated by political knowledge and internal efficacy; internal efficacy and 
political knowledge exert a positive impact on political engagement. The authors also 
question the notion that as network size increases, exposure to diverse viewpoints increases. 
They contend that personality traits, particularly Extraversion and Agreeableness, moderate 
the impact of network size on exposure to cross-cutting viewpoints.   
Gerber et al. (2010) also explore how personality trait effects vary across contexts. 
They argue that race acts as a context that conditions the influence of personality traits. They 
find that among whites, Conscientiousness is more strongly associated with conservativism 
than it is among blacks. Openness is also more strongly associated with liberalism among 
whites than it is among blacks. Finally, blacks who score high on the Extraversion trait are 
more economically liberal while whites who score high on this trait are more economically 
conservative. They conclude by suggesting that the findings show that the relationships 
between personality traits and attitudes are likely to be affected by features of the political  
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environment, and that more research should be conducted in this area. 
While interactions between traits and situational variables are important to study, it is 
also likely that traits interact as well. This possibility has not been explored by personality 
psychologists who employ the five factor model of personality structure in their research. 
Organizational psychologists have entertained this possibility, though. These scholars tend to 
limit their focus to the interaction between Extraversion and Neuroticism, and find support 
for the idea that the “best” or most productive workers in organizations tend to be those who 
are more extraverted and emotionally stable (i.e., content, social, and devoid of anxiety) 
(Judge and Erez 2007). Given the recent application of this framework to political science 
and public opinion research, it is not surprising that trait interactions have not yet been 
explored.  
 
Looking Ahead: Remarks 
 In this chapter, I have offered an overview of past theories that provide researchers 
with valuable insights about the origins of ambivalence. While published literature on the 
root causes of political ambivalence is rather sparse compared to that which is published on 
its consequences (Craig and Martinez 2005), existing theories suggest that it is plausible that 
citizens may experience this attitudinal state if they use multiple values or cues from 
ideologically inconsistent social groups in their attempt to provide structure to their political 
attitudes (see, for example, Feldman and Zaller 1992; Gainous and Martinez 2005; Alvarez 
and Brehm 1995; Lavine and Steenbergen 2005). Furthermore, information environments 
where diverse viewpoints about political objects are discussed and shared may also provide a 
setting that is more conducive to the development of attitudinal ambivalence than an 
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otherwise similar setting where citizens are only exposed to one-sided political views (Keele 
and Wolak 2008; Lavine 2001; Huckfeldt, Mendez, and Osborn 2004). 
While valuable, these existing theories share one characteristic in common: they 
hinge on the presence of conflicting views in the environments in which individuals make 
decisions. Politics is typically wrought with conflict as citizens and politicians alike offer 
competing opinions and viewpoints on issues or candidates in political discourse. Politicians, 
political parties, and newscasters, among others, often frame discussions of political issues so 
that they may be understood in terms of values such as equality, self reliance or 
individualism, and moral traditionalism, or in terms of positions taken by social groups. But 
while exposure to and awareness of multiple and conflicting viewpoints may be a necessary 
condition for attitudinal ambivalence, it is not a sufficient condition. Put simply, ambivalence 
is not experienced by all individuals who are exposed to competing viewpoints offered in 
their information environments, or by those who take attitudinal or behavioral cues from a 
number of different social reference groups. Similarly, while multiple values may be primed 
in political debates and discussions, not all citizens are unable to order the relative salience of 
values that they may perceive to be relevant to the construction of an evaluation of a political 
object.  
After a review of the literature, one overarching question remains: why is it that some 
individuals become ambivalent toward political objects, while others are able to order the 
importance and salience of considerations and reach a univalent attitude? In the chapters that 
follow, I offer an individual-level theory of the antecedents of ambivalence—that personality 
traits predispose individuals to experience this attitudinal state—and test it across a variety of 
political issues and within different information environments.   
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Using the Five Factor Model (FFM) of personality structure as my theoretical 
framework, I offer a set of hypotheses about the direct effects that the “Big Five” traits of 
Openness to Experience, Conscientiousness, Extraversion, Agreeableness, and Neuroticism 
have on the likelihood that a citizen will experience ambivalence. These traits, with the 
exception of Extraversion, are hypothesized to be significant predictors of ambivalence 
toward political issues, controlling for other explanatory factors. The  hypotheses presented 
will then be tested using two different measures of ambivalence (i.e., subjective and 
objective), two personality inventories (a 50-item IPIP inventory and the Ten-Item 
Personality Inventory), and a number of different political issue domains, including stem cell 
research, the wars in Iraq and Afghanistan, same-sex marriage, and mandatory health 
insurance and health care reform. 
 
 CHAPTER THREE 
THEORY AND HYPOTHESES 
  
In this chapter, I offer an individual-level theory of the antecedents of political 
ambivalence. Using the Five Factor Model (FFM) of personality structure as my theoretical 
framework, I develop a set of hypotheses about the direct effects that the “Big Five” traits of 
Openness to Experience, Conscientiousness, Extraversion, Agreeableness, and Neuroticism 
have on the likelihood that a citizen will experience ambivalence. Simply stated, I contend 
that these core personality traits, in addition to environmental or situational factors, play an 
important role in predisposing individuals to experience political ambivalence.  
 
Personality and Political Attitudes Research 
Political scientists seek to identify the factors that affect the political attitudes of 
individuals in the mass public, and typically, the focus is on explaining the roles that 
demographic variables, values, and various environmental stimuli (e.g., information from 
partisan elites, social groups, discussion partners, the media, etc.) play in shaping those 
attitudes. Research into the personality trait antecedents of those attitudes has been lacking in 
comparison (Mondak et al. 2010; Mondak 2010).  
Due to their roots in inherited genetic differences, early socialization experiences, 
and/or early psychological interventions, personality traits display remarkable resistance
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to external influences and remain quite stable over the course of the life cycle (McCrae and 
Costa 1995, 1996: 68, 1997, 2003, 2008; Costa and McCrae 2006, 1988; Gerber et al. 2010; 
Mondak 2010). These traits are therefore able to afford consistency in thought, feeling, and 
behavior patterns across a variety of settings (Caprara and Zimbardo 2004; Roccas et al. 
2002; McCrae and Costa 2008, 1996, 1995). If we are able to understand better individuals’ 
personality traits, then we should be able to predict their political attitudes and behaviors 
more precisely (Mondak and Halperin 2008; Mondak 2010; Mondak et al. 2010; Gerber et al. 
2010, 2011) 
To be sure, scholars have not ignored personality characteristics entirely; on the 
contrary, they have long recognized that dispositions or traits likely play an important role in 
shaping individual-level attitudes and behaviors. But, the typical focus has been on a limited 
number of personality characteristics (e.g., Need for Cognition, Fear of Personal Invalidity, 
Self Esteem, Social Dominance Orientation, Right Wing Authoritarianism) rather than on a 
broad set of traits shown to be part of a comprehensive model of human personality structure 
(Mondak and Halperin 2008; Mondak 2010; Sniderman 1975; see, for example, Thompson 
and Zanna 1995; Pratto et al. 1994; Sidanius, Pratto, and Bobo 1994; Whitley 1999; 
Ekehammar et al. 2004; Altmeyer 1988, 1996). 
As discussed in Chapter Two, the field of personality psychology has largely reached 
a consensus on a framework for studying human personality (Digman 1990, 1996; Pervin 
1996; John, Naumann, and Soto 2008; John and Srivastava 1999). The FFM, or “Big Five” 
framework, is now generally accepted as a useful taxonomy that can organize personality 
research (John and Srivastava 1999; McCrae and Costa 1996; Mondak and Halperin 2008; 
Mondak et al. 2010; Mondak 2010; Caprara and Zimbardo 2004). But, its application to 
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research in political science—especially the study of political behavior and attitude formation 
in the American context—has been limited (see, for example, Mondak 2010; Mondak et al. 
2010; Gerber et al. 2010, 2011; Mondak and Halperin 2008; Hibbing, Ritchie, and Anderson 
2011).   
 
Theoretical Framework 
In line with current research, I employ McCrae and Costa’s Five Factor Model (FFM) 
of Personality structure as the theoretical framework for my study. The basic framework is 
outlined in Figure 3.1 below. 




Note: Figure adapted from McCrae and Costa (1996: 73) 
 
 
In the work and theory of those who employ the FFM, basic tendencies or 
“dispositional traits” represented by the five factors of personality (Openness to Experience, 
Conscientiousness, Extraversion, Agreeableness, and Neuroticism) and external influences 
such as environmental or situational factors, shape and influence the development of “mid-
level units” (goals, habits, or attitudes) known as characteristic adaptations (McCrae and 
Costa 1996: 72-75; Gerber et al. 2010: 111-112). For example, in recent research, political 
scientists conceptualize economic and social policy attitudes, as well as various behaviors 























Mondak et al. 2010). The characteristic adaptation of concern in this research is political 
ambivalence. Thus, I am conceptualizing of political ambivalence as a function of both basic 
personality traits and external influences. 
To date, much of the research conducted in this area has focused on the external 
influences that lead individuals to experience political ambivalence. These explanations share 
a common premise: attitudinal ambivalence is likely to be high when the potential for 
conflict exists in a person’s choice set, whether that be in the conflicting nature of the values 
that structure the political decision in question, conflicting messages from social groups that 
an individual uses as cues to form political attitudes, or the presence of conflicting 
information made available to citizens in political discussions or in campaign 
environments.12
While valuable, I contend that these existing explanations exclude an important factor 
from the analytical framework that should also be used to understand the antecedents of 
political ambivalence: the “basic tendencies” or personality traits of individuals (McCrae and 
Costa 1996: 73). These broad, non-conditional dimensions of human personality shape the 
way that individuals view, understand, and interact with the political world. It is well known 
that people vary on the basic personality tendencies or core dispositions that shape their 
thoughts, feelings, and actions (McCrae and Costa 1996), and empirical evidence 
demonstrates that these traits exert direct and independent effects on various political 
attitudes and behaviors (Mondak 2010; Mondak et al. 2010; Gerber et al. 2010, 2011; 
Mondak and Halperin 2008; Hibbing, Ritchie, and Anderson 2011). As such, I contend that 
 
                                                            
12To be sure, individual-level factors (e.g., political information/knowledge, age, partisan and/or ideological 
affiliation) have been examined in past studies of ambivalence. These factors are included as control variables 
in my models. 
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these dispositional traits may also predispose individuals to experience attitudinal 
ambivalence toward political issues.   
Therefore, I argue that it is important to consider not only the “external influences” or 
environmental factors and previously formed attitudes when identifying the antecedents of 
political ambivalence, but also the “basic tendencies” or personality traits of individuals that 
may predispose them to experience ambivalence (McCrae and Costa 1996: 73). To reiterate, 
I am conceptualizing of political ambivalence as a function of both basic personality traits 
and environmental or external factors. My theoretical framework (as modified from McCrae 
and Costa 1996) is presented in Figure 3.2 below. 
Figure 3.2. Theoretical Framework Summary 
 
By considering the influence of both personality traits and external influences on 
political ambivalence, I supplement existing accounts of ambivalence and formulate a more 
complete explanation of the antecedents of this type of attitude. 
 
Why the “Big Five?”  
Before moving on to a discussion of how the “Big Five” traits influence the 
likelihood of experiencing ambivalence, it is important to acknowledge that the Five Factor 
Model (FFM) of personality is not the only model of human personality structure that exists 
in the literature. Additionally, those who employ the FFM in their research do not contend 























and Neuroticism are the only personality variables worthy of study (Mondak et al. 2010: 86; 
Mondak 2010; McCrae and Costa 1996).   
Rather, the “Big Five” traits are viewed as “broad domains that organize and 
summarize the vast majority of subsidiary traits” (Mondak et al. 2010: 86; see also Gerber et 
al. 2010; McCrae and Costa 2008, 2003, 1995, 1996; Digman 1996; Saucier and Goldberg 
1996; Hogan 1991; John, Naumann, and Soto 2008; John and Srivastava 1999; Harvey, 
Murry, and Markham 1995). Empirical research shows that there is significant overlap 
between the FFM and other personality trait inventories, including the California Personality 
Inventory, the California Q-set, Right Wing Authoritarianism and Social Dominance 
Orientation scales, Holland’s Vocational Preference Inventory, and Murray’s Needs, among 
others, even though these inventories employ different questions and measures (Akrami and 
Ekehammar 2006; Duriez and Soenens 2006; Ekehammar et al. 2004; Furnham 1996; 
McCrae and Costa 2008, 1996, 1986, 1989a, 1989b; McCrae, Costa, and Busch 1986; 
Harvey, Murry, and Markham 1995). Notably, four of the five traits of the FFM are related to 
the four scales of the well known Myers-Briggs Type Indicator (MBTI) (Harvey, Murry, and 
Markham 1999; McCrae and Costa 1989b; Furnham 1996).  
Due to their use by political psychologists, the Social Dominance Orientation (SDO) 
and Right Wing Authoritarianism (RWA) scales deserve additional attention here. These 
scales have been used frequently in studies examining the links between personality 
characteristics and prejudice or intolerance toward women, lesbians and gays, African 
Americans, and other social groups (Ekehammar et al. 2004; Altmeyer 1998, 1996, 1987; 
McFarland 1998; Pratto et al. 1994). Those who score high on RWA tend to be more likely 
to abide by and value conventional norms; they are submissive to authority figures and have 
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hostile feelings toward individuals that they believe to be norm violators (Altmeyer 1998). 
Others who score high on the Social Dominance Orientation scale are prone to favor 
hierarchical relationships among social groups (Pratto et al. 1994). 
While they are powerful predictors of prejudice and tolerance, the RWA and SDO 
scales are two commonly used examples of personality characteristics employed in political 
psychology studies that do not encompass a comprehensive model of personality structure. 
Furthermore, existing research now questions whether RWA and SDO are really measures of 
personality at all; instead, these studies conclude that RWA and SDO should be viewed as 
ideological attitudes or social evaluations (Sibley and Duckitt 2009; Duckitt et al. 2002; 
Reynolds et al. 2001). In their studies of the overlap among the core “Big Five” traits and 
RWA and SDO, Akrami and Ekehammar (2006) and Ekehammar et al. (2004) find support 
for the argument that RWA and SDO are actually caused by the core “Big Five” traits, and 
subsequently predict prejudice (Akrami and Ekehammar 2006). Nevertheless, scholars have 
studied the correlational relationships between the “Big Five” and the RWA and SDO. High 
SDO is associated with low Agreeableness and low Openness scores, while high RWA is 
associated with low Openness, high Conscientiousness, and high Extraversion scores 
(Akrami and Ekehammar 2006; Duriez and Soenens 2006; Ekehammar et al. 2004). 
Another popular measure of personality structure often used by members of the 
general public, as well as organizational and industrial psychologists, is the Myers-Briggs 
Type Indicator (MBTI). The MBTI measures four dimensions of personality rather than five, 
which include: Introversion-Extraversion (EI); Sensing-Intuition (SI); Judging-Perception 
(JP); and Thinking-Feeling (TF). In terms of dimensional correspondence with the “Big 
Five” traits, empirical examination suggests that the “E” pole of the Introversion-
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Extraversion dimension corresponds to high ratings on Extraversion; the “N” pole of the 
Sensing-Intuition dimension is similar to high scores on Openness to Experience; the “F” 
pole of the Thinking-Feeling dimension corresponds to high ratings on Agreeableness, 
Neuroticism, and Extraversion; and the “J” pole of the Judging-Perception dimension is 
much like Conscientiousness (Harvey, Murry, and Markham 1995; McCrae and Costa 
1989b). But while similarities exist between the MBTI and the FFM, the interpretation of the 
scales of the MBTI differ quite significantly from other trait-based models of personality 
structure. Researchers who employ the MBTI use the responses to items on this inventory to 
classify individuals into one of 16 possible “type” categories based upon their profile of 
dichotomous preference scores (e.g., INTP, ESJF, etc.) (McCrae and Costa 1989b; Harvey, 
Murry, and Markham 1995). Then, the “type” scores that are produced are intended to 
provide bases for inference about how respondents would potentially behave in or react to a 
wide variety of circumstances. 
The MBTI has been criticized heavily for two primary reasons. First, while the type 
categories may be useful for developing predictions of behavior across a wide variety of 
settings, the interpretation of the MBTI “types” as mutually exclusive categories is 
troublesome amidst the evidence that the four dimensions do not have bimodal response 
structures (McCrae and Costa 1989b; Harvey, Murry, and Markham 1995). Since a bimodal 
response structure does not exist, responses would be more accurately interpreted in terms of 
continuous preferences ranging from higher to lower scores on each of the dimensions 
presented above—much like the interpretation of the “Big Five” traits (McCrae and Costa 
1989b). Second, and more importantly for my own theory, the MBTI excludes Neuroticism 
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(Emotional Stability) entirely from its conception and measurement of the 16 categorical 
personality types (McCrae and Costa 1989b; Harvey, Murry, and Markham 1995).  
Interestingly, this exclusion is not based on a theory that this personality dimension is 
insignificant. The MBTI actually includes 95 items that typically are “unscored” when 
researchers create “type” scales; when a number of these items are scored and factor 
analyzed (e.g., “obsessive worrying,” “pronounced mood swings,” etc.) they form a unique 
fifth dimension that is similar to Neuroticism (Harvey, Murry, and Markham 1995). One of 
the goals of the MBTI was to avoid measuring dimensions of personality that could be 
perceived as “undesirable;” however, this leads researchers to ignore a separate personality 
dimension covering emotional well-being (Harvey, Murry, and Markham 1999)—a 
dimension that has been deemed as independent and significant by personality psychologists 
since the 1930s (see, for example, Thurstone 1934; Cattell 1946; Guilford and Guilford 1936, 
1939a, 1939b).  
The FFM of personality structure has been the dominant taxonomy in trait research in 
the literature on personality psychology over the last twenty years (John, Naumann, and Soto 
2008; John and Srivastava 1999; Mondak et al. 2010; Mondak 2010; Mondak and Halperin 
2008; Digman 1996; Saucier and Goldberg 1996; McCrae and Costa 2008, 2003, 1996; 
Harvey, Murry, and Markham 1995). It has been shown to be robust across different types of 
samples, raters, and questionnaire-types (McCrae and Costa 2008, 2006, 2003, 1995, 1997, 
1996, 1987, 1982; McCrae and Allik 2002; John, Naumann, and Soto 2008; John and 
Srivastava 1999; Goldberg 1993). Given the comprehensiveness of the model, its overlap 
with other widely used personality inventories, and the evidence suggesting that the “Big 
Five” traits are predictive of attitudes and behaviors in general (McCrae and Costa 2008, 
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2003, 1996), there is substantial reason to believe that these traits influence citizens’ political 
behaviors and attitudes (Gerber et al. 2010, 2011; Hibbing, Ritchie, and Anderson 2011; 
Mondak 2010; Mondak et al. 2010; Mondak and Halperin 2008). Thus, I have chosen to 
employ this theoretical framework in my dissertation research. My hypotheses for how the 
“Big Five” traits are expected to influence the experience of ambivalence about political 
issues are presented in the sections that follow. 
 
Hypotheses 
High Openness to Experience is positively associated with high attitudinal ambivalence. 
Hypothesis 1: Openness to Experience 
 Those who are high on the trait of Openness to Experience tend to be more 
“analytical,” “tolerant of diversity,” “curious,” and “imaginative” (De Raad 2000: 73; Gerber 
et al. 2010, 2011; Mondak et al. 2010; Mondak and Halperin 2008). They engage in political 
discussions frequently, are opinionated and knowledgeable about political issues, and are 
significantly more flexible in their political views when compared to individuals who are low 
on this trait (Mondak and Halperin 2008). Those who are low on this trait prefer simple 
solutions and are more “dogmatic” in their views (De Raad 2000; Mondak and Halperin 
2008). Therefore, they may be less likely to entertain competing considerations when making 
political judgments. Thus, I expect a high score on the Openness to Experience trait to be 
positively associated with the likelihood of experiencing attitudinal ambivalence. 
Conversely, I expect that a low score on the Openness to Experience trait will be negatively 




High Conscientiousness is negatively associated with high attitudinal ambivalence. 
Hypothesis 2: Conscientiousness 
 Those who are high in Conscientiousness prefer to avoid uncertainty, while those 
who are low in this trait are more comfortable with ambiguity. Compared to individuals who 
score low on this trait, those who score high tend to be more “responsible,” “dependable,” 
“organized,” and “persistent;” they are also are more likely to think before acting and have a 
strong tendency to follow social rules and norms (McCrae and Costa 2008, 1996; John and 
Srivastava 1999; Gerber et al. 2010, 2011; Harvey, Murry, and Markham 1995).  Survey 
evidence suggests that individuals who score high on this trait tend to be significantly more 
“conservative” and “dogmatic” than those who are low on this trait; they also tend to know 
comparatively less about politics and voice fewer opinions in political discussions when 
compared to those who score lower on Conscientiousness (Mondak et al. 2010; Mondak and 
Halperin 2008: 353-354). It follows that while individuals who are high in Conscientiousness 
may be likely to engage in political discussions with others, this interaction may not 
necessarily lead them to entertain multiple, or conflicting, views on issues that may lead to 
ambivalence. Since they tend to prefer certainty and consistency to uncertainty, I expect that 
they will be more rigid and uncompromising in their attitudes, and therefore will be less 
likely to be ambivalent than a similar individual who does not score high on this trait. Those 
who are low in Conscientiousness tend to be more spontaneous and indecisive (De Raad 
2000). Since they do not share the same desire to be definitive and resolute in their decisions, 
I expect that they will be comparatively more likely to entertain competing considerations 
when it comes to evaluating their position(s) on political issues, and, therefore, more likely to 
experience ambivalence as a result. 
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High Agreeableness is negatively associated with high ambivalence.  
Hypothesis 3: Agreeableness 
 I hypothesize that those who are high in Agreeableness will be significantly less 
likely to be ambivalent than those who are low in Agreeableness. Past research suggests that 
agreeable persons tend to be less likely to engage in political discussions than individuals 
who are low on this trait; they also appear to be less opinionated, more “trusting” of others, 
and not particularly tied to an ideological orientation (Mondak and Halperin 2008; Gosling, 
Renfrow, and Swann 2003). While these individuals may attend political events on occasion 
(Mondak and Halperin 2008), they may not entertain competing considerations about 
political issues and candidates so that they can better “fit in” with those around them. On the 
other hand, personality psychologists (John and Srivastava 1999; McCrae and Costa 1996) 
contend that those who are low in this trait are more “suspicious,” “argumentative,” and 
“demanding,” and need less social validation of their opinions and judgments when 
compared to those who are high on Agreeableness. Given these tendencies, those who are 
low in Agreeableness may desire to hear both sides of arguments and may hold competing 
considerations when faced with making a judgment of whether or not to support a political 
issue. Those who depend less on social validation when it comes to their beliefs may even 
enjoy the experience of ambivalence.  
 
High Neuroticism is positively associated with high ambivalence.  
Hypothesis 4: Neuroticism 
 Those who score low on Neuroticism tend to be more relaxed and calm, and are less 
likely to engage in political discussion with others. Individuals who score high on this trait 
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tend to be more “self conscious,” “anxious,” and dissatisfied with their surroundings in 
general (McCrae and Costa 1996). To the extent that this discontent and anxiety encourages 
these individuals to think more carefully about their social allegiances or issue positions, they 
may be more likely to hold conflicting considerations on political issues than otherwise 
similar individuals who are calmer and relaxed (Marcus, Neuman, and MacKuen 2000). 
Likewise, those who are low on this trait tend to be more emotionally stable, undemanding, 
and adapt well to challenging surroundings; they also tend to be more effective at developing 
strategies for dealing with stressful situations (De Raad 2000; McCrae and Costa 1996). To 
the extent that entertaining competing considerations is an uncomfortable psychological 
state, those who score low on Neuroticism may be better equipped at resolving the 
ambivalence they experience toward a political object than those who are more self 
conscious and anxious about making poor decisions. 
 
There is no relationship between Extraversion and ambivalence. 
Hypothesis 5: Extraversion 
 I have no clear expectation about how this trait will directly relate to ambivalence.  
Instead, I entertain competing theoretical expectations. First, since an individual who scores 
high on the Extraversion trait tends to be more “assertive” and likely to experience positive 
emotions than a person who is low on this trait (McCrae and Costa 1996; Gerber et al. 2010), 
those who score high on this trait may be less likely to experience ambivalence than 
individuals who are more introverted. Past research has shown that positive affect does not 
necessarily encourage citizens to carefully consider, much less reconsider, current attitudes 
when they are faced with multiple points of view on political issues; instead, the experience 
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of positive emotions such as enthusiasm is associated with an increase in the likelihood to 
rely on learned habits when making judgments (Marcus, Neuman, and MacKuen 2000, 
Brader 2005). Individuals who are more introverted tend to possess more political knowledge 
compared to those who are more extraverted; therefore, they may possess more knowledge of 
multiple viewpoints on political matters (Mondak and Halperin 2008: 329). For introverts, 
though, the simple acquisition of political knowledge does not necessarily imply that the 
person will value both sides of a political debate and be more likely to experience 
ambivalence as a consequence.  
 Alternatively, those who are extraverted tend to enjoy socializing with others more 
than introverted individuals do (McCrae and Costa 1996; Gerber et al. 2010). Those who are 
more introverted are more “passive” and” reserved” (DeRaad 2000: 72). The act of 
socializing with others may lead extraverted people to be exposed to multiple points of view 
in an information-rich environment, and they may be more likely to participate in discussions 
about politics in their social networks than those who are more introverted. In the survey 
evidence offered by Mondak and Halperin (2008) and Mondak et al. (2010), extraverts are 
significantly more likely than introverts to be politically active, engage in political 
discussions frequently, and voice numerous opinions on social issues (2008: 358-359). 
However, this does not mean that they are discussing competing opinions on these issues, 
and there is also no direct evidence (to date) to suggest that these individuals are more likely 
to discuss politics with people who hold diverse views on political matters than introverted 






 Researchers who utilize the MBTI instrument in their studies of personality in the 
fields of organizational and personnel psychology contend that traits interact to form an 
individual’s personality. Due to the overlap between the FFM and the MBTI, it may be 
beneficial to examine interactions between selected personality traits from the Five Factor 
Model of personality structure as well. To date, no studies have been published that examine 
the interactions between the “Big Five” personality traits and their corresponding effects on 
political behavior and attitudes. 
  While the “Big Five” framework for studying personality traits contends that there are 
no “types” of people, there are some theoretical reasons to expect that certain traits may 
modify the expression of other traits in individuals. In the paragraphs that follow, I examine 
the potential effects of two personality trait interactions (Openness to Experience x 
Neuroticism; Conscientiousness x Agreeableness). Other researchers may find it worthwhile 
to explore alternative and/or additional interactions between and among personality traits. 
Given that there are greater than 100 possible interactive effects, this is expected. However, I 
choose to focus on the following two interactions based upon my theoretical expectations 
about how these traits may influence information processing. 
 
High Openness to Experience and high Neuroticism are positively associated with high 
ambivalence. 
Hypothesis 6: Openness to Experience x Neuroticism 
 The Openness to Experience trait may moderate the effect of the Neuroticism trait 
when predicting the likelihood that a person will experience attitudinal ambivalence. Those 
59 
 
who are high on the Openness to Experience trait are more analytical, curious, and tolerant of 
diverse viewpoints, while those who are low on this trait are more short-sighted and less 
likely to entertain competing viewpoints. A person who scores high on the Neuroticism trait 
is more likely to be self-conscious, demanding, and anxious than a person who scores low on 
this trait. When examining the theoretical potential for an interactive effect, it is possible that 
Neuroticism will only lead to ambivalence among those who are also curious and analytical. 
If a person is Neurotic, but also intolerant of diverse perspectives, then that individual may 
seek out additional information on only one side of an issue. This would result in a truncated 
view of the relevant viewpoints in that issue area. As a result, ambivalence may only be 
likely for Neurotic individuals who are also Open to Experience(s). 
 
High Conscientiousness and high Agreeableness are negatively associated with high 
ambivalence. 
Hypothesis 7: Conscientiousness x Agreeableness 
 Conscientiousness may moderate the effect of Agreeableness. Those who are high on 
the trait of Agreeableness are less opinionated and more trusting of “popular” opinions than 
those who are low on this trait. Those who are high on the trait of Conscientiousness prefer to 
avoid uncertainty and are more conservative and dogmatic in their views, while those who 
are low on this trait are comfortable with ambiguity and multiple opinions. If a person is 
Agreeable, and also Conscientious, then that individual may be the least likely candidate for 
the experience of attitudinal ambivalence, due to a tendency to be overly trusting of popular 
opinion and a general disdain of ambiguity. However, if that Agreeable person is low on the 
trait of Conscientiousness, then this may result in an increase in the likelihood of 
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experiencing ambivalence. A person who is trusting of the opinions of others, who is 
comfortable with ambiguity and exposure to multiple opinions, may have trouble discerning 
which opinions are more valued than others. Thus, that person may internalize the merits of 




 Existing studies of the antecedents of attitudinal ambivalence largely focus on values 
and environmental factors that shape individuals’ evaluations. While these explanations 
provide researchers with plausible explanations and valuable information, they exclude the 
individual-level, psychological factors that may contribute to the likelihood of experiencing 
this attitudinal state. This is problematic, as an ambivalent attitude is likely caused by core 
personality traits or dispositions and environmental or external factors (McCrae and Costa 
2008, 1996). 
In the empirical chapter that follows, I test my theory that the core “Big Five” 
personality traits are antecedents of attitudinal ambivalence toward political issues. I test my 
hypotheses using data gathered from multiple sources: the 2008 Cooperative Congressional 
Election Survey and a series of surveys with experimental treatments administered to 
undergraduate students recruited from the Political Science Subject Pool at the University of 
North Carolina at Chapel Hill between 2008 and 2011. In the final chapter, I discuss the 
implications of my findings for our understanding of political ambivalence. 
 
 
 CHAPTER FOUR 
PERSONALITY TRAITS AS ANTECEDENTS OF POLITICAL AMBIVALENCE 
 
In this chapter, I test my theory that personality traits are causal factors that contribute 
to a state of attitudinal ambivalence toward political issues. I conceptualize political 
ambivalence as a characteristic adaptation. Characteristic adaptations are “acquired skills, 
habits, attitudes, and relationships that result from the interaction of [the] individual and [the] 
environment” (McCrae and Costa 1996: 69).  I contend that political ambivalence is caused 
by basic tendencies or dispositional traits represented by the five factors of personality 
(Openness, Conscientiousness, Extraversion, Agreeableness, and Neuroticism) and external 
influences, such as conflict in the information environment, value conflict, and conflict in 
social group affect. My theoretical framework is summarized in Figure 4.1 below. 





















Specifically, I conduct several empirical tests of my theory that personality traits are 
causal factors that contribute to the experience of attitudinal ambivalence toward political 
issues. In doing so, I draw on multiple data sources, including experiments and surveys 
conducted using samples of college students and a national sample of adults. Moreover, 
different measures of ambivalence (i.e., subjective and objective) and the “Big Five” 
personality traits are employed as well. The data sources are described and findings are 
discussed in the sections that follow. 
 
Data 
Unfortunately, large-scale surveys such as the National Election Study and General 
Social Survey that are commonly used to explain political attitudes and behavior cannot be 
used to test this theory, since critical measures of ambivalence and personality traits are not 
included on those surveys. Therefore, I constructed original instruments and used alternative 
data sources and samples for my analyses. 
Four data sets were used in my research. The first is the 2008 Cooperative 
Congressional Election Study (CCES), which was based on a national sample. The remaining 
three datasets—the 2008-2009, 2010-2011, and the Fall 2011 Political Attitudes Studies—are 
survey experiments that used samples of undergraduate students from the University of North 
Carolina at Chapel Hill. These studies vary in their measures of ambivalence, the key 
dependent variable, as well as measures of personality traits, the key independent variables. 
Those who study ambivalence agree that an ambivalent attitude consists of 
inconsistent thoughts and/or feelings—considerations—about an object. These considerations 
pull a person in opposing directions when formulating an attitude about it (Mulligan 2006; 
63 
 
Martinez, Craig, and Kane 1995; Meffert, Guge, and Lodge 2004). Furthermore, as the 
intensity of inconsistent considerations increases, ambivalence becomes more strongly felt. 
However, there are different ways that researchers conceptualize and measure ambivalence.   
First, a subjective measure of ambivalence may be used, in which respondents are 
asked to report how “mixed” their feelings and beliefs about an attitude object are through a 
series of items on which they provide subjective ratings (Mulligan 2006; Martinez, Craig, 
and Kane 2005; Priester and Petty 1996, 2001; Tourangeau et al. 1989). In effect, 
respondents are asked to report an “introspective perception of their ambivalence” (Mulligan 
2006). A second type of measure of ambivalence is called objective ambivalence. Rather than 
asking respondents to explicitly assess their own ambivalence, researchers ask respondents to 
report whether they have positive and/or negative considerations about an object, and how 
strongly those considerations are held; then, the researcher calculates the degree of 
ambivalence. Both ambivalence measures are employed in the analyses that follow. 
Specifically, three of these studies focus on objective ambivalence, while one measures 
subjective ambivalence. 
 Personality inventories of varying lengths have been developed to measure the “Big 
Five” trait as well. Recently published studies that examine the roles that personality traits 
play in shaping political behaviors and attitudes use brief 10-item inventories to measure the 
“Big Five” traits (Mondak 2010; Mondak et al. 2010; Gerber et al. 2010, 2011). While these 
abbreviated inventories are appealing in that they are less time consuming and short enough 
to be placed on national surveys, they have limitations in terms of their reliability and 
(potentially) validity. Even those who use the 10-item inventories recommend that the “Big 
Five” be measured by longer inventories whenever possible (Mondak et al. 2010: 103) to 
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determine whether findings can be replicated using different measures. Therefore, two of my 
studies use a longer 50-item measure of the “Big Five,” while the other two use a shorter 10-
item inventory. 
Table 4.1 provides a data source matrix, which details the dependent and independent 
variables included in each data set. 
Table 4.1. Data Source Matrix (Variables by Study and Semester) 






Fall 2011 PAS 
(PAS 3) 
Timeline 








(by issue area) 




Privatization of Social 
Security  
 Stem Cell Research; 
Same-Sex Marriage; 
Health Care Reform; 
Troop Withdrawal from 
Iraq; U.S. Troop Increase 
in Afghanistan 
Embryonic Stem Cell 
Research; Same-Sex 
Marriage; U.S. Troop  
Withdrawal from 
Afghanistan; Health Care 
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Timeline for Troop 
Withdrawal from Iraq 
  









 X X  
Experimental Treatments 












Value Conflict  X X X 
Group Affect 
Conflict 
 X X X 
Issue 
Importance 
X X X X 
Partisan 
Strength 
X X X X 
Liberal X X X X 
Conservative X X X X 
Political 
Information 
 X X X 




 X X X 
Note: Each study has been given a number, which will be used (along with the study’s name) to identify the data source throughout the explanation and analyses 
that follow. PAS stands for Political Attitudes Study.  All Political Attitudes Studies used samples of UNC-Chapel Hill undergraduate students. In the Fall of 
2008, only the baseline version of the survey was administered; no survey experiments were conducted. During the Spring of 2009, survey experiments were 
conducted.  Otherwise, the instruments were the same. Due to their similarities, and the fact that there were no differences in ambivalence between and among 




Let me now explain the nature of each data set in greater depth. 
 
One of the key variations across datasets is the personality measure that I used. I 
employed two measures (i.e., a 50-item inventory and a 10-item inventory) of the “Big Five” 
in my research to examine whether the relationships between the traits and political 
ambivalence would be similar across studies. Two of the data sets used a 50-item trait 
inventory. During the 2008-2009 and 2010-2011 academic years, I recruited college students 
from the Political Science Subject Pool at the University of North Carolina at Chapel Hill to 
participate in web-based Political Attitudes Studies. In each case, students participated in the 
study to fulfill a course research requirement. Participants received an e-mail inviting them to 
participate in the study, and they were able to access a survey instrument to which they were 
randomly assigned through a unique hyperlink provided in the e-mail.   
Political Attitudes Studies with 50-Item “Big Five” Trait Inventory 
During each academic year, 2008-2009 and 2010-2011, the studies were conducted 
during the fall and spring semesters; the samples for the year were combined. Seven hundred 
and fifty (750) students participated in the Political Attitudes Study (PAS 1) during the 2008-
2009 academic year, while 696 participated during the 2010-2011 academic year (PAS 2). 
The demographic composition of both samples was similar. Since the Political Science 
Subject Pool draws students primarily from Introduction to American Government courses, 
the majority of respondents were first-year college students (PAS 1: 59%; PAS 2: 64%). 
Female respondents outnumbered male respondents in both studies, (PAS 1: 62% female, 
38% male; PAS 2: 66% female, 34% male), and more respondents leaned Democratic than 
Republican in terms of their partisan affiliation. This was especially the true in the 2008-
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2009 sample (PAS 1: 58% Democratic, 34% Republican; PAS 2: 47% Democratic, 44% 
Republican). Finally, in both Political Attitudes Studies, the majority of participants 
identified as Caucasian (PAS 1: 77%, PAS 2: 78%). African Americans comprised 11% of 
the sample in 2008-2009 (PAS 1) and 9% in 2010-2011 (PAS 2), while Hispanic students 
made up the next 6% and 7% respectively. 
 The web-based Political Attitudes Studies used a survey instrument that included 
questions traditionally employed on large-scale surveys to measure political and ideological 
affiliations, values, and social group affect. In addition to those items, a 50-item personality 
trait inventory designed to measure the “Big Five” factors of Openness to Experience, 
Neuroticism, Extraversion, Agreeableness, and Conscientiousness was included (Goldberg 
1992, 2006), as well as batteries of questions designed to measure the dependent variables of 
interest. During the 2008-2009 academic year (PAS 1), the dependent variable was subjective 
ambivalence toward four different political issues: stem cell research, setting a timetable for 
the withdrawal of U.S. troops from Iraq, implementation of a government health insurance 
plan, and same-sex marriage. Objective ambivalence toward five political issues was the 
dependent variable during the 2010-2011 academic year (PAS 2). The political issues were 
similar to those included on the 2008-2009 instrument, and included ambivalence toward 
stem cell research, setting a timetable for the withdrawal of U.S. troops from Iraq, health care 
reform, same-sex marriage, and increasing U.S. troop presence in Afghanistan. 
Beginning in the spring of 2009, and continuing through the 2010-2011 academic 
year, the study instruments included experimental manipulations that varied respondents’ 
exposure to different types of information relating to the political issues for which 
ambivalence was measured. These experimental manipulations were included due to past 
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research findings that suggest that the experience of attitudinal ambivalence may, in part, be 
a function of the information made available to individuals within their environments (Keele 
and Wolak 2008). Current theory suggests that when individuals are subjected to a roughly 
equal number of competing or opposing viewpoints on a political issue, they tend to be more 
ambivalent with regard to that issue as a result (Feldman and Zaller 1992, Huckfeldt, 
Mendez, and Osborn 2004). In essence, providing a great deal of information about a 
particular political issue to citizens may make taking a one-sided stance on the issue more 
difficult (Alvarez and Brehm 2002). Information exposure could influence the likelihood of 
experiencing ambivalence, regardless of the personality traits possessed by individuals. 
Exposure to political information can occur in a variety of different ways, the vast 
majority of which cannot be controlled for in an experimental setting. But, in order to assess 
whether simply exposing respondents to different types of information about political issues 
influences the likelihood of experiencing attitudinal ambivalence, respondents in the Political 
Attitudes Studies (PAS 1 and 2) were randomly assigned to one of four conditions:  
1. a baseline/no information condition;13
2. a competing considerations condition, in which participants were presented with 
introductory question stems that provided them with two competing arguments both 
for and against a political issue from an ambiguous, but credible, source;  
 
3. a positive considerations condition, in which participants were only exposed to 
positive information from an ambiguous, but credible, proponent of a political issue; 
or  
                                                            
13Only the baseline survey was administered in Fall 2008. 
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4. a negative considerations condition, in which participants were only exposed to 
negative information from an ambiguous, but credible, opponent of a political issue.   
While the wording of the introductory issue statements varied by treatment condition, the 
remainder of the survey instrument was identical across all conditions. On average, it took 
respondents approximately 25-30 minutes to complete the studies. The wordings of the 
introductory issue statements are presented in the Appendix. 
 
In 2008, the Political Science department at the University of North Carolina at 
Chapel Hill purchased question space on the 2008 Cooperative Congressional Election Study 
(CCES 1) survey, which was administered to a national sample of adults via the web by 
Polimetrix. I included four sets of objective ambivalence measures on this survey, which 
assessed respondents’ ambivalence toward four issues: federal funding of embryonic stem 
cell research, banning same-sex marriage, privatizing Social Security, and making health 
insurance mandatory for all citizens. I also included six personality trait questions taken from 
the Ten-Item Personality Inventory (TIPI) on the national CCES. Indicators measured the 
traits of Openness to Experience, Neuroticism, and Conscientiousness. Questions for 
Agreeableness and Extraversion were not able to be included on the CCES survey due to 
question space constraints. 
2008 CCES and 2011 Political Attitudes Study with Ten-Item Personality Inventory 
The UNC module of the CCES had 1,000 respondents who participated in the study 
by taking a web survey. This sample (CCES 1) was composed of a roughly equal number of 
men and women (men: 49%; women: 51%), the mean age of respondents was 49, and the 
majority of respondents self-identified as Caucasian (75%). African Americans made up 11% 
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of the sample, and 9% identified as Hispanic. Respondents were well educated on average, 
with 37% of the sample having a two-year college degree, four-year baccalaureate degree, or 
graduate degree, 24% having completed at least some college, and 36% having completed 
high school.14
I was unable to include all 10 of the TIPI measures, as well as other key independent 
variables of interest (e.g., group affect conflict, value conflict, political discussion partners, 
information exposure, etc.), on the national CCES. Therefore, I conducted a follow-up 
Political Attitudes Study (PAS 3) that was administered via the web to respondents recruited 
from the Political Science Subject Pool at the University of North Carolina at Chapel Hill 
during the fall semester of 2011. This study’s survey instrument included all 10 of the TIPI 
items to measure the “Big Five” traits, as well as questions to measure the other key 
independent variables. As in past administrations of the study’s instruments, students were 
able to fulfill a course research requirement by participating, and they were able to access the 
survey through a unique hyperlink provided in an e-mail invitation. On average, the survey 
took participants approximately 20 minutes to complete.    
 
The fall 2011 (PAS 3) student sample included 442 respondents, and was composed 
of more females than males (women: 63%; men: 37%). Respondents were more likely to lean 
Democratic than Republican in terms of their partisan affiliation (Democrats: 49%; 
Republicans: 42%). Since the Political Science Participant Pool draws students primarily 
from Introduction to American National Government courses, a majority (62%) of 
respondents were first-year college students. Most participants in this study self-identified as 
                                                            
14Only 4% of respondents reported that they had not finished high school. 
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Caucasian (78%). African Americans comprised 9% of the sample, and self-identified 
Hispanics made up 7% of the sample.15
There were two major differences between the Political Attitudes Study instruments 
used in the fall of 2011 (PAS 3) and previous administrations. First, in addition to the items 
designed to measure such variables as value conflict, group affect conflict, ideology, and 
partisan affiliation, the 50-item personality inventory was replaced by the full Ten-Item 
Personality Inventory (TIPI) (Gosling, Renfrow, and Swann 2003). Second, rather than 
including four information experimental treatment conditions, only two were used: (1) the 
baseline (no information) condition, and (2) the competing considerations condition. 
Otherwise, the dependent variable was objective ambivalence, and ambivalence was 
measured toward five political issues: embryonic stem cell research, same-sex marriage, 
privatizing Social Security, setting a timetable for the withdrawal of U.S. troops from 
Afghanistan, and health care reform.   
 
 
 This is the first study that examines whether the “Big Five” personality traits are 
antecedents of political ambivalence, and using multiple sources of data to test my theory has 
several advantages. Past studies that examine the antecedents of ambivalence typically 
operationalize this attitudinal state as either objective or subjective, but do not examine both 
measures. While existing studies shed light on causal factors, they are unable to demonstrate 
whether the contributing factors are significant across both measures of this type of attitude. 
In this dissertation, I examine whether the five traits influence both subjective and objective 
Virtues of Using Multiple Data Sources 
                                                            
15The remaining 6% of respondents self-identified as Asian, Native American, or Other. 
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measures of ambivalence across similar political issue areas, which allows us to test whether 
the effects of personality traits are consistent or variable across these measures.  
In addition, I was able to use a longer 50-item inventory as well as a shorter 10-item 
inventory to measure the “Big Five” personality traits and their effect(s) on objective 
ambivalence in particular. Ten-item inventories are being used more often in studies of 
political attitudes and behavior because they are brief; however, using both the longer and 
shorter inventories allows us to determine whether similar findings are uncovered across both 
measures. If they are not, then this may lead us to question whether the shorter inventories 
are truly adequate indicators of these traits.  
Finally, I was able to test my theory using student samples and a national sample of 
adults, while measuring political ambivalence toward similar issue items across surveys. 
While personality traits should exert similar effects on the likelihood of experiencing 
ambivalence despite the age of the sample, using both types of samples will help to provide a 
more comprehensive test of the theory. Including similar issue items across multiple study 





 The first dependent variable in this analysis is subjective ambivalence, conceptualized 
as “psychological” or “felt” ambivalence toward a political issue (Mulligan 2006; Priester 
and Petty 2001). On the 2008-2009 Political Attitudes Studies (PAS 1) respondents were 
asked to report their subjective ambivalence toward four major issues—same-sex marriage, 
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the implementation of a government health insurance plan, stem cell research, and setting a 
timetable for the withdrawal of U.S. troops from Iraq. These issues were selected because 
they were deemed to be “hard issues;” proponents and opponents of the issues appeal to 
principles or values that Americans share when advocating their positions to the public 
(Alvarez and Brehm 1995, 2002). As such, I expected that individuals in the electorate could 
recognize the merits of the pros and cons surrounding the debates on these issues, and could 
potentially experience subjective ambivalence as a result. Furthermore, since the issues were 
present on the national political agenda and the students were enrolled in an introductory 
American Government course, they were likely to have some understanding of these issues 
and the debates surrounding them.   
 To assess the degree of subjective ambivalence toward each of the issue areas, a 
subjective ambivalence index was employed. The index was created by Ken Mulligan 
(2006), and is a more thorough measurement tool than a single question that would ask 
respondents whether they feel “torn” or “conflicted” about an issue. A similar measurement 
tool is also used by psychologists Priester and Petty (2001) in their published work on 
subjective ambivalence. The first question following each issue item asked respondents 
whether or not they perceived their views to be consistent on the issue in question. Then, 
eight questions probed further to assess respondents’ levels of subjective ambivalence. These 
questions are outlined in Table 4.2. 
Four of these questions were phrased so that a positive response indicated 
ambivalence, while the other four were worded so that a negative response indicated 
ambivalence. The responses to the latter were then reverse coded so that for all eight items, 
higher values reflect higher levels of subjective ambivalence. Based on the responses to these 
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questions, an additive scale of subjective ambivalence was created, ranging from 0 to 1, with 
higher values indicating greater subjective ambivalence. The Cronbach’s alpha coefficients 
for the items comprising the indices were above .90 for all issue areas (for PAS 1 studies 
conducted in both the fall 2008 and spring 2009 semesters), and are presented in the 
Appendix to this chapter. 
Table 4.2. Subjective Ambivalence Index Items (Mulligan 2006) 
1. I have both positive and negative thoughts about this issue at the same time. 
2. When I think about whether I favor or oppose this issue, I feel like I could go 
either way. 
3. When I think about whether I favor or oppose this issue, I think both sides of the 
debate over this issue are equally correct. 
4. I feel extremely ambivalent about this issue. 
5. My views on this issue are extremely consistent (reverse coded). 
6. When I think about this issue, I do NOT think I could move back and forth 
between favoring and opposing this issue; my position is firmly on one side 
(reverse coded). 
7. I do NOT find myself feeling torn between favoring and opposing this issue. My 
feelings go in one direction only (reverse coded). 
8. I feel strongly that one side of the debate over this issue is completely right and 
the other side is completely wrong (reverse coded). 
Note: Seven-point response scale ranging from Disagree Very Strongly to Agree Very Strongly. Responses 
indicating “Neither Agree nor Disagree” were excluded, as they indicate an absence of thought/opinion about 
the issue in question. 
 
Objective Ambivalence  
 The second dependent variable used in this analysis is objective ambivalence. 
Respondents were asked to report their objective ambivalence toward a similar set of major 
political issues, including stem cell research, health care reform, increasing U.S. troop 
presence in Afghanistan, setting a timetable for the withdrawal of U.S. troops from Iraq and 
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Afghanistan, same-sex marriage, and privatization of Social Security (depending upon the 
data source). The political issues included on each study are outlined in Table 4.1.   
Once again, these issues were selected because they were deemed to be somewhat 
difficult issues (Alvarez and Brehm 2002), and it was entirely possible that different social 
groups could provide cues for “appropriate” stances to take on those issues. As such, I 
expected that individuals in the electorate could recognize the merits of the pros and cons 
surrounding the debates on these issues, and could potentially experience objective 
ambivalence as a result. Furthermore, since the issues were present on the national political 
agenda and student respondents were enrolled in an introductory American Government 
course, they were likely to have some understanding of these issues and the debates 
surrounding them. Subjective ambivalence toward the same or related issues was also 
measured, which allows for some discussion of similar and dissimilar findings. 
For each issue area, respondents were asked first to report whether they had any 
favorable thoughts about the issue. If they responded “yes,” a follow-up question asked them 
to report how favorable their favorable thoughts were on a scale ranging from slightly 
favorable (1) to extremely favorable (4). Respondents were then asked whether they had any 
unfavorable thoughts about the issue. Again, if they responded “yes,” a follow-up question 
asked them to report how unfavorable their unfavorable thoughts were on a scale ranging 
from slightly unfavorable (1) to extremely unfavorable (4).  The full-text of each of the 
questions is provided in the Appendix to this chapter.16
                                                            
16This measure was developed by Martinez, Gainous, and Craig (2007) in their manuscript entitled,” Measuring 




The responses to these questions were used to calculate a measure of objective 
ambivalence using the traditional algorithm developed by Thompson, Zanna, and Griffin 
(1995): 
Objective Ambivalence = [(P + N)/2] - |P-N| 
In this formula, P is the positive (favorable) reaction score and N is the negative 
(unfavorable) reaction score. The scores that result range from 5 (both positive and negative 
thoughts about the issue that are extremely favorable) to -2.5 (extremely favorable thoughts 
and no unfavorable thoughts about the issue, or vice-versa).   
The objective ambivalence scale that was derived from the algorithm had 15 ordinal 
categories, some with more respondents than others.17 To simplify the interpretation of the 
statistical models and to make them more intuitive, the 15-point scale was divided into three 
major categories: low ambivalence, which included scale values ranging from -2.5 to -.5; 
moderate ambivalence, which included scale values ranging from .5 to 2.5; and high 
ambivalence, which included scale values ranging from 3 to 5.18
 
   
Personality Traits 
Key Explanatory Variables 
The “Big Five” personality traits of Openness to Experience, Conscientiousness,  
                                                            
17Those who responded that they had no favorable thoughts and no unfavorable thoughts about the issue in 
question were coded as “0,” which represents indifference or an absence of thoughts about the issue.  Indifferent 
respondents were excluded from these analyses, leaving a 15-point ordinal scale ranging from  -2.5 (one-sided 
considerations/low ambivalence) to 5 (mixed thoughts/high ambivalence). 
 
18The statistical analyses were conducted using the full 15-point scale, a collapsed 5-point scale, and a collapsed 
3-point scale.  The results did not differ in a substantive manner, and the 3-point scale resulted in an ordinal 
logit model that did not violate the parallel lines assumption.  Thus, the results of the statistical analyses using 
the 3-point (low, medium, high) ambivalence scale as the dependent variable are reported in this chapter.  The 




Extraversion, Agreeableness, and Neuroticism were measured using both a longer 50-item 
personality inventory drawn from the International Personality Item Pool (Goldberg 1992, 
2006) and a brief Ten-Item Personality Inventory (TIPI) developed by Gosling, Renfrow, and 
Swann (2003). 
The Big Five personality traits of Openness, Conscientiousness, Extraversion, 
Agreeableness, and Neuroticism were measured with a 50-item inventory developed by Dr. 
Lewis R. Goldberg (1992, 2006) on the 2008-2009 and 2010-2011 Political Attitude Studies 
(PAS 1 and 2).
50-Item Personality Trait Inventory 
19 Goldberg created a scientific “collaboratory” for the development of 
measures of personality and individual differences known as the International Personality 
Item Pool (IPIP) (http://ipip.ori.org/). Based on his extensive research on the “Big Five” 
structure of personality, Goldberg has developed and compiled others’ measures of the “Big 
Five,” and has made them available in the public domain.20
Respondents were provided with the following instructions: 
  
Please use the rating scale to describe how accurately each statement describes you.  
Describe yourself as you generally are now, not as you wish to be in the future. Describe 
yourself as you honestly see yourself, in relation to other people you know of the same sex as 
                                                            
19A full discussion of why the “Big Five” traits were used as opposed to other personality trait indices (e.g., 
Authoritarian Personality scale, Social Dominance scale, Myers-Briggs) can be found in Chapters 2 and 3 of my 
dissertation. 
 
20The IPIP scales are readily used by personality psychologists. An extensive list of IPIP scale related 
publications can be found at http://ipip.ori.org/newPublications.htm. Prior to the creation of this collaboratory, 
scholars had to rely on personality inventories such as the NEO-PI-R (240 item) or the NEO-FFI (60 item) that 
were created by Costa and McCrae (1992). While these inventories are also very well respected within the field 
of personality psychology, they are not publicly available. Rather, they are copyrighted by Psychological 
Assessment Resources (PAR) in Florida, and can only be ordered by professionals for limited use by permission 
only (http://www.parinc.com). While the IPIP scales do not replicate exactly the NEO-PI-R/NEO-FFI 
inventories, this is not essential.  Research which compares the two inventory types suggests that they measure 
the same underlying factors. Both are acceptable measurement tools of the “Big Five” factors of personality.  
Furthermore, political scientists are using other publicly available inventories, such as the Ten Item Personality 
Inventory, or creating their own for inclusion on surveys of political attitudes (Mondak et al. 2010, Gerber et al. 
2010).   
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you are, and roughly your same age. Please read each statement carefully, and then choose 
the response that best fits you. 
 
Each trait was then measured by a balanced set of ten indicators; a set of statements which 
describe peoples’ behaviors. A five-point response scale ranged from Very Inaccurate (1) to 
Very Accurate (5). Based on the responses to these questions, an additive scale for each 
personality trait was created and rescaled, ranging from 0 to 1, with higher values indicating 
higher scores on the particular trait. The full personality trait inventory, and the Cronbach’s 
alpha coefficients for the items that made up the five indices for each trait, are presented in 
the Appendix to this chapter. 
 
The “Big Five” personality traits of Openness to Experience, Conscientiousness, 
Extraversion, Agreeableness, and Neuroticism were also measured with a 10-item inventory 
developed by Gosling, Renfrow, and Swann (2003) known as the Ten-Item Personality 
Inventory (TIPI) on the 2008 CCES and the 2011 Political Attitudes Study (PAS 3). The TIPI 
was designed as an alternative to the longer and more time consuming personality inventories 
(e.g., NEI-PI-R, IPIP, NEO-FFI, etc.) that are sometimes used by personality psychologists. 
In this inventory, two pairs of adjectives serve as indicators for each of the five traits. 
Respondents are instructed to rate the extent to which a pair of adjectives/short phrases 
applies to them, even if one of the characteristics applies more strongly than another. The 
respondents provide the ratings for each pair of traits on a seven-point Likert scale, which 
ranges from Strongly Disagree to Strongly Agree. Based on the responses to these questions, 
an additive scale for each personality trait was created and rescaled, ranging from 0 to 1, with 
higher values indicating higher scores on the particular trait. The full personality trait 
Ten-Item Personality Inventory (TIPI) 
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inventory, and the Cronbach’s alpha coefficients for the items that made up the five indices 
for each trait, are presented in the Appendix to this chapter. 
While the longer personality inventories are generally thought to be more reliable 
measures of the five factors, experimental results suggest that the TIPI is strong in content 
validity and it exhibits high test-retest correlations (Gosling, Renfrow, and Swann 2003). 
Moreover, findings suggest that the TIPI is a reasonably proxy for a longer “Big Five” 
inventory, especially when researchers face time and space constraints on larger scale 
surveys (Gosling, Renfrow, and Swann 2003). 
 
Value Conflict 
Other Determinants of Ambivalence 
 Value conflict is used much in the ambivalence literature to explain political behavior 
and preferences (Gainous and Martinez 2005; Feldman and Zaller 1992). This variable 
measures the conflict between two core values, in this case, egalitarianism and moral 
traditionalism. The egalitarianism variable is comprised of an additive index of six items 
borrowed from the National Election Study; the index for moral traditionalism consists of 
four items, which are generally the same across large-scale surveys. The questions that 
comprise both scales, along with the respective Cronbach’s alpha coefficients, are presented 
in the Appendix. The response scale for each value question ranged from Agree Strongly to 
Disagree Strongly. All items were recoded on a 0 to 1 scale, with 1 indicating strong 
agreement with the value and 0 indicating strong disagreement. 
The value conflict scale was then computed by taking: 
1- |Equality Index – Moral Traditionalism Index|. 
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Low scores indicate relatively greater support for one value over the other (i.e., low value 
conflict), while high scores indicate equivalent support for the two values (i.e., high value 
conflict).   
 
Group Affect Conflict 
 The measure of group affect conflict is borrowed from the group ambivalence work 
of Lavine and Steenbergen (2005), and was created using the feeling thermometer ratings of 
social groups.  Feeling thermometer questions used commonly in the National Election Study 
were used in the student Political Attitudes Studies. These thermometer questions were 
employed to assess respondents’ feelings toward a number of different groups; ratings below 
50 indicated “cold” feelings toward a group and scores greater than 50 signified “warm” 
feelings toward a group. Two group indices, liberal groups and conservative groups, were 
created by averaging the feeling thermometer scores across groups that were positively 
correlated with liberal ideology and negatively correlated with conservative ideology, and 
groups that were positively correlated with conservative ideology and negatively correlated 
with liberal ideology (Lavine and Steenbergen 2005). After rescaling the indices from 0 to 1, 
the group ambivalence variable was created by taking: 
1 - |Liberal Group Index – Conservative Group Index|. 
 Thus, if an individual evaluates both liberal and conservative groups about the same, 
the value on the scale will be closer to 1—indicating a high degree of group affect conflict. 
Likewise, if an individual feels more positively or negatively about liberal groups relative to 
conservative groups, then the value on the scale will be closer to 0—indicating a lower 
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degree of group affect conflict. The social groups used to create the variable are outlined in 
the Appendix.   
 
 A number of control variables were included to account for additional factors that 
Control Variables 
could influence whether an individual experiences attitudinal ambivalence, including the 
homogeneity of political discussion partners, perception of issue importance, political 
information, ideological identification, strength of partisan identification, and the semester in 
which the survey was taken. These control variables are discussed below: 
• Homogeneous Discussion Partners. Respondents were asked to characterize the 
nature of their political discussion partners by answering the question: “Would you 
say your political discussion partners share your political views all of the time, most 
of the time, sometimes, or never?” The four-point response scale ranged from never 
(0) to all of the time (3). Those who discuss politics with others whose views are 
dissimilar to their own may be exposed to a wider range of political views and 
information than those who do not. If ambivalence is a function of exposure to 
diverse viewpoints, then having heterogeneous political discussion partners is 
expected to increase the likelihood of experiencing ambivalence while having 
homogeneous discussion partners is expected to decrease the likelihood of 
experiencing ambivalence. 
• Perception of Issue Importance. For each issue examined, survey respondents were 
asked to report their perception of issue importance. The wording of each issue 
importance question is presented in the Appendix to this chapter, and the response 
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scale for each ranged from 0, not at all important, to 5, very important. It is possible 
that if individuals feel invested in an issue and believe it to be important, then they 
may be more likely to take a firm, one-sided stance with regards to the issue and 
experience less ambivalence as a result. Thus, it is important to control for this factor. 
• Political Information. Some have suggested that ambivalence may simply be 
associated with political information (see, for example, Alvarez and Brehm 2002); the 
reason being that if citizens do not know much about politics or political issues, then 
they will not have a knowledge base upon which they can evaluate those issues and 
take a stance as a result. The more knowledge citizens possess about politics, the 
more ambivalent they may be as a result, since having a great deal of information 
may make taking firm, one-sided policy stances more difficult. To account for this 
explanation, a political information variable is included in each of the issue 
ambivalence models (with the exception of the CCES 1 study), and ranges from 0 
(low information) to 1 (high information). 
• Partisan Strength. Partisanship is often the lens through which citizens view politics 
and political issues. It is plausible that stronger partisans may be more likely to adopt 
partisan stances on issues and experience less conflict in their thoughts and feelings 
toward particular issues as a result.  As such, a variable for partisan strength is 
included in each of the issue ambivalence models.  This variable was created by 
folding the partisan identification scale in half, and categorizes Democrats and 
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Republicans as partisan identifiers. The partisan strength scale ranges from 0 
(independents) to 3 (strong partisans).21
• Ideological Orientation. Dummy variables are included for ideological orientation 
(i.e., Liberal and Conservative) to account for the possibility that liberal orientation 
may be positively associated with the experience of attitudinal ambivalence, while 
conservative orientation may be negatively associated with the experience of this 
attitudinal state (Feldman and Zaller 1992). While this effect is usually associated 
with attitudes towards social welfare issues, it may be seen across other types of 
issues as well. 
 
• Condition. Control variables for the information conditions to which student 
respondents were assigned were included in the models to account for any variation 
in ambivalence levels between groups. 
• Semester. Finally, a control variable for the semester in which the survey was 
administered was also included in the models to account for any unexplained 
variation in ambivalence levels across semesters.   




                                                            
21My models were built solely on theory. There is no reason to expect differences between Democrats and 
Republicans, other than those associated with ideology, which I control for; thus, I do not include additional 
dummy variables for partisanship in addition to the partisan strength variable. 
 
22Additional issue specific control variables, such as military service and lack of health insurance, were included 
in models predicting objective ambivalence towards Setting a Timetable for the Withdrawal of U.S. Troops 
from Iraq/Afghanistan, and the Implementation of a Government Health Insurance Plan or Health Care Reform.  
These variables did not reach statistical significance and did not change the substantive conclusions drawn from 
the current model specifications.  Thus, in an effort to keep the model specifications the same across issue areas 
and to simplify presentation, they were excluded from the models and from the analyses that follow. 
85 
 
Personality Traits as Predictors of Subjective Ambivalence 
 Subjective ambivalence was the focus of the 2008-2009 Political Attitudes Study 
(PAS 1).  This study was conducted over the course of two semesters: Fall 2008 and Spring 
2009. As mentioned in Table 4.1, only the baseline (no information) version of the survey 
was administered to UNC undergraduates during the fall of 2008.  In the Spring 2009 
semester, the survey experiments were conducted and students were randomly assigned to 
one of four experimental conditions. Otherwise, the PAS instruments were identical, and a 
50-item “Big Five” trait inventory was used to measure Openness to Experience, 
Conscientiousness, Extraversion, Agreeableness, and Neuroticism.  
Before conducting the analyses, one-way ANOVAs were performed to test whether 
the means of subjective ambivalence in each of the four issue areas differed across the 
information conditions that respondents were randomly assigned to during the Spring 2009 
semester. For each issue area, neither the null hypothesis of equal means nor the null 
hypothesis of equal variances could be rejected at the p <.05 level. These results were 
corroborated further by Kruskal-Wallis tests, which test the null hypothesis of equal medians. 
Each test showed that the exposure to different types of information (i.e., conflicting 
information, positive information only, negative information only) did not promote more or 
less subjective ambivalence compared to the baseline/control condition in any of the issue 
areas. Thus, the experiment failed.  
The failure of the experiment suggests that subjective ambivalence is not overly 
sensitive to manipulating respondents’ information environments—at least in this 
experimental setting.  Respondents who were exposed to conflicting information or one-sided 
information (either positive or negative) about the four issue areas were not any more or less 
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ambivalent than those who were not exposed to information about the political issue at all.  
Individuals hold preexisting considerations about political issues, and they use these 
considerations to form their own attitudes.  Simply exposing individuals to different kinds of 
information, or withholding information, does not make them report feeling any more or less 
torn or conflicted about the issue in question.  
Although the experiment failed, the treatment groups can be combined and used to 
explore the antecedents of attitudinal ambivalence; but, the sample is not random. Other than 
the introductory issue prompts, the questions posed on each survey and survey experiment 
administered during the Fall 2008 and Spring 2009 semesters were identical. Thus, these 
datasets were combined, and control variables were added to the model specifications to 
account for any variation between semesters or among experimental treatment conditions. 
 Table 4.3 reports regression coefficients for antecedents of subjective ambivalence in 
each of the four issue areas: stem cell research, same-sex marriage, the implementation of a 
government health insurance plan, and setting a timetable for the withdrawal of U.S. troops 




Table 4.3. Antecedents of Subjective Ambivalence, PAS 1  










































































































































































Note: Data source is the 2008-2009 Political Attitudes Study (PAS1). Robust Regression coefficients are reported for 
stem cell ambivalence model; regression coefficients with robust standard errors are reported for the remaining 
models. Interaction terms for Neuroticism x Openness and Conscientiousness x Agreeableness were included initially 
but did not reach statistical significance or change the substantive interpretation of other coefficients. The simple base 
model is presented here (and in later tables in this chapter). *p<.10, **p<.05, ***p<.01 
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Due to the nature of the dependent variable, requisite regression diagnostics were 
conducted. Robust regression (M-estimation) coefficients are reported for the stem cell 
research model, while regression coefficients with robust standard errors are reported for the 
three remaining issue models.   
The results show that when we seek to identify the antecedents of subjective 
ambivalence, personality traits are important variables to consider, even when controlling for 
other predictors. However, some personality traits matter more than others. High values of 
Neuroticism were hypothesized to be positively associated with high subjective ambivalence.  
This relationship is evident in two of the four issue models. A one unit increase in 
Neuroticism leads to a .14 unit increase in subjective ambivalence toward the issues of same-
sex marriage (p<.01) and the implementation of a government health insurance plan (p<.05). 
The Agreeableness trait is also a powerful predictor of subjective ambivalence in one of the 
issue models. High values of Agreeableness were initially hypothesized to be negatively 
associated with high subjective ambivalence, but the opposite effect is observed in these data. 
A one unit increase in this trait leads to a .18 unit increase in subjective ambivalence toward 
same-sex marriage (p<.01). Perhaps those college students who are high on Agreeableness 
feel a greater need to express that they feel conflicted they feel on this issue due to social 
pressures that pull them in opposing directions. The Openness to Experience trait only 
approached statistical significance in the stem cell research issue model (p<.10). High values 
of this trait were hypothesized to be positively associated with high subjective ambivalence, 
but a one unit increase in Openness actually leads to a .13 unit decrease in subjective 
ambivalence toward stem cell research. The two remaining traits, Conscientiousness and 
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Extraversion, were not significant predictors of subjective ambivalence toward any of the 
four issue areas examined. 
 Group affect conflict and value conflict were the strongest and most consistent 
predictors of subjective ambivalence. High values of both group affect conflict and value 
conflict were hypothesized to be positively associated with high subjective ambivalence, and 
these relationships were supported in each of the four issue models at the p<.05 level of 
statistical significance or below. A one unit increase in group affect conflict leads to a .21 
unit increase in subjective ambivalence toward stem cell research, a .14 unit increase in 
subjective ambivalence toward the issues of same-sex marriage and implementation of a 
government health insurance program, and a .11 unit increase in subjective ambivalence 
toward setting a timetable for the withdrawal of U.S. combat troops from Iraq. Similarly, a 
one unit increase in value conflict leads to a .12 unit increase in subjective ambivalence 
toward stem cell research, a .19 unit increase in subjective ambivalence toward same-sex 
marriage, a .12 unit increase in subjective ambivalence toward the implementation of a 
government health insurance plan, and a .13 unit increase in subjective ambivalence toward 
setting a timetable for the withdrawal of troops from Iraq. 
 The perception of issue importance was also a significant explanatory variable. As 
hypothesized, in each of the four issue models, perception of issue importance was 
negatively associated with subjective ambivalence (p<.01). A one unit increase in issue 
importance leads to a .07 unit decrease in subjective ambivalence toward stem cell research 
and same-sex marriage, a .08 unit decrease in subjective ambivalence toward the 
implementation of a government health insurance program, and a .04 unit decrease in 
subjective ambivalence toward setting a timetable for the withdrawal of troops from Iraq. 
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 As discussed previously, exposing respondents to different information conditions 
(conflicting or one-sided) did not make them more or less likely to experience subjective 
ambivalence.  Simply exposing individuals to both a number of pros and cons or one-sided 
viewpoints about political issues did not lead them to be significantly more or less likely to 
experience subjective ambivalence as a result. Exposing respondents to only negative 
considerations about setting a timetable for the withdrawal of U.S. troops from Iraq led to a 
.05 unit decrease in subjective ambivalence toward this issue. But, the effect was small and 
only significant at the p<.10 level in one issue area. This finding is certainly not evidence of 
a trend. 
Engaging in political discussions with others who hold attitudes that are dissimilar did 
not exert a strong influence on subjective ambivalence either. The discussion partners 
variable only approached statistical significance in one issue area, stem cell research (p<.10). 
In this area only, there was a negative association between having discussion partners who 
share similar views and subjective ambivalence toward this issue. Discussing politics with 
others who have dissimilar opinions did not lead individuals to report higher levels of 
subjective ambivalence toward the other political issues examined.   
 Ideological identification and partisan strength exerted significant effects on 
subjective ambivalence. Partisan strength was hypothesized to be negatively associated with 
subjective ambivalence, and this predicted effect was significant at the p<.01 level in two 
issue areas:  implementation of a government health insurance plan and setting a timetable 
for the withdrawal of U.S. troops from Iraq. A one unit increase in partisan strength leads to a 
.03 unit decrease in subjective ambivalence toward the implementation of a government 
health insurance plan, and a .04 unit decrease in subjective ambivalence toward setting a 
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timetable for the withdrawal of U.S. troops from Iraq. Conservative identification was 
hypothesized to be negatively associated with the experience of subjective ambivalence, and 
this effect was uncovered in the same-sex marriage (-.05**) and implementation of a 
government health insurance plan (-.07**) issue areas. Liberal identification was 
hypothesized to exert the opposite effect on the likelihood of experiencing subjective 
ambivalence; however, the findings were weak and mixed. Liberals were more likely to 
experience subjective ambivalence toward the implementation of a government health 
insurance plan (.04*), but less likely to experience subjective ambivalence toward same-sex 
marriage (-.04*). Perhaps the discrepancy in the latter findings can be attributed to the length 
of time that those issues have been on the national political agenda. Liberals have been 
associated with having more favorable views toward same-sex marriage for a longer period 
of time, and may be less ambivalent as a result. While liberals may have been open to 
arguments both for and against the idea of implementing a government health insurance plan, 
the issue is relatively newer in comparison, and they may not have reached a one-sided 
political view. 
 
Personality Traits as Predictors of Objective Ambivalence 
 Objective ambivalence was the focus of the 2010-2011 Political Attitudes Study 
(PAS 2), and it was examined across five issue areas: stem cell research, same-sex marriage, 
health care reform, U.S. troop withdrawal from Iraq, and increasing U.S. troop presence in 
Afghanistan. This study was conducted over the course of two semesters: Fall 2010 and 
Spring 2011. During the fall and spring semesters, the survey experiments were conducted 
and students were randomly assigned to one of the four experimental conditions (i.e., 
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baseline/no information, competing considerations, one-sided positive considerations, or one-
sided negative considerations). A 50-item IPIP “Big Five” trait inventory was used to 
measure Openness to Experience, Conscientiousness, Extraversion, Agreeableness, and 
Neuroticism.  
As was the case in the subjective ambivalence models, the information treatments did 
not significantly influence the experience of objective ambivalence. One-way ANOVAs were 
performed to test whether the means of objective ambivalence in each of the five issue areas 
differed across the information conditions to which respondents were randomly assigned. For 
each issue area, neither the null hypothesis of equal means nor the null hypothesis of equal 
variances could be rejected at the p<.05 level. These results were corroborated further by 
Kruskal-Wallis tests, which test the null hypothesis of equal medians. Each test showed that 
the exposure to different types of information (i.e., conflicting information, positive 
information, negative information) did not promote more or less objective ambivalence 
compared to the baseline/control condition in any of the issue areas.  
The failure of the experiment may well have been due to the strength of the treatment 
itself. Students in the competing considerations and one-sided considerations conditions were 
asked to summarize the information that they were presented with to help control for issues 
related to comprehension of the treatment. However, the treatment was still a relatively 
passive event in comparison to a “real-life” situation in which individuals could be exposed 
to the same sorts of information from people that they trust, or through face-to-face 
conversations with others. But the results do provide interesting and valuable information: 
simply exposing respondents to multiple political viewpoints, or one-sided viewpoints, does 
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not make them more or less likely to report having both positive and negative thoughts about 
an issue.   
Even though the experiment failed, the treatment groups can be combined and used to 
explore the antecedents of attitudinal ambivalence; but, once again, the sample is not random. 
The questions posed on each of the survey experiments administered during the Fall 2010 
and Spring 2011 semesters were identical, with the exception of the issue prompts. Thus, 
these datasets were combined, and control variables were added to the model specifications 
to account for any variation between semesters or among experimental treatment conditions. 
Due to the ordinal nature of the dependent variable, ordered logit models were run for 
each issue area. Table 4.4 reports ordered log-odds regression coefficients for the antecedents 
of objective ambivalence in each of the five issue areas. For the sake of substantive 
























Table 4.4. Antecedents of Objective Ambivalence (Ordered Logistic Regression), PAS 2      
 
































































































































































































Log-Likelihood -498.27 -318.76 -512.93 -569.91 -520.22 
 N = 556 
LR Chi2 (17) 
= 82.76*** 
Pseudo R2 = 
.08 
N=563 
LR Chi2 (17) 
=78.19*** 
Pseudo R2 = 
.11 
N=580 
LR Chi2 (17) 
=57.72*** 
Pseudo R2 = 
.05 
N=566 
LR Chi2 (17) 
=34.61*** 
Pseudo R2 = 
.03 
N=534 
LR Chi2 (17) 
=25.64* 
Pseudo R2 = 
.02 
Note: Data source is the 2010-2011 Political Attitudes Study (PAS 2). Entries are ordered log-odds coefficients; standard 




Table 4.5. Antecedents of Objective Ambivalence (Proportional Odds Ratios), PAS 2 
 




























































































































































































































Note: Data source is the 2010-2011 Political Attitudes Study (PAS 2). Entries are proportional odds ratios with standard 
errors are in parentheses. Additive scale variables are centered.  The simple base model is presented. 
*p<.10, **p<.05, ***p<.01 
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Similar to the findings reported for subjective ambivalence, the results show that 
personality traits do matter when predicting the antecedents of objective ambivalence; but 
some traits matter more than others. To recap, the personality trait hypotheses discussed in 
detail in Chapter Three are outlined below: 
• High Neuroticism will be positively associated with high ambivalence. 
• High Openness to Experience will be positively associated with high ambivalence. 
• High Agreeableness will be negatively associated with high ambivalence. 
• High Conscientiousness will be negatively associated with high ambivalence. 
Openness to Experience, Neuroticism, and Agreeableness each reach statistical 
significance at the p<.10 level or below in at least one of the issue areas examined, with the 
exception of ambivalence toward the decision to withdraw U.S. combat troops from Iraq.  
Conscientiousness and Extraversion did not reach significance in any of the models of issue 
ambivalence. Extraversion was not hypothesized to have a significant effect on attitudinal 
ambivalence. 
  The hypothesized relationship between Neuroticism and objective ambivalence is 
observed in these data. Neuroticism reaches statistical significance at the p<.01 level when 
predicting ambivalence towards the issue of same-sex marriage. A one unit increase in 
Neuroticism would result in a 2.25 unit increase in the ordered log-odds of being in a higher 
same-sex marriage ambivalence category, while all of the other variables in the model are 
held constant. To provide a more intuitive interpretation of the meaning of this effect, the 
proportional odds ratios for the ordered logit model are presented in Table 4.5. For a one unit 
increase in the Neuroticism score, the odds of high ambivalence versus the combined 
moderate and low ambivalence categories are 9.47 times greater, given that other variables 
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are held constant in the model. Likewise, the odds of the combined categories of high and 
moderate ambivalence versus low ambivalence are 9.47 times greater given all other 
variables are held constant. 
Openness to Experience also exerts the hypothesized effect on ambivalence in three 
of the issue areas examined. Higher values of this trait are positively associated with 
ambivalence toward same-sex marriage, health care reform, and the decision to increase U.S. 
troop presence in Afghanistan. A one unit increase in the score on the Openness to 
Experience scale results in a 2.10 unit increase in the ordered log-odds of being in a higher 
same-sex marriage ambivalence category, while the other variables are held constant. 
Similarly, a one unit increase in this trait is also associated with a 2.46 unit increase in the 
ordered log-odds of being in a higher ambivalence category towards health care reform, and 
a 1.66 unit increase in the ordered log-odds of being in a higher ambivalence category on the 
issue of increasing U.S. troop presence in Afghanistan.   
The proportional odds ratios make the interpretation of these effects more 
straightforward. For a one unit increase in Openness to Experience, the odds of high 
ambivalence versus the combined moderate and low ambivalence categories are 8.16 times 
greater in the same-sex marriage issue model (p<.10), 11.67 times greater in the health care 
reform model (p<.01), and 5.28 times greater in the increasing U.S. troop presence in 
Afghanistan model (p<.10). Those who are open to new ideas and experiences are more 
likely to entertain both positive and negative thoughts/feelings of similar intensity about 
these issue areas than those who score lower on this personality trait. 
Finally, Agreeableness was hypothesized to be negatively associated with attitudinal 
ambivalence. Existing research suggests that those who score high on this trait are less likely 
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to engage in political discussions and tend to be less opinionated than those who score low on 
the trait (Mondak and Halperin 2008: 356-358). However, the hypothesized relationship was 
not observed in these data; instead, Agreeableness was positively associated with 
ambivalence toward stem cell research (p<.10). A one unit increase in Agreeableness results 
in a 1.53 unit increase in the ordered log odds of being in a higher ambivalence category, 
while the other variables are held constant. For a one unit increase in the Agreeableness 
score, the odds of high ambivalence versus combined moderate and low ambivalence are 4.6 
times greater in this issue area. The odds of the combined categories of high and moderate 
levels of ambivalence versus low are 4.6 times greater, given that other variables are held 
constant. Thus, those who score high on Agreeableness may have a more difficult time 
devaluing the multiple viewpoints that they are exposed to with regards to political issues and 
experience greater ambivalence as a result. 
However, personality traits are not the most important antecedents of attitudinal 
ambivalence.  As hypothesized, group affect conflict was a very significant predictor, and 
was positively associated with the experience of objective ambivalence. Indeed, the group 
affect conflict variable was the most significant and consistent predictor of ambivalence 
across all five issues examined in my study (p<.05 or below). A one unit increase in group 
affect conflict results in a 2.86 unit increase in the ordered log-odds of being in a higher stem 
cell research ambivalence category, a 2.64 unit increase in the ordered log-odds of being in a 
higher same-sex marriage ambivalence category, a 2.29 unit increase in the ordered log-odds 
of being in a higher health care reform ambivalence category, a 1.95 unit increase in the 
ordered log-odds of being in a higher category of ambivalence toward the withdrawal of U.S. 
combat troops from Iraq, and a 1.67 unit increase in the ordered log-odds of being in a higher 
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category of ambivalence toward increasing U.S. troop presence in Afghanistan, holding all 
other variables in the models constant. For a one unit increase in group affect conflict score, 
the odds of high ambivalence versus the combined moderate and low ambivalence categories 
are 17.50 times greater in the stem cell research model, 14.07 times greater in the same-sex 
marriage model, 9.92 times greater in the health care reform model, 7.04 times greater in the 
troop withdrawal from Iraq model, and 5.32 times greater in the increasing U.S. troop 
presence in Afghanistan model, holding all other variables constant. 
The perception of issue importance variables were also powerful predictors of 
attitudinal ambivalence, and were negatively associated with it in three of the issue models. 
A one unit increase in perception of issue importance results in a .46 unit decrease in the 
ordered log-odds of being in a higher stem cell research ambivalence category, a .48 unit 
decrease in the ordered log-odds of being in a higher same-sex marriage ambivalence 
category, and a .21 unit decrease in the ordered log-odds of being in a higher health care 
reform ambivalence category. For a one unit increase in issue importance, the odds of high 
ambivalence versus the combined middle and low ambivalence categories are .63 times less 
in the stem cell research ambivalence model, .62 times less in the same-sex marriage 
ambivalence model, and .81 times less in the health care reform ambivalence model, holding 
all other variables constant. 
Strong partisans were hypothesized to experience less ambivalence than weak 
partisans or independents, because they receive clearer and more powerful cues from partisan 
elites who serve as signals to them regarding appropriate partisan positions to take on issues. 
Thus, strong partisans were expected to be less likely to hold both positive and negative 
considerations about political issues—especially those prominent on the national agenda. 
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When controlling for other plausible antecedents, the hypothesized relationship emerges only 
in the health care reform issue area—one of the most prominent issues on the national 
political agendas for both parties. A one unit increase in partisan strength is associated with a 
.39 unit decrease in the ordered log-odds of being in a higher ambivalence category, and the 
odds of high ambivalence versus combined moderate and low ambivalence are .68 times less, 
given that all other variables are held constant. The two political parties have taken clear 
stances on this issue, thus, strong partisans are significantly less likely to experience 
attitudinal ambivalence toward it. However, in the other issue areas, partisan strength was not 
a significant predictor of objective ambivalence when controlling for other plausible 
explanatory variables. 
Ideological orientation did not exert as powerful of an effect on attitudinal 
ambivalence as was expected either. Liberal orientation was hypothesized to be positively 
associated with the experience of ambivalence, while conservative orientation was 
hypothesized to be negatively associated with this attitudinal state. The liberal variable did 
not have a statistically significant effect on ambivalence toward any of the issues examined, 
including social issues, but the conservative variable was positively associated with 
ambivalence toward the withdrawal of U.S. combat troops from Iraq. Conservative 
identification was associated with a .47 unit increase in the ordered log-odds of being in a 
higher ambivalence category, and the odds of higher ambivalence versus combined moderate 
to low ambivalence are 1.6 times greater for Conservatives, holding other variables constant. 
It is possible that Conservatives are more likely to experience ambivalence on this issue 
because they are being faced with cues that are inherently conflicting. Conservative leaders 
are typically associated with positions that favor staying the course in foreign policy 
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conflicts, but on the war in Iraq, even conservative leaders have expressed views that it is 
time for U.S. combat troops to withdraw.  
As discussed previously, exposure to experimental information conditions did not 
exert a significant influence on the experience of ambivalence. Control variables for 
information condition were included in the model specifications to account for any variation, 
but clearly did not reach statistical significance. Simply exposing respondents to multiple 
viewpoints, or one-sided views, does not make them more or less likely to experience 
ambivalence. Finally, being politically informed and having political discussion partners with 
dissimilar views were not significantly associated with objective ambivalence towards any of 
the issues examined either. When controlling for other significant predictors like personality 
traits, group affect conflict, partisan strength, etc., simply having knowledge of political 
processes and leaders does not lead one to be more or less ambivalent toward particular 
issues. Likewise, talking with others who have dissimilar views does not automatically lead 
individuals to be more ambivalent toward specific political issues.   
 
TIPI and Objective Ambivalence 
The final test of my theory was conducted using data from the 2008 CCES (CCES 1) 
and the Political Attitudes Study conducted using undergraduates during the fall 2011 
semester (PAS 3). Due to the ordinal nature of the dependent variable, ordered logit models 
were run for each issue area using the two data sources. First, I present the results of the 
limited CCES models. Table 4.6 reports ordered log-odds regression coefficients for the 
antecedents of objective ambivalence in four issue areas: embryonic stem cell research, 
same-sex marriage, making health insurance mandatory, and privatizing Social Security. For 
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the sake of substantive interpretation, Table 4.7 shows the proportional odds ratios for these 
ordered logit models.  
Then, I present the results of the full empirical models using data from the 2011 
student Political Attitudes Study (PAS 3). Table 4.8 reports the ordered log-odds regression 
coefficients and Table 4.9 reports the corresponding proportional odds ratios for the models 
predicting attitudinal ambivalence toward embryonic stem cell research, same-sex marriage, 
health care reform, setting a timetable for the withdrawal of U.S. combat troops from 




Table 4.6. Antecedents of Objective Ambivalence (Ordered Logistic Regression), CCES  
CCES Findings 










































































Log-Likelihood -190.75 -149.89 -247.61 -181.47 
 N = 377 
LR Chi2 (8) = 
26.27*** 
Pseudo R2 = 
.06 
N=326 
LR Chi2 (8) 
=18.87*** 
Pseudo R2 = 
.06 
N=404 
LR Chi2 (8) 
=8.75** 
Pseudo R2 = 
.02 
N=352 
LR Chi2 (8) 
=10.60 
Pseudo R2 = 
.03 
Note: Data source is the 2008 Cooperative Congressional Election Study (CCES1). Entries are ordered log-odds 




Table 4.7. Antecedents of Objective Ambivalence (Proportional Odds Ratios), CCES 
 










































































Log-Likelihood -190.75 -149.89 -247.61 -181.47 
 N = 377 
LR Chi2 (8) = 
26.27*** 
Pseudo R2 = 
.06 
N=326 
LR Chi2 (8) 
=18.87*** 
Pseudo R2 = 
.06 
N=404 
LR Chi2 (8) 
=8.75** 
Pseudo R2 = 
.02 
N=352 
LR Chi2 (8) 
=10.60 
Pseudo R2 = 
.03 
Note: Data source is the 2008 Cooperative Congressional Election Study (CCES 1).  Entries are proportional odds 
ratios with standard errors in parentheses.  *p<.10, **p<.05, ***p<.01 
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The CCES findings are limited in that only three of the five personality traits were 
measured on the survey instrument: Neuroticism, Openness to Experience, and 
Conscientiousness. In addition, other key explanatory variables, such as value conflict, group 
affect conflict, exposure to information about the political issue, diversity of discussion 
partners, and political information were not measured. However, perception of issue 
importance was measured for each of the issue areas, and three of the other control 
variables—liberal and conservative ideological orientation and strength of partisan 
identification—were included in the ordered logit models.  Education was used as a proxy for 
political information. 
In these models, the effects of personality traits did differ from those reported in 
previous analyses. Neuroticism and Openness to Experience were both hypothesized to be 
positively associated with the experience of attitudinal ambivalence, while Conscientiousness 
was hypothesized to be negatively associated with ambivalence. The findings show that 
neither Neuroticism nor Openness to Experience exerted a significant influence on 
ambivalence toward any of the four issue areas examined when using the TIPI indicators and 
this model specification. However, Conscientiousness did exert a significant effect in two of 
the issue areas: ambivalence toward stem cell research (p<.10) and same-sex marriage 
(p<.05). As hypothesized, an increase in one’s score on Conscientiousness is negatively 
associated with the experience of attitudinal ambivalence. For a one unit increase in the 
Conscientiousness score, the odds of high ambivalence versus the combined moderate and 
low ambivalence categories are .80 times less in the stem cell research model and .71 times 
less in the same-sex marriage model, given that the other variables are held constant. 
Likewise, the odds of the combined categories of high and moderate ambivalence versus low 
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ambivalence are .80 times less in the stem cell research issue model and .71 times less in the 
same-sex marriage model. 
 The perception of issue importance variable was a significant predictor of 
ambivalence in only one of the issue areas examined: stem cell research. As hypothesized, an 
increase in the perception of issue importance was negatively associated with ambivalence. 
For a one unit increase in issue importance ratings, the odds of high ambivalence versus the 
combined moderate and low ambivalence categories are .67 times less, given the other 
variables in the model are held constant. This also means that the odds of the combined 
categories of high and moderate ambivalence verses low ambivalence are .67 times less 
given that all other variables are held constant. 
 Ideological orientation did exert a significant effect on this attitudinal state as well.  
Liberal orientation was a significant predictor of attitudinal ambivalence toward stem cell 
research. As hypothesized, liberal identification was positively associated with ambivalence. 
Liberal identification resulted in a .71 unit increase in the ordered log-odds of being in a 
higher ambivalence category, while other variables were held constant. The odds of high 
ambivalence versus the combined moderate and low ambivalence categories are 2.04 times 
greater for liberals, all else constant. However, stem cell research was the only area in which 
liberal identification was a significant predictor.   
In the other three issue areas, conservative identification was a significant predictor of 
ambivalence. As you will recall, conservatives were hypothesized to be less likely to 
experience ambivalence. This hypothesized relationship was observed in the mandatory 
health insurance issue area. In this issue area, conservative identification resulted in a .58 unit 
decrease in the ordered log-odds of being in a higher ambivalence category, and the odds of 
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high ambivalence versus the combined moderate and low ambivalence categories was .56 
times less for conservatives, all else constant. But, conservative identification was positively 
associated with ambivalence in the two remaining issue areas: same-sex marriage and 
privatization of Social Security. The odds of high ambivalence versus the combined 
moderate and low ambivalence categories were 2.48 times greater for conservatives in the 
same-sex marriage ambivalence model, and 1.86 times greater in the privatization of Social 
Security model. 
 Strength of partisan identification was hypothesized to be negatively associated with 
the experience of attitudinal ambivalence, and this relationship was observed in three of the 
issue models: same-sex marriage (p<.05), making health insurance mandatory (p<.10), and 
privatization of Social Security (p<.10). A one unit increase in partisan strength resulted in a 
.32 unit decrease in the ordered log-odds of ambivalence toward same-sex marriage, a .21 
unit decrease in the ordered log-odds of ambivalence toward making health insurance 
mandatory, and a .24 unit decrease in the ordered log-odds of ambivalence toward 
privatization of Social Security. For a one unit increase in partisan strength, the odds of high 
ambivalence versus the combined moderate and low ambivalence categories are .72 times 
less in the same-sex marriage model, .81 times less in the mandatory health insurance model, 
and .79 times less in the privatization of Social Security model, given the other variables in 




Table 4.8. Antecedents of Objective Ambivalence (Ordered Logistic Regression), PAS 3 
Student Survey of Political Attitudes Findings 































































































































































Log-Likelihood -262.48 -159.98 -266.94 -275.09 -250.06 
 N = 290 
LR Chi2 (14) 
= 41.49*** 
Pseudo R2 = 
.07 
N=305 
LR Chi2 (14) 
=33.35*** 
Pseudo R2 = 
.09 
N=302 
LR Chi2 (14) 
=32.74*** 
Pseudo R2 = 
.06 
N=296 
LR Chi2 (14) 
=26.46** 
Pseudo R2 = 
.05 
N=278 
LR Chi2 (14) 
=18.78 
Pseudo R2 = 
.04 
Note: Data source is the Fall 2011 Political Attitudes Study (PAS 3).  Entries are ordered log-odds coefficients; 




Table 4.9. Antecedents of Objective Ambivalence (Proportional Odds Ratios), PAS 3 
 

























































































































































































Note: Data source is the Fall 2011 Political Attitudes Study (PAS 3).  Entries are proportional odds ratios with 
standard errors in parentheses. Additive scale variables are centered. The simple base model is presented.   
*p<.10, **p<.05, ***p<.01 
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The Political Attitudes Study (PAS 3) administered to students during the fall 2011 
semester measured attitudinal ambivalence toward five political issues: embryonic stem cell 
research, same-sex marriage, setting a timetable for troop withdrawal from Afghanistan, 
health care reform, and privatization of Social Security. While there were similarities in the 
findings as compared to those uncovered in the student surveys administered during the 
2010-2011 academic year and the 2008 CCES, there were some differences as well. 
Once again, it is evident that personality traits, even when measured with the Ten- 
Item Personality Inventory, matter when predicting the antecedents of attitudinal 
ambivalence. Four of the five personality traits were significant predictors of attitudinal 
ambivalence. Neuroticism was the only trait that did not reach statistical significance in any 
of the issue ambivalence models. As hypothesized, Conscientiousness was negatively 
associated with attitudinal ambivalence toward health care reform (p<.10) and privatizing 
Social Security (p<.10). In the health care reform ambivalence model, a one unit increase in 
the Conscientiousness score would result in a .19 unit decrease in the ordered log-odds of 
being in a higher ambivalence category; similarly, in the privatizing Social Security 
ambivalence model, a one unit increase in this trait would result in a .20 unit decrease in the 
ordered log-odds of being in a higher ambivalence category, holding all other variables in the 
model constant. In terms of odds, this means that for a one unit increase in 
Conscientiousness, the odds of high ambivalence versus the combined middle and low 
ambivalence categories are .82 times less for both issue areas, given the other variables are 
held constant. 
 Extraversion reached statistical significance in the stem cell research ambivalence 
model. I did not have a firm expectation about whether this trait would be positively or 
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negatively associated with the state of attitudinal ambivalence. When measured with the 
TIPI, Extraversion was negatively associated with ambivalence. A one unit increase in 
Extraversion would result in a .21 unit decrease in the ordered log-odds of being in a higher 
ambivalence category. The odds of high ambivalence versus the combined middle and lower 
ambivalence categories are .81 times less in this issue area, given that the other variables are 
held constant in the model. 
 Finally, Openness to Experience and Agreeableness also exerted significant effects on 
the state of attitudinal ambivalence.  However, when measured with the TIPI, these traits 
exert effects that were opposite than those hypothesized. Openness to Experience was 
negatively associated with ambivalence toward the issue of setting a timetable for the 
withdrawal of U.S. troops from Afghanistan. A one unit increase in Openness would result in 
a .22 unit decrease in the ordered log-odds of being in a higher ambivalence category, all else 
constant. The odds of high ambivalence versus the combined middle and lower ambivalence 
categories are .80 times less in this issue area. Likewise, the odds of the combined categories 
of high and middle ambivalence versus low ambivalence are .80 times less given all other 
variables are held constant. Agreeableness was positively associated with the experience of 
ambivalence toward stem cell research (p<.01) and health care reform (p<.05). A one unit 
increase in Agreeableness would result in a .25 unit increase in the ordered log-odds of being 
in a higher stem cell research ambivalence category; a unit increase in this trait would also 
result in a .20 unit increase in the ordered log-odds of being in a higher health care reform 
ambivalence category. The odds of high ambivalence versus the moderate and low 
ambivalence categories are 1.28 times greater in the stem cell research issue area and 1.22 
times greater in the health care reform issue area. 
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As in the Political Attitudes Studies conducted during 2008-2009 and 2010-2011, the 
Fall 2011 Political Attitudes Study (PAS 3) also included an experimental manipulation. 
Students were randomly assigned to either a competing considerations condition or to the 
baseline (no information) condition. One-sided information conditions were not used in this 
study since it was only conducted over the course of one semester and the sample size was 
smaller.  In this study, exposure to political information was a significant predictor in two of 
the issue areas: setting a timetable for the withdrawal of U.S. troops from Afghanistan 
(p<.01) and health care reform (p<.10). However, the effects were not the same across both 
issue areas.  
Those who were exposed to competing considerations about setting a timetable for 
troop withdrawal from Afghanistan were significantly more ambivalent than those who were 
not exposed to that information. However, in the health care reform area, those who were 
exposed to competing considerations were significantly less ambivalent than those who were 
not exposed to the same information. The results suggest, once again, that simply exposing 
individuals to contradictory information about political issues does not automatically make 
them more ambivalent as a result. The findings from these analyses, and those from previous 
chapters, indicate that the relationship is not that clear cut.  Exposure to conflicting 
information may not exert any effect at all on the likelihood that an individual will 
experience attitudinal ambivalence, as was the case in the stem cell research, same-sex 
marriage, and privatization of Social Security issue areas in this study. Alternatively, this 
exposure may lead individuals to feel more ambivalent, due to all of the conflicting 
information they are given. Or, it may lead them to be significantly less ambivalent than 
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otherwise similar individuals who are not exposed to the same information, as some may be 
more likely to intensify preexisting viewpoints when faced with conflicting information.  
The perception of issue importance variable was hypothesized to be negatively 
associated with attitudinal ambivalence. This relationship was uncovered in four of the issue 
ambivalence models; it was not a significant predictor in the health care reform ambivalence 
model. The odds of high ambivalence versus the moderate and low ambivalence categories 
are .76 times less in the stem cell research issue area, .64 times less in the same-sex marriage 
issue area, .77 times less in the setting a timetable for the withdrawal of U.S. troops from 
Afghanistan issue area, and .83 times less in the privatization of Social Security issue area. If 
an individual perceives an issue to be important, s/he will experience significantly less 
ambivalence as a result. 
As for the other existing explanations for ambivalence, we find mixed results.  Group 
affect conflict was a significant predictor in two of the issue areas: setting a timetable for the 
withdrawal of U.S. troops from Afghanistan (p<.05) and privatizing Social Security (p<.10). 
A one unit increase in the group affect conflict variable results in a 2.7 unit increase in the 
ordered log-odds of being in a higher ambivalence category; and the odds of high 
ambivalence versus the moderate and low ambivalence categories are 14.82 times greater, 
holding all other variables in the model constant. Similarly, a one unit increase in this 
variable would result in a 1.75 unit increase in the log-odds of being in a higher ambivalence 
category, and the odds of high ambivalence versus the combined moderate and low 
ambivalence categories are 5.76 times greater. Value conflict was expected to be positively 
associated with the experience of attitudinal ambivalence.  However, this effect was not 
uncovered in these data at all. In four of the five issue areas, value conflict was not a 
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significant predictor. However, in the setting a timetable for the withdrawal of U.S. troops 
from Afghanistan issue area, value conflict was negatively associated with ambivalence. A 
one unit increase in value conflict resulted in a 2.21 unit decrease in the ordered log-odds of 
being in a higher ambivalence category; the odds of high ambivalence versus the moderate 
and low ambivalence categories are .11 times less, holding all other variables in the model 
constant.  
Finally, ideological orientation did significantly predict the likelihood of attitudinal 
ambivalence in two of the issue areas. However, the observed effects were opposite of those 
that were hypothesized. Liberal orientation was negatively associated with ambivalence 
toward setting a timetable for the withdrawal of U.S. troops from Afghanistan, while 




 In this chapter, I have presented the results of four studies that I conducted to examine 
the influence that personality traits exert on attitudinal ambivalence. These studies employed 
two different measures of ambivalence (subjective and objective), two personality trait 
inventories (a 50-item “Big Five” IPIP Trait Inventory and the Ten-Item Personality 
Inventory), and used a national sample of adults and samples of undergraduate students from 
the University of North Carolina at Chapel Hill.  
 
Table 4.10 below presents a summary of the personality trait effects across the 
Personality Traits as Antecedents of Ambivalence 
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different studies and issue areas examined. The direction of the effects and indicators of 
significance for the personality traits are provided for each study.   
Taken together, these findings show that personality traits do have an impact on 
ambivalence; but, their impact is not overwhelming, very great, or consistent. Out of 82 
possible significant personality coefficients, only 17 coefficients reached statistical 
significance. The levels of significance also varied: eight personality coefficients were 
weakly significant at the p<.10 level, three were significant at the p<.05 level, and six were 
strongly significant at the p<.01 level. Now, let me discuss these findings in more detail. 
Personality traits were more powerful predictors of ambivalence toward stem cell 
research, same-sex marriage, and the implementation of a government health insurance plan 
or health care reform. Across these issue areas, each trait was significant at least once. 
Openness was the only significant personality trait in the ambivalence toward U.S. troop 
involvement in Afghanistan model, while Conscientiousness was the only significant 
personality trait in the model that measured ambivalence toward privatizing Social Security. 
No personality traits were significant predictors of ambivalence toward setting a timetable for 
the withdrawal of U.S. troops from Iraq, perhaps because the war was beginning to wind 
down when the studies were being administered. 
 Table 4.10. Summary of Personality Effects across Measures and Studies 
 Stem Cell Research Same-Sex Marriage Health Insurance/Health Care 
Reform 

























Neuroticism + + + - +*** +*** + - +** + - + 
Openness -* + - + - +* - + + +*** - - 
Extraversion + -  -*** - +  - - -  - 
Conscientiousness + + -* + + + -** - + + - -* 
Agreeableness + +*  +*** +*** +  - + +  +** 
 Timetable for U.S. Troop 
Withdrawal from Iraq 
U.S. Troop Increase or Timetable 
for Withdrawal from Afghanistan 
Privatizing Social Security 

























Neuroticism + +    +  -   + + 
Openness + +    +*  -*   - + 
Extraversion - -    +  +    - 
Conscientiousness - -    -  -   + -* 
Agreeableness + +    +  -    + 
 
Note: The four studies conducted are identified as PAS 1, PAS 2, CCES, and PAS 3. The 2008-2009 Political Attitudes Study (PAS 1) used a UNC 
undergraduate student sample and a 50-item personality inventory. The 2010-2011 Political Attitudes Study (PAS 2) used a UNC undergraduate student sample 
and a 50-item personality inventory. The Fall 2011 Political Attitudes Study (PAS 3) used a UNC undergraduate student sample and the Ten-Item Personality 




While the effects of personality traits on ambivalence are not as consistent as 
hypothesized, some patterns do emerge in these data.  Neuroticism and Agreeableness were 
the strongest predictors of attitudinal ambivalence across studies, relative to the other traits. 
High values of Neuroticism were hypothesized to be positively associated with high levels of 
political ambivalence. The reasoning behind this hypothesis was that those high on this trait 
tend to be more self conscious and anxious; and to the extent that this anxiety encourages 
them to think more carefully about their social allegiances or issue positions, or seek out 
additional information, they may be more likely to hold conflicting considerations than 
otherwise similar individuals who are calmer and more relaxed. Neuroticism reached 
statistical significance three times (out of a possible 18), and the hypothesized relationship 
was observed in these data. In each case, the coefficient was positive and significant at the 
p<.05 level or below.  When this trait reached statistical significance, it was negatively 
associated with political ambivalence on a consistent basis. 
I hypothesized that high levels of Agreeableness would be negatively associated with 
high levels of ambivalence due to past research that suggests that those who are high on this 
trait are less opinionated, more trusting, and not particularly tied to an ideological orientation 
(Mondak and Halperin 2008). Those who score low on this trait are more suspicious and 
demanding, and need less social validation of their opinions and judgments. Given those 
tendencies, I reasoned that those low on Agreeableness may desire to hear both sides of 
arguments and might even enjoy the experience of ambivalence. Agreeableness did reach 
statistical significance four times out of a possible 14; two coefficients were strongly 
significant at the p<.01 level, one was significant at the p<.05 level, and one was weakly 
significant at the p<.10 level. However, in each case, this trait was positively associated with 
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ambivalence. While this relationship was not hypothesized, it is not entirely surprising. 
Agreeableness is a broad trait that is comprised of six facets. These facets include trust in 
others, altruism, modesty, sincerity, compliance, and sympathy (Costa and McCrae 1992). To 
the extent that Agreeable persons desire to get along well with others, and believe that people 
are honest and trustworthy, they may have a difficult time taking one-sided stances on 
political issues—especially if they feel sympathy or compassion for those who are affected 
by the issue in question. 
The traits of Conscientiousness and Extraversion were also significant predictors of 
political ambivalence. Those who are high on Conscientiousness prefer to follow social 
norms and rules, are uncomfortable with ambiguity, and know comparatively less about 
politics and voice fewer opinions than those who are low on this trait. Since these individuals 
prefer certainty and consistency, I hypothesized a negative association between this trait and 
ambivalence. This relationship was observed in these data. Conscientiousness reached 
statistical significance four out of a possible 18 times. In each case, the coefficient was 
negative. However, the relationship was not very strong; one of the coefficients reached 
statistical significance at the p<.05 level, while the other three coefficients were significant at 
only the p<.10 level.  
As for Extraversion, I did not have a clear expectation about how this trait would 
relate to ambivalence. It reached statistical significance only one time (p<.05), and was 
negatively associated with ambivalence toward stem cell research. Extraversion was 
definitely not a consistent predictor of political ambivalence, as it failed to reach statistical 
significance 13 out of 14 possible times.  
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Finally, those who are high on the Openness to Experience trait tend to be more 
tolerant, analytical, and tolerant of diversity; they engage in political discussions often and 
are opinionated, knowledgeable about political issues, and flexible in their views (Mondak 
and Halperin 2008; De Raad 2000). Based on these tendencies, I hypothesized that high 
Openness to Experience would be positively associated with high levels of attitudinal 
ambivalence. While this trait reached significance five times, the effects were mixed. It was 
negatively associated with ambivalence twice (stem cell research and setting a timetable for 
the withdrawal of U.S. troops from Afghanistan issue areas) and positively associated with 
ambivalence three times (same-sex marriage, health care reform, and U.S. troop increase in 
Afghanistan issue areas). Furthermore, these mixed effects were not a result of the 
personality inventory used, as negative coefficients were present in models that measured the 
“Big Five” traits with either the longer 50-item or shorter 10-item inventories. 
I do not have a firm explanation for why Openness to Experience was negatively 
associated with ambivalence.  Those who score high on Openness tend to be more liberal in 
their views. Perhaps the negative relationship that was observed between this trait and 
ambivalence toward these issue areas is not entirely surprising, since liberals tend to support 
stem cell research and setting a timetable for the withdrawal of U.S troops from Afghanistan. 
While these individuals may typically be open to multiple ideas and viewpoints, the 
considerations that lead them to support these issue positions could have outweighed the 
considerations that would have lead them to stand against such positions. However, I cannot 
be sure that this is the case. More research needs to be conducted to explore the relationship 
between this trait and political ambivalence. 
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These data provide an opportunity to explore whether the effects of personality traits 
vary by type of ambivalence measure as well. Subjective ambivalence and objective 
ambivalence measures were employed in my research. The 2008-2009 Political Attitudes 
Study (PAS 1) examined subjective ambivalence, while objective ambivalence was the 
dependent variable in the other studies. Table 4.10 shows that Agreeableness, Openness, and 
Conscientiousness were more likely to be significant predictors of objective ambivalence 
than subjective ambivalence. Agreeableness was a significant predictor of objective 
ambivalence three times, but was a significant predictor of subjective ambivalence only once. 
Similarly, Openness to Experience was a significant predictor of objective ambivalence four 
times, but was a significant predictor of subjective ambivalence one time. Conscientiousness 
and Extraversion were not significant predictors of subjective ambivalence in any of the issue 
areas or studies, but were significant predictors of objective ambivalence.  Neuroticism was 
the only trait that significantly predicted subjective ambivalence more than once—it did so 
twice. This trait was a significant predictor of objective ambivalence only once. 
To be sure, it is important to note that subjective ambivalence was only measured in 
one of the four studies I conducted.  Thus, each of the “Big Five” traits only had a chance of 
significantly predicting subjective ambivalence four times. Neuroticism was the strongest 
predictor of subjective ambivalence.  Individuals who score high on this trait tend to be 
anxious and self conscious, so it was interesting that they were willing to admit that they felt 
torn or conflicted toward political issues.  
An analysis of whether the type of personality measure employed affects the results 
can also be conducted using these data. As you will recall, I employed a 50-item personality 
inventory to measure the “Big Five” traits in the 2008-2009 and 2010-2011 Political 
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Attitudes Studies (PAS 1 and 2), and the Ten-Item Personality Inventory (TIPI) in the CCES 
and Fall 2001 Political Attitudes Study (PAS 3).  Neuroticism and Openness to Experience 
were more likely to be significant predictors when the longer 50-item personality inventory 
was used. Neuroticism only reached significance when the longer inventory was used; 
Openness, a trait that tends to be difficult to measure well, was a significant predictor only 
one time when the TIPI was used, but reached significance four times when the longer 
inventory was used.  The effects of Agreeableness appear to be unaffected by the choice of 
indicators. However, Conscientiousness and Extraversion were only significant predictors 
when the TIPI was used.  
These results suggest that while shorter personality inventories may be attractive 
alternatives for survey researchers who wish to incorporate personality trait measures into 
their work, the inferences that are drawn about these traits may be largely dependent on the 
personality inventories used to construct the trait measures. Thus, repeating studies with 
different personality measures to determine whether the findings are replicable is a 
worthwhile venture. 
 
In some cases, personality traits do predispose individuals to experience political 
ambivalence. Furthermore, these findings hold even while controlling for variables that have 
long been associated with the experience of attitudinal ambivalence, such as value conflict, 
group affect conflict, exposure to different types of political information, and self-reported 
engagement in political discussions with individuals who have dissimilar thoughts and 
Other Antecedents of Ambivalence 
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beliefs. However, personality traits were not the strongest or most consistent predictors in my 
studies. 
Group affect conflict was the most significant variable across all of the studies, and 
was positively associated with the experience of political ambivalence, regardless of whether 
a subjective or objective ambivalence measure was used. When citizens evaluate liberal and 
conservative social groups similarly, they are more likely to experience attitudinal 
ambivalence as a result. Presumably, if those individuals take cues from both liberal and 
conservative groups, and receive conflicting bits of information, it makes it more difficult for 
them to reconcile their evaluations into a one-sided political viewpoint.  
However, value conflict, when measured as the conflict between the values of moral 
traditionalism and egalitarianism, did not exert the powerful influence that existing theory 
would lead me to expect. It was a significant predictor of subjective ambivalence, and was 
positively associated with this attitudinal state, but it was not a powerful predictor of 
objective ambivalence. This finding may have been a function partly of the student sample 
and the issues examined.  Only the domestic issues really have an “egalitarian” component 
and moral traditionalism may only have been used to structure students’ views on same-sex 
marriage. Perhaps adults would use these values more to structure their attitudes, but I cannot 
test this possibility with these data. These findings beg the question of whether the influence 
of value conflict is ambivalence measure-specific. 
Perception of issue importance was very significant and negatively associated with 
the experience of both subjective and objective ambivalence. The conclusion to be drawn 
from these results is that individuals are less ambivalent about issues they think are 
important, regardless of which ambivalence measure is employed. Partisan strength was also 
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negatively associated with the experience of objective and subjective ambivalence in some 
issue areas, but was clearly a more powerful predictor in the limited CCES models when 
other explanatory factors (e.g., group affect conflict, value conflict, political information, 
etc.) were not included in the model specifications. 
Finally, I conducted experiments in three of my Political Attitudes Studies (PAS 1, 2, 
and 3) in which I varied the types of information about political issues that individuals were 
exposed to. These experiments failed a combined nine times in the 2008-2009 and 2010-2011 
Political Attitude Studies. In the Fall 2011 Political Attitudes Study (PAS 3), varying 
exposure to conflicting information about political issues mattered in only two out of five 
issue areas, and the effects were not consistent. In one issue area, exposure to conflicting 
information lead to greater ambivalence; in the other, exposure to conflicting information 
lead to significantly less ambivalence among those in the treatment group. Simply exposing 
citizens to a variety of conflicting viewpoints will not necessarily make them more 
ambivalent as a result. Similar findings were uncovered with regard to the heterogeneous 
discussion partner(s) variable. Engaging in general political discussions with others who hold 
attitudes that are dissimilar to one’s own political views did not independently influence the 
dependent variable either when controlling for other plausible antecedents of ambivalence, 
such as personality traits, group affect conflict, and value conflict.  
Thus, these findings indicate that the information environment may not be as 
powerful of a predictor of ambivalence as past arguments would suggest. Perhaps the 
experiment failed because of the strength of the treatments, or because the samples were 
comprised entirely of students. Or, it is possible that exposure to conflicting views may 
actually serve to intensity pre-existing attitudes. In either case, additional research needs to 
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be conducted to evaluate further the role of the information environment in influencing 
political ambivalence. 
In the conclusion, I will provide an overview of these findings, and discuss the 
limitations of the studies and the implications of these findings our understanding of the 





 While literature published on the root causes of political ambivalence is sparse 
compared to that which is published on its consequences (Martinez, Craig, and Kane 2005), 
existing theories suggest that citizens may experience this attitudinal state if they use 
multiple conflicting values or cues from ideologically inconsistent social groups in their 
attempt to provide structure to their political attitudes (see, for example, Feldman and Zaller 
1992; Gainous and Martinez 2005; Alvarez and Brehm 1995; Lavine and Steenbergen 2005). 
Furthermore, information environments where diverse viewpoints about political objects are 
discussed and shared may also be more conducive to the development of attitudinal 
ambivalence than settings where citizens are only exposed to one-sided political views 
(Keele and Wolak 2008; Lavine 2001; Huckfeldt, Mendez, and Osborn 2004). 
While valuable, I have argued that these existing theories share one characteristic in 
common: they hinge largely on the presence of conflicting views in the environments in 
which individuals make decisions. Political discussions and coverage are ripe with conflict; 
citizens and politicians routinely offer competing opinions and viewpoints on issues or 
candidates in political discourse. Politicians, political parties, television networks, and 
campaign and grassroots organizations, among others, frame discussions 
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of political issues so that they may be understood in terms of values such as equality, self 
reliance, or moral traditionalism, and citizens take note of the positions taken by social 
groups. But ambivalence is not experienced by all individuals who are exposed to competing 
viewpoints offered in their information environments, or by those who take attitudinal cues 
from a number of different social reference groups. Similarly, while multiple values may be 
primed in political debates and discussions, not all citizens are unable to order the relative 
salience of values that they perceive to be relevant to the construction of a political attitude. 
To date, political scientists have not put forth a comprehensive theory addressing why 
some individuals become ambivalent toward political issues, while others are able to order 
the importance and salience of considerations to reach univalent attitudes. As such, I offered 
an individual-level theory of the antecedents of ambivalence: that ambivalent attitudes are 
likely caused by deeply rooted individual differences that systematically influence behaviors 
and attitudes in addition to environmental factors that have been addressed in past studies 
(McCrae and Costa 1996).   
Using the Five Factor Model (FFM) of personality structure as my theoretical 
framework, I developed a set of hypotheses about the direct effects that the “Big Five” traits 
of Openness to Experience, Conscientiousness, Extraversion, Agreeableness, and 
Neuroticism would have on the likelihood that a citizen would experience ambivalence. 
These traits, with the exception of Extraversion, were hypothesized to be significant 
predictors of ambivalence toward political issues, controlling for other explanatory factors 
(e.g., the information environment, value conflict, and group affect conflict).   
I tested my hypotheses using data gathered from multiple sources: the 2008 
Cooperative Congressional Election Survey (CCES) and a series of three studies with 
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experimental treatments administered to undergraduate students at the University of North 
Carolina at Chapel Hill between 2008 and 2011. The dependent variables used in my 
analyses were either subjective or objective ambivalence toward a variety of political issues: 
stem cell research; health care reform and health care plans; same-sex marriage; and U.S. 
troop involvement in the wars in Iraq and Afghanistan. The key independent variables of 
interest, the “Big Five” traits, were measured using either a 50-item personality inventory 
borrowed from the International Personality Item Pool (IPIP, Goldberg 1992; Goldberg et al. 
2006) or the Ten-Item Personality Inventory (TIPI) developed by Gosling, Renfrow, and 
Swann (2003). Experimental treatments that randomly varied exposure to information were 
included in the studies involving student respondents. Finally, control variables for 
perception of issue importance, value conflict, group affect conflict, ideology, partisan 
strength, homogeneity of discussion partners, and political information were included when 
available.23
The results presented in Chapter Four represented a first look at the question of 
whether personality traits are antecedents of attitudinal ambivalence. They do lend some 
support to my theory. Several of the “Big Five” personality traits did predispose individuals 
to experience attitudinal ambivalence, even when controlling for other explanatory variables 
that have long been associated with the experience of this attitudinal state. When the 50-item 
IPIP Personality Inventory was used to create the personality trait variables, Neuroticism was 
positively associated with subjective ambivalence toward same-sex marriage and 
implementing a government health insurance plan; it was also positively related to objective 
ambivalence toward same-sex marriage.  Agreeableness was positively associated with the 
 
                                                            
23Please refer to Table 4.1 included in Chapter 4 for a breakdown of variables by study. 
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experience of objective ambivalence toward stem cell research and subjective ambivalence 
toward same-sex marriage. The relationship between Openness to Experience and 
ambivalence was mixed, though. This trait was positively associated with objective 
ambivalence toward health care reform, same-sex marriage, and increasing U.S. troop 
presence in Afghanistan; however, it was negatively associated with subjective ambivalence 
toward stem cell research. Extraversion and Conscientiousness did not reach statistical 
significance when the longer personality inventory was used to measure these traits.  
Using the full Ten-Item Personality Inventory (TIPI) and an undergraduate student 
sample, I found that Openness to Experience was negatively associated with objective 
ambivalence toward U.S. troop withdrawal from Afghanistan. Agreeableness was positively 
associated with objective ambivalence toward stem cell research and health care reform. 
Conscientiousness was negatively associated with objective ambivalence toward health care 
reform and privatization of Social Security, and Extraversion was negatively associated with 
objective ambivalence toward stem cell research. When only six of the TIPI indicators were 
included on the CCES, Conscientiousness was negatively associated with objective 
ambivalence toward stem cell research and same-sex marriage. But, Neuroticism and 
Openness to Experience were not significant predictors in the CCES models. 
Thus, these results show that the effects of personality traits were not as uniform or 
consistent as hypothesized. While each trait reached statistical significance in at least one 
model, not one trait predicted the experience of ambivalence (either subjective or objective) 
across all of the issue areas examined. Moreover, the Openness to Experience trait exhibited 
mixed effects and the influence of Agreeableness ran counter to the initial hypothesis. At this 
point, it is unclear whether these effects are limited to the questionnaires administered, or 
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whether they would be uncovered in additional studies as well. More research in this area is 
needed to gain a more comprehensive understanding of the influence of these traits on 
political ambivalence. 
While personality traits were shown to be factors contributing to attitudinal 
ambivalence, they were not the only predictors to consider, nor were they the most important.  
The other predictors that were included in the models to account for situational factors still 
exhibited a powerful influence on attitudinal ambivalence, even while accounting for 
personality traits. The group affect conflict variable was a consistently strong predictor of 
both subjective and objective ambivalence. When citizens evaluate liberal and conservative 
social groups similarly, they are more likely to experience attitudinal ambivalence as a result. 
Value conflict, when measured as the conflict between the values of moral traditionalism and 
egalitarianism, was also positively associated with the experience of ambivalence.  However, 
this relationship was only present in the models of subjective ambivalence; not objective 
ambivalence.  
The lack of explanatory power of value conflict in the objective ambivalence models 
could be a function of the particular issues examined in this study. It could also be attributed 
to how ambivalence was operationalized. The experience of value conflict may be activated 
when respondents have to report how torn or conflicted they feel about particular issues. 
However, this may not be the case when individuals are only asked to respond to questions 
about whether they have positive and negative thoughts or feelings about the same issues. 
The nature of the samples themselves may also contribute to these findings. The Political 
Attitudes Studies samples were comprised entirely of undergraduate college students. Value 
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conflict may be more deeply rooted and a more powerful predictor of objective ambivalence 
among adults. However, I cannot determine whether this is the case with these data. 
Interestingly, the findings indicate that when controlling for other plausible 
explanations, the information environment may not be as powerful of a predictor of 
ambivalence as past arguments (Keele and Wolak 2008; Lavine 2001; Huckfeldt, Mendez, 
and Osborn 2004) suggest. In my studies, I repeatedly found that simply exposing individuals 
to a number of pros and/or cons of political issues did not significantly influence whether 
they experienced subjective or objective ambivalence. Engaging in general political 
discussions with others holding similar views did not independently influence the dependent 
variable on a consistent basis either. When controlling for other probable antecedents, such 
as personality traits, group affect conflict, and value conflict, among others, these predictors 
did not exert a significant influence on attitudinal ambivalence. Even without controlling for 
these factors, the difference of means tests showed that the experimental information 
treatments failed. Thus, either the treatments did not capture the effects of the information 
environment, or the environment was not as powerful of a factor as previously thought.  
On the one hand, it is not entirely surprising that information exposure and 
heterogeneous discussion partners did not exert a consistently significant influence on the 
experience of ambivalence. Individuals are presented with different types and varying levels 
of information on a daily basis and over the course of their lives. This exposure is relatively 
episodic. However, in comparison, personality traits are stable individual differences that are 
at least partly rooted in genetics (Bouchard 1997; Van Gestel and Van Broeckhoven 2003; 
Costa and McCrae 2006; McCrae and Costa 1996; Gosling, Renfrow, and Swann 2003). 
Thus, it is reasonable to expect that when placed in the same empirical model, traits may be 
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more important predictors than information exposure or heterogeneous political discussion 
partners.   
But on the other hand, these conclusions regarding the effects of exposure to 
information on ambivalence should be taken with caution. It is possible that respondents who 
were exposed to varying types of information were not convinced of the arguments presented 
for and/or against the issue items, or that the source of the information was not perceived as 
credible. Furthermore, exposure to information (i.e., reading an introductory statement about 
an issue) was a relative passive experience, as participants did not actually engage in 
discussions about any of the issues with others before they answered the follow-up 
ambivalence questions. Thus, one can question how realistic or powerful this treatment 
actually was. In effect, the complex nature of the real world political information 
environment was not perfectly replicated in the web-based Political Attitudes Studies. For 
future research, it would be worthwhile to conduct additional studies to determine whether 
face-to-face engagement in political discussions with others who have dissimilar views has a 
more powerful effect on the experience of attitudinal ambivalence, while also accounting for 
personality traits. 
When interpreting these results, it is important to consider that with the exception of 
the CCES dataset, I relied on data collected from samples of undergraduate students to test 
my hypotheses. The structure of human personality is consistent across age groups, so using 
a student sample to test the theory is not inherently problematic. If a particular trait exerts a 
significant effect on ambivalence, it should do so regardless of whether college-age students 
or older adults are sampled. However, it is possible that the effect of information exposure 
could vary across age groups. In addition, the effects of other key variables (e.g., group affect 
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conflict, value conflict) and controls (partisan strength, political information) could vary 
across age groups, as could the nature of ambivalence on particular issues. Thus, it would be 
beneficial to run a similar study with a sample consisting of a wider range of age groups to 
determine whether the conclusions drawn from these studies still hold true. It would also be 
beneficial to examine whether similar results are uncovered using different political issues. 
But while the findings do have their limitations, they, nonetheless, demonstrate that 
personality traits add to our understanding of political ambivalence. However, environmental 
explanations—especially group affect conflict, and in some cases value conflict—are 
stronger and more important predictors. Personality traits, in combination with environmental 
factors and previously formed values and attitudes, contribute to the likelihood of 
experiencing this type of attitude. By including both external and psychological factors into 
the theoretical model, I provide a more complete understanding of the antecedents of 
ambivalence toward political issues.  
The results of these analyses are promising enough to suggest that there is a need for 
additional research and empirical investigation into the effects that personality traits have on 
the experience of attitudinal ambivalence. In my dissertation, I focused attention on 
ambivalence toward political issues. But, it would be worthwhile to study whether 
personality traits exert a similar influence on partisan and ideological ambivalence as well to 
determine whether the five traits exert similar effects. 
In addition, there is a growing literature on the interaction between personality traits 
and political contexts. Another area of future research would be to explore how personality 
traits interact with diverse political discussion networks, and whether these interactions lead 
to various forms of political ambivalence (e.g., issue ambivalence, partisan ambivalence, 
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ideological ambivalence). The information treatment conditions used in my dissertation do 
not provide a good forum to examine this question, since the respondents passively 
consumed information and did not engage in discussions with others with similar or 
dissimilar views. But personality traits likely shape the way that individuals talk and engage 
with others in political discussion groups. For example, extraverts may be more likely to 
become ambivalent about political issues if placed in heterogeneous discussion groups based 
upon their desire to interact with others, whereas introverts may not experience ambivalence 
in this type of setting because they do not enjoy interacting with those around them. Thus, the 
information environment may be a powerful predictor of ambivalence—but only among a 
subset of respondents. 
Recent research conducted by political scientists suggests that the core personality 
traits influence a variety of political attitudes and behaviors, from partisan identification to 
civic engagement and voter turnout (Mondak and Halperin 2008; Mondak 2010; Mondak et 
al. 2010; Gerber et al. 2010, 2011; Hibbing, Ritchie, and Anderson 2011).  My research adds 
to this growing literature by suggesting that personality traits also influence the experience of 
political ambivalence and should therefore not be ignored in our analyses. But political 
scientists have not yet examined the role(s) that the core traits may play in predisposing 
citizens to experience indifference toward political issues, parties, and ideology. Since traits 
shape the way that individuals interact with their surroundings and others, it is possible that 
traits may also play a role in predisposing some citizens to be politically disengaged and 
indifferent toward political parties and/or issues. This may be an area ripe for future research. 
Moving forward, it is important to realize that political scientists who rely on large-N 
surveys to test their theories and hypotheses will most likely be unable to use long, multi-
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item personality inventories to measure the “Big Five” traits. As such, they may have to use 
the shorter 10-item inventories, such as the TIPI, instead. These 10-item personality 
inventories are appealing due to time and space constraints that political scientists face when 
conducting surveys, and using these inventories to obtain trait measures is better than 
excluding traits entirely from our behavioral and attitudinal models. However, in my 
research, I found evidence that the conclusions we draw about the effects of personality traits 
do vary somewhat according to the personality inventories used to measure the “Big Five” 
traits.  Whenever possible, scholars should attempt to replicate their work using longer 
personality inventories to ensure that the same conclusions are drawn when using longer and 
more reliable personality measures. 
Finally, the core “Big Five” personality traits of Openness to Experience, 
Extraversion, Agreeableness, Conscientiousness, and Neuroticism are each comprised of six 
facets, or sub-traits. As our knowledge of how the five broad traits influence political 
behavior and attitudes improves, we can begin to examine how the facets of these traits affect 
political variables, and how the facets interact with environmental factors. Using longer 
personality inventories that include multiple indicators of each of the “Big Five” core traits’ 
facets will allow researchers to refine existing theories, improve the personality inventories 
we include on surveys, and deepen our understanding of how personality affects political 
attitudes and behavior.  
Political attitudes and behaviors are a function of personality and environmental 
factors. By grounding our personality trait antecedent research in an accepted theoretical 
framework—the Five Factor Model or “Big Five” framework of personality structure—we 
are able to move past the critique that the study of personality and politics is a field with a 
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“jerry built appearance” (Sniderman 1975; Mondak 2010; Mondak and Halperin 2008). 
Instead, using this common framework of personality structure in political science research 
allows us to draw on the knowledge gleaned from past studies conducted in other fields such 
as personality and organizational psychology to improve our own theories of the causal 
factors of various political attitudes and behaviors. Its use also provides political scientists 
with the opportunity to generalize findings both within the field of political behavior and 





2008-2009 POLITICAL ATTITUDES STUDY (PAS 1) 
 
Condition 1 – Baseline/No Information Condition: 
Issue Information Conditions and Question Prompts 
Issue Question Prompts 
Stem Cell Research 
Next, we will be asking you a series of questions about your thoughts on the issue of 
stem cell research. 
Timetable for Withdrawal of Troops from Iraq 
Now we would like to ask you about your thoughts on whether the government should 
set a timetable for the withdrawal of U.S. troops from Iraq.  
Implementation of Government Health Insurance Plan 
Now we would like to ask you about your thoughts on the implementation of a 
government health insurance plan which would cover all medical and hospital expenses 
for all citizens.  
Same-Sex Marriage 
Now we would like to ask you about your thoughts on the issue of same-sex marriage. 
 
Condition 2 - Competing Considerations Condition: 
Issue Question Prompts 
 Stem Cell Research 
Respected proponents of stem cell research argue that it may lead to cures for diseases 
and disabilities affecting large numbers of Americans, and should be funded.  
Respected opponents of stem cell research argue that a potential human life has to be 
destroyed in order to use these cells, and funding this research would be unethical.  




Timetable for Withdrawal of Troops from Iraq 
Now we would like to ask you about your position about setting a timetable for the 
withdrawal of U.S. troops from Iraq. 
Respected proponents for setting a timetable argue that setting out a plan to withdraw 
would make Iraqis take responsibility for their country and become more independent of 
the United States.  
Respected opponents of setting a timetable argue that we have a moral obligation to 
make sure Iraq is a stable democracy even if that takes a long time, and that setting a 
timetable would make terrorists grow bolder. 
Implementation of Government Health Insurance Plan 
Given concern about the rapid rise in medical and hospital costs, respected proponents 
of a government health insurance plan argue that health care is a right of the American 
people, and feel that the government has a responsibility for providing an insurance plan 
which would cover all medical and hospital expenses for all citizens.  
Respected opponents are not supportive of a governmental insurance plan because they 
fear the quality of care for patients would decrease under such a program; instead, they 
feel that all medical expenses should be paid by individuals through private insurance 
plans like Blue Cross or other company paid plans.  
Now we would like to ask you about your position on the implementation of a 
government health insurance plan which would cover all medical and hospital expenses 
for all citizens. 
Same-Sex Marriage 
Respected opponents of same-sex marriage argue that we should take steps to preserve 
the traditional definition of marriage. More specifically, they believe the institution of 
marriage should be restricted to one man and one woman, as is stated in the Defense of 
Marriage Act, and that this restriction should not be changed. Some opponents even 
argue that an amendment prohibiting same-sex marriage should be embedded in the U.S. 
Constitution.  
Respected proponents of same-sex marriage argue that the institution of marriage should 
be opened to same-sex couples, and that current restrictions on gay and lesbian citizens 
are unfair. Proponents are especially against a constitutional amendment that would ban 
same-sex marriage and think its suggestion is an unnecessary attack on lesbian and gay 
Americans that would create a constitutionally-mandated second class of American 
citizens. 




Condition 3 – Negative Information Condition: 
Issue Question Prompts 
 Stem Cell Research 
Respected opponents of stem cell research argue that a potential human life has to be 
destroyed in order to use these cells, and funding this research would be unethical.  
We would like to gather your thoughts on the issue of stem cell research 
Timetable for Withdrawal of Troops from Iraq 
Now we would like to ask you about your position about setting a timetable for the 
withdrawal of U.S. troops from Iraq. 
Respected opponents of setting a timetable argue that we have a moral obligation to 
make sure Iraq is a stable democracy even if that takes a long time, and that setting a 
timetable would make terrorists grow bolder. 
Implementation of Government Health Insurance Plan 
Respected opponents are not supportive of a governmental insurance plan because they 
fear the quality of care for patients would decrease under such a program; instead, they 
feel that all medical expenses should be paid by individuals through private insurance 
plans like Blue Cross or other company paid plans.  
Now we would like to ask you about your position on the implementation of a 
government health insurance plan which would cover all medical and hospital expenses 
for all citizens. 
Same-Sex Marriage 
Respected opponents of same-sex marriage argue that we should take steps to preserve 
the traditional definition of marriage. More specifically, they believe the institution of 
marriage should be restricted to one man and one woman, as is stated in the Defense of 
Marriage Act, and that this restriction should not be changed. Some opponents even 
argue that an amendment prohibiting same-sex marriage should be embedded in the U.S. 
Constitution.  






Condition 4 – Positive Information Condition: 
Issue Question Prompts 
 Stem Cell Research 
Respected proponents of stem cell research argue that it may lead to cures for diseases 
and disabilities affecting large numbers of Americans, and should be funded.  
We would like to gather your thoughts on the issue of stem cell research 
Timetable for Withdrawal of Troops from Iraq 
Now we would like to ask you about your position about setting a timetable for the 
withdrawal of U.S. troops from Iraq. 
Respected proponents for setting a timetable argue that setting out a plan to withdraw 
would make Iraqis take responsibility for their country and become more independent of 
the United States.  
Implementation of Government Health Insurance Plan 
Given concern about the rapid rise in medical and hospital costs, respected proponents 
of a government health insurance plan argue that health care is a right of the American 
people, and feel that the government has a responsibility for providing an insurance plan 
which would cover all medical and hospital expenses for all citizens.  
Now we would like to ask you about your position on the implementation of a 
government health insurance plan which would cover all medical and hospital expenses 
for all citizens. 
Same-Sex Marriage 
Respected proponents of same-sex marriage argue that the institution of marriage should 
be opened to same-sex couples, and that current restrictions on gay and lesbian citizens 
are unfair. Proponents are especially against a constitutional amendment that would ban 
same-sex marriage and think its suggestion is an unnecessary attack on lesbian and gay 
Americans that would create a constitutionally-mandated second class of American 
citizens. 
Now we would like to ask you about your thoughts on the issue of same-sex marriage. 
 
The text of subjective ambivalence questions are provided in Chapter 4 – Table 4.2. 





1-Disagree very strongly 
2-Disagree somewhat strongly 
3-Disagree 
4-Neither agree nor disagree* 
5-Agree 
6-Agree somewhat strongly 
7-Agree very strongly 
*NOTE: “Neither agree nor disagree” responses were not included in the final subjective ambivalence scale. 
 
Scale Reliability Coefficients for Subjective Ambivalence Indices: 
Issue Area Fall 2008 Spring 2009 
Stem Cell Research Index α: .92 α: .91 
Setting a Timetable for U.S. Troop Withdrawal 
from Iraq Index 
α: .91 α: .91 
Implementation of Government Health 
Insurance Program Index 
α: .94 α: .94 
Same-Sex Marriage Index α: .94 α: .93 
 
How important is the issue of ________ to you? 
Issue Importance 
 5 – Very important 
 4 – Important 
 3 – Somewhat important 
 2 – Somewhat unimportant 
 1 – Unimportant 
 0 – Not at all important 
 
Scale Reliability Coefficients for Personality Trait Indices: 
Personality Traits 
Personality Factor Fall 2008 Spring 2009 
Openness to Experience α: .74 α: .75 
Conscientiousness α: .81 α: .86 
Extraversion α: .87 α: .88 
Agreeableness α: .77 α: .80 
Neuroticism α: .86 α: .85 
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Personality Inventory Items: 
1. Often feel blue (N +) 
2. Feel comfortable around people (E +) 
3. Believe in the importance of art (O +) 
4. Have a good word for everyone (A +) 
5. Am always prepared (C +) 
6. Rarely get irritated (N -) 
7. Have little to say (E -) 
8. Am not interested in abstract ideas (O -) 
9. Have a sharp tongue (A -) 
10. Waste my time (C -) 
11. Dislike myself (N +) 
12. Make friends easily (E +) 
13. Have a vivid imagination (O +) 
14. Believe that others have good intentions (A +) 
15. Pay attention to details (C +) 
16. Seldom feel blue (N -) 
17. Keep in the background (E -) 
18. Do not like art. (O -) 
19. Cut others to pieces (A -) 
20. Find it difficult to get down to work (C-) 
21. Am often down in the dumps (N +) 
22. Am skilled in handling social situations (E +) 
23. Tend to vote for liberal political candidates (O +) 
24. Respect others. (A +) 
25. Get chores done right away. (C +) 
26. Feel comfortable with myself. (N -) 
27. Would describe my experiences as somewhat dull. (E +) 
28. Avoid philosophical discussions. (O -) 
29. Suspect hidden motives in others. (A -) 
30. Do just enough work to get by. (C -) 
31. Have frequent mood swings. (N +) 
32. Am the life of the party. (E +) 
33. Carry the conversation to a higher level. (O +) 
34. Accept people as they are. (A +) 
35. Carry out my plans. (C +) 
36. Am not easily bothered by things. (N -) 
37. Don’t like to draw attention to myself. (E -) 
38. Do not enjoy going to art museums. (O -) 
39. Get back at others. (A -) 
40. Don’t see things through. (C -) 
41. Panic easily. (N +) 
42. Know how to captivate people. (E +) 
43. Enjoy hearing new ideas. (O +) 
44. Make people feel at ease. (A +) 
45. Make plans and stick to them. (C +) 
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46. Am very pleased with myself. (N -) 
47. Don’t talk a lot. (E -) 
48. Tend to vote for conservative political candidates. (O -) 
49. Insult people. (A -) 
50. Shirk my duties. (C -) 
 
Liberal Groups: 
Feeling Thermometer  
• People on welfare (Liberal +) 
• Gays (Liberal +) 
• Democrats (Liberal +) 
• African Americans (Liberal +) 
• Jews (Liberal +) 
• Liberals (Liberal +) 
• Labor Unions (Liberal +) 
• Poor people (Liberal +) 
• Hispanics (Liberal +) 
• Feminists (Liberal +) 
• The elderly (Liberal +) 
 
Conservative Groups: 
• Christian fundamentalists (Conservative +) 
• Catholics (Conservative +) 
• Southerners (Conservative +) 
• Rich people (Conservative +) 
• Gun owners (Conservative +) 
• Protestants (Conservative +) 
• Republicans (Conservative +) 
• Conservatives (Conservative +) 
• The military (Conservative +) 
 
Cronbach’s α reliability coefficient for the egalitarianism items was .88 in Fall 2008 and .82 
in Spring 2009. 
Egalitarianism Items 
 
1. Our society should do whatever is necessary to make sure everyone has equal 
opportunity to succeed. 
2. We have gone too far pushing equal rights in this country. 
3. One of the big problems in this country is that we don’t give everyone an equal 
chance. 
4. This country would be better off if we worried less about how equal people are. 




6. If people were treated more equally in this country we would have fewer problems. 
 
The Cronbach’s  α for the moral traditionalism items was acceptable at .66 in Fall 2008 and 
.76 in Spring 2009. 
Moral Traditionalism Items 
 
1. People in society should adjust their views to a changing world. 
2. Newer lifestyles are causing societal breakdown. 
3. Society should be more tolerant of different moral standards. 
4. There should be more emphasis on traditional family ties. 
 
Would you say your political discussion partners share your political views all of the time, 




1. How many seats are in the U.S. House of Representatives? 
 (α = .69) 
2. Who nominates judges for federal district courts? 
3. How many justices must agree to hear a case before the Supreme Court will issue of 
writ of certiorari? 
4. Who currently serves as the Speaker of the House? 
5. Who currently serves as the Senate Majority Leader? 
6. Who currently holds the office of Secretary of State? 
 
 3 – Strong Democrats/Republicans 
Partisan Intensity 
 2 – Democrats/Republicans 
 1 – Weak Democrats/Republicans 
 0 – Independents 
 
 1 – Very Liberal, Liberal, Slightly Liberal 
Liberals 
0 – Other (Moderates and Conservatives) 
 
 1 – Very Conservative, Conservative, Slightly Conservative 
Conservatives 
0 – Other (Moderates and Conservatives) 
2008-2009 PAS 1—Correlation Matrices 
Subjective Ambivalence: Stem Cell Research 
 
 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 
1. Stem Cell 
Research 
1.00                   
2. Neuroticism .03 1.00                  
3. Openness -.18 .04 1.00                 
4. Extraversion -.06 -.32 .28 1.00                
5. Conscientious .01 -.33 .07 .22 1.00               
6. Agreeableness -.38 -.39 .08 .07 .36 1.00              
7. Issue Importance .22 .04 .21 .09 .10 .00 1.00             
8. Group Affect 
Conflict 
.23 -.07 -.05 -.02 .04 .11 -.09 1.00            
9. Value Conflict .23 -.07 -.37 -.07 -.03 -.00 -.20 .44 1.00           
10. Disc. Partners -.08 -.00 -.01 .01 -.07 -.10 -.01 -.14 -.09 1.00          
11. Liberal -.12 -.09 .49 .01 -.11 -.07 .13 -.14 -.42 .03 1.00         
12. Conservative .03 -.14 -.51 -.01 .10 .08 -.11 -.02 .32 .01 -.74 1.00        
13. Partisan 
Strength 
-.17 -.10 -.04 .06 .08 .00 .13 -.37 -.21 .08 .08 .19 1.00       
14. Political 
Information 
-.16 -.11 .09 .09 .09 -.00 .10 -.13 -.15 .09 .05 .01 .17 1.00      
15. Baseline 
Condition 
.03 .04 -.06 -.12 -.06 -.02 -.08 .03 .03 -.12 -.01 .03 .04 -.12 1.00     
16. Competing 
Considerations  
.05 .08 .01 -.00 -.03 -.06 -.05 -.03 .06 -.08 -.00 .04 -.01 -.13 -.17 1.00    
17. Negative 
Considerations  
-.04 -.07 .07 -.02 .02 .03 .05 .05 -.01 -.01 .05 -.03 .04 -.07 -.17 -.15 1.00   
18. Positive 
Considerations 
-.05 .02 .04 -.00 -.01 -.02 .08 -.01 -.00 -.06 .04 -.04 -.02 -.12 -.18 -.16 -.16 1.00  




Subjective Ambivalence: Timetable for U.S. Troop Withdrawal from Iraq 
 
 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 
1. Troop 
Withdrawal-Iraq 
1.00                   
2. Neuroticism .04 1.00                  
3. Openness -.03 .04 1.00                 
4. Extraversion -.05 -.33 .27 1.00                
5. Conscientious -.07 -.32 .08 .23 1.00               
6. Agreeableness -.04 -.40 .08 .07 .35 1.00              
7. Issue Importance -.31 .08 .22 .00 .04 .04 1.00             
8. Group Affect 
Conflict 
.24 -.07 -.07 -.03 .04 .11 -.08 1.00            
9. Value Conflict .27 -.08 -.39 -.07 -.03 -.00 -.29 .44 1.00           
10. Disc. Partners -.08 -.01 -.01 .00 -.07 -.10 -.07 -.14 -.09 1.00          
11. Liberal -.12 -.09 .50 .00 -.11 -.06 .25 -.14 -.42 .04 1.00         
12. Conservative -.00 -.14 -.51 -.01 .09 .09 -.25 -.02 .33 .01 -.74 1.00        
13. Partisan 
Strength 
-.30 -.10 -.04 .05 .09 .01 .08 -.37 -.21 .08 .08 .19 1.00       
14. Political 
Information 
-.20 -.10 .09 .08 .09 -.00 .15 -.13 -.15 .08 .05 .01 .16 1.00      
15. Baseline 
Condition 
.10 .04 -.06 -.11 -.06 -.01 -.05 .02 .03 -.12 -.02 .03 .06 -.10 1.00     
16. Competing 
Considerations  
.02 .08 .02 .00 -.02 -.07 -.06 -.03 .06 -.08 -.00 .04 -.01 -.12 -.17 1.00    
17. Negative 
Considerations  
.00 -.07 .06 -.03 .02 .04 -.01 .05 -.01 -.01 .05 -.03 .03 -.07 -.16 -.15 1.00   
18. Positive 
Considerations 
.12 .02 .04 -.01 -.00 -.02 -.01 -.00 -.00 -.06 .04 -.04 -.02 -.13 -.18 -.16 -.16 1.00  





Subjective Ambivalence: Same-Sex Marriage 
 
 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 
1. Same-Sex 
Marriage 
1.00                   
2. Neuroticism .02 1.00                  
3. Openness -.12 .04 1.00                 
4. Extraversion -.09 -.32 .28 1.00                
5. Conscientious -.02 -.33 .08 .23 1.00               
6. Agreeableness -.04 -.39 .08 .06 .36 1.00              
7. Issue Importance -.44 .08 .23 .13 .03 .06 1.00             
8. Group Affect 
Conflict 
.22 -.07 -.05 -.03 .04 .11 -.23 1.00            
9. Value Conflict .29 -.08 -.38 -.06 -.03 .00 -.30 .44 1.00           
10. Disc. Partners -.10 .00 -.00 .00 -.07 -.10 .05 -.14 -.08 1.00          
11. Liberal -.15 .08 .51 .00 -.11 -.06 .16 -.14 -.43 .04 1.00         
12. Conservative -.01 -.13 -.52 -.02 .09 .08 -.08 -.02 .33 .01 -.74 1.00        
13. Partisan 
Strength 
-.15 -.11 -.04 .06 .09 .00 .16 -.37 -.21 .08 .08 .20 1.00       
14. Political 
Information 
-.06 -.10 .10 .08 .10 -.01 -.0 -.13 -.14 .07 .05 .01 .17 1.00      
15. Baseline 
Condition 
.03 .04 -.06 -.12 -.06 -.02 -.05 .04 .03 -.12 -.02 .03 .04 -.12 1.00     
16. Competing 
Considerations  
-.00 .09 .02 .00 -.02 -.07 -.05 -.03 .06 -.08 -.00 .03 -.01 -.11 -.17 1.00    
17. Negative 
Considerations  
.01 -.07 .07 -.02 .00 .04 -.01 .05 -.02 -.01 .05 -.04 .04 -.06 -.17 -.15 1.00   
18. Positive 
Considerations 
.02 .02 .05 -.00 -.00 -.02 .06 -.00 .00 -.06 .04 -.05 -.02 -.13 -.18 -.16 -.16 1.00  





Subjective Ambivalence: Implementation of Government Health Insurance Plan 
 




1.00                   
2. Neuroticism .13 1.00                  
3. Openness .03 .03 1.00                 
4. Extraversion -.10 -.33 .23 1.00                
5. Conscientious -.09 -.33 .07 .23 1.00               
6. Agreeableness -.00 -.40 .07 .07 .36 1.00              
7. Issue Importance -.48 -.02 .22 .09 .09 -.01 1.00             
8. Group Affect 
Conflict 
.30 -.06 -.04 -.03 .05 .11 -.22 1.00            
9. Value Conflict .22 -.07 -.37 -.06 -.04 .00 -.28 .44 1.00           
10. Disc. Partners -.04 .00 .00 .01 -.08 -.10 .06 -.15 -.10 1.00          
11. Liberal -.08 .08 .50 .00 -.10 -.07 .18 -.14 -.42 .04 1.00         
12. Conservative -.20 -.14 -.52 -.01 .09 .09 -.11 -.02 .32 .01 -.74 1.00        
13. Partisan 
Strength 
-.37 -.10 -.05 .06 .06 .00 .23 -.37 -.22 .08 .09 .19 1.00       
14. Political 
Information 
-.15 -.10 .11 .09 .09 -.00 .11 -.13 -.16 .08 .06 .00 .16 1.00      
15. Baseline 
Condition 
-.00 .04 -.07 -.12 -.07 -.02 -.01 .03 .03 -.12 -.01 .03 .03 -.11 1.00     
16. Competing 
Considerations  
.00 .07 .02 .01 -.00 -.06 .02 -.03 .08 -.08 -.01 .05 .00 -.10 -.17 1.00    
17. Negative 
Considerations  
-.03 -.07 .06 -.03 .02 .02 .04 .05 -.01 -.01 .05 -.03 .04 -.07 -.17 -.15 1.00   
18. Positive 
Considerations 
.03 .02 .04 -.00 -.01 -.01 .00 -.00 -.00 -.05 .05 -.05 -.02 -.13 -.18 -.16 -.16 1.00  





  2010-2011 POLITICAL ATTITUDES STUDY (PAS 2) 
 
Condition 1 – Baseline/No Information Condition: 
Issue Information Conditions and Prompts 
Issue Question Prompts 
Stem Cell Research 
Next, we will be asking you a series of questions about your thoughts on the issue of 
stem cell research. 
Timetable for Withdrawal of Troops from Iraq 
In the next set of questions, we would like to ask you about your thoughts on the U.S. 
government’s decision to set a timetable for the withdrawal of U.S. troops from Iraq. 
Health Care Reform 
Now we would like to ask you about your thoughts on the issue of health care reform. 
Same-Sex Marriage 
Now we would like to ask you about your thoughts on the issue of same-sex marriage. 
Increasing U.S. Troop Presence in Afghanistan 
Now we would like to gather your thoughts on President Obama’s plan to increase U.S. 
troop presence in Afghanistan. 
Condition 2 - Competing Considerations Condition: 
Issue Question Prompts 
Stem Cell Research 
Respected proponents of stem cell research argue that it may lead to cures for diseases 
and disabilities affecting large numbers of Americans, and funding this research is 
ethical because it may save human life.  
Respected opponents of stem cell research argue that a potential human life has to be 
destroyed in order to use these cells, and funding this research would be unethical.  
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Now we would like to gather your thoughts on the issue of stem cell research. 
Timetable for Withdrawal of Troops from Iraq 
Respected proponents for setting a timetable argue that setting out a plan to withdraw 
would make Iraqis take responsibility for their country and become more independent of 
the United States.  
Respected opponents of setting a timetable argue that we have a moral obligation to 
make sure Iraq is a stable democracy even if that takes a long time, and that a timetable 
would make terrorists grow bolder. 
Now we would like to ask you about your position about setting a timetable for the 
withdrawal of U.S. troops from Iraq. 
Health Care Reform 
Respected proponents of health care reform view health care as a right and argue that 
the government has a responsibility to ensure that health insurance is available and 
affordable to all citizens – even those with preexisting conditions.  
Respected opponents of health care reform argue that if the government takes a more 
active role in reforming the health care system, then the quality of the system will 
become worse, higher taxes will likely result, and the deficit will inevitably increase. 
Now we would like to gather your thoughts on the issue of health care reform. 
Same-Sex Marriage 
Respected opponents of same-sex marriage argue that we should take steps to preserve 
the traditional definition of marriage. More specifically, they believe the institution of 
marriage should be restricted to one man and one woman, as is stated in the Defense of 
Marriage Act, and that this restriction should not be changed.  Some opponents even 
argue that an amendment prohibiting same-sex marriage should be embedded in the U.S. 
Constitution.  
Respected proponents of same-sex marriage argue that the institution of marriage should 
be opened to same-sex couples, and that current restrictions on same-sex marriage are 
unfair. Proponents are especially against a constitutional amendment that would ban 
same-sex marriage and think its suggestion is an unnecessary attack on lesbian and gay 
Americans that would create a constitutionally mandated second class of American 
citizens. 
Now we would like to ask you about your thoughts on the issue of same-sex marriage. 
Increasing U.S. Troop Presence in Afghanistan 
Respected proponents of President Obama’s plan to increase U.S. troop presence in 
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Afghanistan argue that the plan is necessary to improve security; they contend that the 
plan will stabilize the volatile situation in the country, ensure that human rights are 
protected, and provide training to Afghan security forces and government officials so 
that the U.S. can eventually withdraw. 
Respected opponents of President Obama’s plan to increase U.S. troop presence in 
Afghanistan question whether a military solution will improve security; they contend 
that the plan exaggerates the threat of terrorism from the nation, and fear that an 
increased troop presence will fuel the insurgency and lengthen an endless and extremely 
costly war. 
Now we would like to gather your thoughts on President Obama’s plan to increase troop 
presence in Afghanistan.  
Condition 3 – Negative Information Condition: 
Issue Question Prompts 
Stem Cell Research 
Respected opponents of stem cell research argue that a potential human life has to be 
destroyed in order to use these cells, and funding this research would be unethical.  
Now we would like to gather your thoughts on the issue of stem cell research. 
Timetable for Withdrawal of Troops from Iraq 
Respected opponents of setting a timetable argue that we have a moral obligation to 
make sure Iraq is a stable democracy even if that takes a long time, and that a timetable 
would make terrorists grow bolder. 
Now we would like to ask you about your position about setting a timetable for the 
withdrawal of U.S. troops from Iraq. 
Health Care Reform 
Respected opponents of health care reform argue that if the government takes a more 
active role in reforming the health care system, then the quality of the system will 
become worse, higher taxes will likely result, and the deficit will inevitably increase. 
Now we would like to gather your thoughts on the issue of health care reform. 
Same-Sex Marriage 
Respected opponents of same-sex marriage argue that we should take steps to preserve 
the traditional definition of marriage. More specifically, they believe the institution of 
marriage should be restricted to one man and one woman, as is stated in the Defense of 
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Marriage Act, and that this restriction should not be changed.  Some opponents even 
argue that an amendment prohibiting same-sex marriage should be embedded in the U.S. 
Constitution.  
Now we would like to ask you about your thoughts on the issue of same-sex marriage. 
Increasing U.S. Troop Presence in Afghanistan 
Respected opponents of President Obama’s plan to increase U.S. troop presence in 
Afghanistan question whether a military solution will improve security; they contend 
that the plan exaggerates the threat of terrorism from the nation, and fear that an 
increased troop presence will fuel the insurgency and lengthen an endless and extremely 
costly war. 
Now we would like to gather your thoughts on President Obama’s plan to increase troop 
presence in Afghanistan.  
Condition 4 – Positive Information Condition: 
Issue Question Prompts 
Stem Cell Research 
Respected proponents of stem cell research argue that it may lead to cures for diseases 
and disabilities affecting large numbers of Americans, and funding this research is 
ethical because it may save human life.  
Now we would like to gather your thoughts on the issue of stem cell research. 
Timetable for Withdrawal of Troops from Iraq 
Respected proponents for setting a timetable argue that setting out a plan to withdraw 
would make Iraqis take responsibility for their country and become more independent of 
the United States.  
Now we would like to ask you about your position about setting a timetable for the 
withdrawal of U.S. troops from Iraq. 
Health Care Reform 
Respected proponents of health care reform view health care as a right and argue that 
the government has a responsibility to ensure that health insurance is available and 
affordable to all citizens – even those with preexisting conditions.  




Respected proponents of same-sex marriage argue that the institution of marriage should 
be opened to same-sex couples, and that current restrictions on same-sex marriage are 
unfair. Proponents are especially against a constitutional amendment that would ban 
same-sex marriage and think its suggestion is an unnecessary attack on lesbian and gay 
Americans that would create a constitutionally mandated second class of American 
citizens. 
Now we would like to ask you about your thoughts on the issue of same-sex marriage. 
Increasing U.S. Troop Presence in Afghanistan 
Respected proponents of President Obama’s plan to increase U.S. troop presence in 
Afghanistan argue that the plan is necessary to improve security; they contend that the 
plan will stabilize the volatile situation in the country, ensure that human rights are 
protected, and provide training to Afghan security forces and government officials so 
that the U.S. can eventually withdraw. 
Now we would like to gather your thoughts on President Obama’s plan to increase troop 
presence in Afghanistan.  
 
You might have favorable thoughts about _________.  You might have unfavorable thoughts 
about ________. Or, you might have some of each.  We would like to ask you first about any 
favorable thoughts you might have about this issue. Then, in a moment, we will ask you 
some separate questions about any unfavorable thoughts you might have. 
Objective Ambivalence Questions 
First, do you have ANY favorable thoughts about _______, or do you NOT have any? 
1 – Yes, I have favorable thoughts 
0 - No, I do not have any favorable thoughts 
 
How favorable are your favorable thoughts about ________? 
 4 – Extremely favorable 
 3 – Very favorable 
 2 – Moderately favorable 
 1 – Slightly favorable 
 
Now we would like to ask about any unfavorable thoughts you have about ________. 
Do you have ANY unfavorable thoughts about _____, or do you not have any? 
1 – Yes, I have unfavorable thoughts 
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0 - No, I do not have any unfavorable thoughts 
 
How unfavorable are your unfavorable thoughts about ________? 
 4 – Extremely unfavorable 
 3 – Very unfavorable 
 2 – Moderately unfavorable 
 1 – Slightly unfavorable 
 
How important is the issue of ________ to you? 
Issue Importance 
 5 – Very important 
 4 – Important 
 3 – Somewhat important 
 2 – Somewhat unimportant 
 1 – Unimportant 
 0 – Not at all important 
 
Scale Reliability Coefficients for Personality Trait Indices: 
Personality Traits 
Personality Factor Fall 2010 Spring 2011 
Openness to Experience  α: .79 α: .79 
Conscientiousness α: .84 α: .86 
Extraversion α: .86 α: .86 
Agreeableness α: .77 α: .78 
Neuroticism α: .85 α: .80 
 
Personality Inventory Items: 
1. Often feel blue (N +) 
2. Feel comfortable around people (E +) 
3. Believe in the importance of art (O +) 
4. Have a good word for everyone (A +) 
5. Am always prepared (C +) 
6. Rarely get irritated (N -) 
7. Have little to say (E -) 
8. Am not interested in abstract ideas (O -) 
9. Have a sharp tongue (A -) 
10. Waste my time (C -) 
11. Dislike myself (N +) 
12. Make friends easily (E +) 
13. Have a vivid imagination (O +) 
14. Believe that others have good intentions (A +) 
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15. Pay attention to details (C +) 
16. Seldom feel blue (N -) 
17. Keep in the background (E -) 
18. Do not like art. (O -) 
19. Cut others to pieces (A -) 
20. Find it difficult to get down to work (C-) 
21. Am often down in the dumps (N +) 
22. Am skilled in handling social situations (E +) 
23. Tend to vote for liberal political candidates (O +) 
24. Respect others. (A +) 
25. Get chores done right away. (C +) 
26. Feel comfortable with myself. (N -) 
27. Would describe my experiences as somewhat dull. (E +) 
28. Avoid philosophical discussions. (O -) 
29. Suspect hidden motives in others. (A -) 
30. Do just enough work to get by. (C -) 
31. Have frequent mood swings. (N +) 
32. Am the life of the party. (E +) 
33. Carry the conversation to a higher level. (O +) 
34. Accept people as they are. (A +) 
35. Carry out my plans. (C +) 
36. Am not easily bothered by things. (N -) 
37. Don’t like to draw attention to myself. (E -) 
38. Do not enjoy going to art museums. (O -) 
39. Get back at others. (A -) 
40. Don’t see things through. (C -) 
41. Panic easily. (N +) 
42. Know how to captivate people. (E +) 
43. Enjoy hearing new ideas. (O +) 
44. Make people feel at ease. (A +) 
45. Make plans and stick to them. (C +) 
46. Am very pleased with myself. (N -) 
47. Don’t talk a lot. (E -) 
48. Tend to vote for conservative political candidates. (O -) 
49. Insult people. (A -) 
50. Shirk my duties. (C -) 
 
Liberal Groups: 
Feeling Thermometer  
• People on welfare (Liberal +) 
• Gays (Liberal +) 
• Democrats (Liberal +) 
• African Americans (Liberal +) 
• Jews (Liberal +) 
• Liberals (Liberal +) 
• Labor Unions (Liberal +) 
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• Poor people (Liberal +) 
• Hispanics (Liberal +) 
• Feminists (Liberal +) 
 
Conservative Groups: 
• Conservatives (Conservative +) 
• The military (Conservative +) 
• Christian fundamentalists (Conservative +) 
• Catholics (Conservative +) 
• The elderly (Conservative +) 
• Southerners (Conservative +) 
• Rich people (Conservative +) 
• Gun owners (Conservative +) 
• Protestants (Conservative +) 
• Republicans (Conservative +) 
 
Cronbach’s α reliability coefficient for the Egalitarianism items was .89 in Fall 2010 and .88 
in Spring 2011.   
Egalitarianism Items 
 
1. Our society should do whatever is necessary to make sure everyone has equal 
opportunity to succeed. 
2. We have gone too far pushing equal rights in this country. 
3. One of the big problems in this country is that we don’t give everyone an equal 
chance. 
4. This country would be better off if we worried less about how equal people are. 
5. It is not really that big a problem if some people have more of a chance in life than 
others. 
6. If people were treated more equally in this country we would have fewer problems. 
 
Cronbach’s α reliability coefficient for the Moral Traditionalism items was .76 in Fall 2010 
and Spring 2011.   
Moral Traditionalism Items 
 
1. People in society should adjust their views to a changing world. 
2. Newer lifestyles are causing societal breakdown. 
3. Society should be more tolerant of different moral standards. 
4. There should be more emphasis on traditional family ties. 
 
Would you say your political discussion partners share your political views all of the time, 








1. How many seats are in the U.S. House of Representatives? 
 (α = .71) 
2. Who nominates judges for federal district courts? 
3. How many justices must agree to hear a case before the Supreme Court will issue of 
writ of certiorari? 
4. Who currently serves as the Speaker of the House? 
5. Who currently serves as the Senate Majority Leader? 
6. Who currently holds the office of Secretary of State? 
 
 3 – Strong Democrats/Republicans 
Partisan Intensity 
 2 – Democrats/Republicans 
 1 – Weak Democrats/Republicans 
 0 - Independents 
 
 1 – Very Liberal, Liberal, Slightly Liberal 
Liberals 
0 – Others (Moderates and Conservatives) 
 
 1 – Very Conservative, Conservative, Slightly Conservative 
Conservatives 
0 – Other (Moderates and Conservatives) 
 
2010-2011 PAS 2—Correlation Matrices 
Objective Ambivalence:  Stem Cell Research 
 
 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 
1. Stem Cell 
Research 
1.00                   
2. Neuroticism .03 1.00                  
3. Openness -.15 -.04 1.00                 
4. Extraversion -.05 -.33 .24 1.00                
5. Conscientious .03 -.32 .09 .20 1.00               
6. Agreeableness .08 -.35 .23 .14 .31 1.00              
7. Issue Importance -.32 -.07 .27 .07 .08 .08 1.00             
8. Group Affect 
Conflict 
.28 -.08 -.28 -.06 -.01 .17 -.13 1.00            
9. Value Conflict .20 -.03 -.28 -.06 -.05 .01 -.12 .54 1.00           
10. Disc. Partners -.08 .01 -.02 .02 -.02 -.05 -.02 -.21 -.08 1.00          
11. Liberal -.19 .02 .58 .01 -.03 .06 .16 -.41 -.33 .01 1.00         
12. Conservative .15 -.01 -.60 -.02 .05 -.09 -.15 .28 .23 .09 -.77 1.00        
13. Partisan 
Strength 
-.01 -.04 -.16 .05 .13 .05 .01 -.11 -.14 .12 .10 .24 1.00       
14. Political 
Information 
-.07 -.07 .04 .03 .02 -.02 .14 -.03 -.08 .01 .02 .04 .17 1.00      
15. Baseline 
Condition 
.02 .02 .03 .02 .02 .04 .05 .03 .02 -.07 -.03 -.03 .01 .02 1.00     
16. Competing 
Considerations  
.08 -.01 -.06 -.06 .01 -.06 -.01 -.01 .06 .00 -.05 .09 .09 .02 -.33 1.00    
17. Negative 
Considerations  
-.04 -.02 .02 .03 -.01 -.03 .03 .01 -.02 .10 .02 -.04 -.03 .01 -.33 -.35 1.00   
18. Positive 
Considerations 
-.06 .01 .01 .01 -.03 -.07 .08 -.03 -.10 -.03 .05 -.03 -.07 -.15 -.32 -.33 -.33 1.00  




Objective Ambivalence:  Same-Sex Marriage 
 
 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 
1. Same-Sex 
Marriage 
1.00                   
2. Neuroticism .06 1.00                  
3. Openness -.04 -.02 1.00                 
4. Extraversion -.01 -.34 .22 1.00                
5. Conscientious .00 -.32 .06 .16 1.00               
6. Agreeableness -.03 -.35 .20 .11 .30 1.00              
7. Issue Importance -.39 -.01 .27 .05 .07 .15 1.00             
8. Group Affect 
Conflict 
.25 -.08 -.30 -.04 .02 .09 -.33 1.00            
9. Value Conflict .27 -.03 -.30 -.03 -.02 .02 -.40 .54 1.00           
10. Disc. Partners -.04 -.02 -.01 .07 .02 -.03 -.02 -.20 -.08 1.00          
11. Liberal -.12 .02 .59 .02 -.05 .05 .23 -.43 -.36 .02 1.00         
12. Conservative .06 .00 -.60 -.01 .05 -.09 -.18 .28 .27 .10 -.76 1.00        
13. Partisan 
Strength 
-.09 -.07 -.15 .05 .12 .03 .08 -.11 -.13 .12 -.08 .23 1.00       
14. Political 
Information 
-.02 -.06 .05 .01 -.01 -.04 .04 -.03 -.08 -.00 -.01 .02 .15 1.00      
15. Baseline 
Condition 
.03 -.01 .00 .01 .03 .04 -.02 .04 .01 -.04 -.05 -.02 .03 .01 1.00     
16. Competing 
Considerations  
.04 -.01 -.06 -.04 -.01 .04 .03 .00 .07 .01 -.04 .09 .07 .04 -.34 1.00    
17. Negative 
Considerations  
-.03 .01 .05 .03 -.01 -.03 .06 -.03 -.01 .09 .04 -.05 -.03 .01 -.33 -.34 1.00   
18. Positive 
Considerations 
.02 .01 .01 -.00 -.01 -.05 -.06 -.02 -.07 -.05 .05 -.02 -.07 -.06 -.33 -.33 -.33 1.00  





Objective Ambivalence:  Health Care Reform 
 
 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 
1. Health Care 
Reform 
1.00                   
2. Neuroticism .05 1.00                  
3. Openness .07 -.03 1.00                 
4. Extraversion -.07 -.34 .24 1.00                
5. Conscientious -.01 -.31 .07 .18 1.00               
6. Agreeableness .07 -.34 .23 .13 .30 1.00              
7. Issue Importance -.16 -.07 .23 .10 .11 .08 1.00             
8. Group Affect 
Conflict 
.22 -.08 -.29 -.05 .00 .08 -.21 1.00            
9. Value Conflict .16 -.02 -.29 -.05 -.04 .02 -.25 .54 1.00           
10. Disc. Partners -.07 -.02 -.01 .05 .04 -.05 .09 -.20 -.09 1.00          
11. Liberal -.05 .02 .59 .02 -.04 .05 .18 -.42 -.35 -.00 1.00         
12. Conservative -.03 -.01 -.61 -.01 .06 -.09 -.15 .29 .26 .11 -.76 1.00        
13. Partisan 
Strength 
-.18 -.05 -.15 .04 .12 .05 .09 -.10 -.12 .11 -.09 .23 1.00       
14. Political 
Information 
-.04 -.05 .03 .01 .00 -.04 .09 -.05 -.09 .02 -.02 .04 .16 1.00      
15. Baseline 
Condition 
.03 -.01 .03 .03 .02 .05 .07 .03 -.00 -.05 -.04 -.03 .02 .02 1.00     
16. Competing 
Considerations  
.03 -.01 -.06 -.05 .00 .04 -.04 .01 .08 .01 -.05 .09 .06 .02 -.33 1.00    
17. Negative 
Considerations  
-.03 -.00 .02 .04 -.01 -.03 .01 -.01 .00 .10 .03 -.03 -.01 -.00 -.33 -.35 1.00   
18. Positive 
Considerations 
.04 .02 .01 -.01 -.01 -.06 -.03 -.03 -.08 -.06 .05 -.03 -.07 -.04 -.33 -.34 -.34 1.00  





Objective Ambivalence: Timetable for Withdrawal of Troops from Iraq 
 
 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 
1. Troop 
Withdrawal - Iraq 
1.00                   
2. Neuroticism .01 1.00                  
3. Openness -.07 -.04 1.00                 
4. Extraversion -.02 -.32 .24 1.00                
5. Conscientious -.00 -.31 .08 .18 1.00               
6. Agreeableness .01 -.36 .23 .12 .30 1.00              
7. Issue Importance -.17 -.05 .28 .09 .11 .14 1.00             
8. Group Affect 
Conflict 
.22 -.06 -.29 -.07 -.01 .06 -.16 1.00            
9. Value Conflict .19 -.02 -.28 -.06 -.05 .01 -.14 .56 1.00           
10. Disc. Partners -.01 -.01 -.01 .06 .04 -.05 .01 -.20 -.10 1.00          
11. Liberal -.19 .02 .59 .01 -.05 .06 .23 -.41 -.34 -.00 1.00         
12. Conservative .16 -.01 -.61 .00 .06 -.12 -.20 .27 .25 .12 -.75 1.00        
13. Partisan 
Strength 
-.02 -.03 -.16 .03 .13 .03 .00 -.11 -.13 .12 -.10 .24 1.00       
14. Political 
Information 
-.06 -.07 .03 .02 .02 -.02 .03 -.04 -.07 .03 -.02 .05 .16 1.00      
15. Baseline 
Condition 
-.03 -.02 .02 .02 .02 .03 .06 .03 .01 -.06 -.03 -.05 .01 .02 1.00     
16. Competing 
Considerations  
.01 .00 -.06 -.07 .02 .06 .01 -.01 .06 .02 -.06 .10 .08 .04 -.33 1.00    
17. Negative 
Considerations  
.04 -.01 .03 .05 -.01 -.03 .01 .02 .01 .09 .02 -.03 -.03 .01 -.33 -.34 1.00   
18. Positive 
Considerations 
-.02 .03 .01 .00 -.02 -.06 -.08 -.04 -.08 -.05 .06 -.02 -.06 -.07 -.32 -.34 -.34 1.00  





Objective Ambivalence: Increasing U.S. Troop Presence in Afghanistan 
 
 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 
1. Troop Surge - 
Afghanistan 
1.00                   
2. Neuroticism -.00 1.00                  
3. Openness -.04 -.03 1.00                 
4. Extraversion -.00 -.32 .22 1.00                
5. Conscientious -.02 -.31 .07 .18 1.00               
6. Agreeableness .02 -.34 .23 .13 .28 1.00              
7. Issue Importance -.12 -.11 .13 .07 .15 .04 1.00             
8. Group Affect 
Conflict 
.16 -.07 -.28 -.04 .00 .07 -.13 1.00            
9. Value Conflict .10 -.01 -.27 -.04 -.03 .03 -.12 .54 1.00           
10. Disc. Partners -.01 -.01 -.01 .06 .04 -.07 .03 -.22 -.08 1.00          
11. Liberal -.12 .01 .59 .01 -.04 .07 .05 -.40 -.34 -.01 1.00         
12. Conservative .11 -.01 -.61 -.00 .05 -.12 -.07 .27 .25 .12 -.76 1.00        
13. Partisan 
Strength 
.01 -.05 -.15 .05 .12 .04 .01 -.10 -.11 .08 -.10 .24 1.00       
14. Political 
Information 
.00 -.05 .04 .02 .01 -.04 .09 -.04 -.08 .02 -.04 .05 .17 1.00      
15. Baseline 
Condition 
-.06 -.00 .04 .01 -.00 .02 .07 .03 .03 -.07 -.00 -.05 -.00 .02 1.00     
16. Competing 
Considerations  
.05 -.00 -.08 -.07 -.00 .05 -.01 .02 .08 .04 -.07 .12 .08 .04 -.32 1.00    
17. Negative 
Considerations  
.06 .00 .02 .05 .01 -.01 -.05 .01 .03 .08 -.00 -.02 -.04 -.01 -.33 -.35 1.00   
18. Positive 
Considerations 
-.05 .01 .02 .01 -.00 -.06 .00 -.06 -.13 -.05 .07 -.04 -.04 -.05 -.32 -.33 -.34 1.00  
19. Semester -.02 .01 .02 .00 -.00 .00 -.06 -.07 .00 .05 .09 -.07 -.59 -.23 -.02 .00 .00 .01 1.00 
161
APPENDIX C 
 2008 CCES AND 2011 POLITICAL ATTITUDES STUDY (PAS 3) 
 
Issue Ambivalence Introductions on 2008 CCES 
Issue Question Prompts 
Privatizing Social Security 
In the next series of questions, we would like to ask you about your thoughts on the 
issue of privatizing Social Security. 
Embryonic Stem Cell Research 
Next, we will be asking you a series of questions about your thoughts on federal funding 
of embryonic stem cell research. 
Mandatory Health Insurance 
Now we would like to ask you about your thoughts on making health insurance 
mandatory for all citizens. 
Same-Sex Marriage 
Next, we will ask you a series of questions about your thoughts on banning same-sex 
marriage. 
 
Condition 1 – Baseline/No Information Condition: 
Issue Information Conditions and Prompts on 2011 Political Attitudes Study (PAS 3) 
Issue Question Prompts 
Embryonic Stem Cell Research 
Next, we will be asking you a series of questions about your thoughts on embryonic 
stem cell research. 
Privatizing Social Security 
In the next series of questions, we would like to ask you about your thoughts on the 
issue of privatizing Social Security. 
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Health Care Reform 
Now we would like to ask you about your thoughts on the issue of health care reform. 
Same-Sex Marriage 
Now we would like to ask you about your thoughts on the issue of same-sex marriage. 
Setting a Timetable for Withdrawal of U.S. Troops from Afghanistan 
Now we would like to gather your thoughts about setting a timetable for the withdrawal 
of U.S. combat troops from Afghanistan. 
Condition 2 - Competing Considerations Condition: 
Issue Question Prompts 
Embryonic Stem Cell Research 
Next, we will be asking you a series of questions about your thoughts on embryonic 
stem cell research. 
 
Respected proponents of embryonic stem cell research argue that it may lead to cures for 
diseases and disabilities that are suffered by millions of Americans, and that this 
research offers the greatest potential for the alleviation of human suffering since the 
introduction of antibiotics. 
 
Respected opponents of embryonic stem cell research argue that it is morally 
unacceptable since a potential human life has to be destroyed in order to use stem cells 
for research, and that research in this area has not resulted in any cures for diseases thus 
far. 
Privatizing Social Security 
In the next series of questions, we would like to ask you about your thoughts on the 
issue of privatizing Social Security. 
 
Respected proponents of privatization contend that personal accounts are fundamental to 
Social Security reform. They argue that private investment would not only provide a 
higher rate of return for investors than government-invested funds, but would also 
impart a sense of ownership over one's retirement money.  
 
Respected opponents of privatization contend that personal accounts are not 
fundamental to Social Security reform. They argue that private investment of retirement 
money is complicated and too risky, and that future returns to equity investment are 
likely to fall far below historical rates of return. 
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Health Care Reform 
Now we would like to ask you about your thoughts on the issue of health care reform. 
Respected proponents of health care reform view health care as a right and argue that 
the government has a responsibility to ensure that health insurance is available and 
affordable to all citizens – even those with preexisting conditions. 
 
Respected opponents of health care reform argue that if the government takes a more 
active role in reforming the health care system, then the quality of the system will 
become worse, higher taxes will likely result, and the deficit will inevitably increase. 
Setting a Timetable for Withdrawal of U.S. Troops from Afghanistan 
Respected proponents for setting a timetable argue that the troop surge into Afghanistan 
has been a success, the U.S. military has halted Taliban advances, and that setting out a 
plan to withdraw will encourage Afghans to take responsibility for the governance of 
their own country, thereby ending an extremely costly and seemingly endless war for the 
U.S. 
 
Respected opponents argue that the U.S. runs the risk of pulling large numbers of troops 
out of the country before the Afghans are prepared to assume control, which could 
reverse the gains made against the Taliban, and that setting an arbitrary timetable will 
destabilize the country further and put the U.S. at a greater risk of another terrorist 
attack. 
 
Now we would like to ask you about your position about setting a timetable for the 
withdrawal of U.S. combat troops from Afghanistan. 
 
You might have favorable thoughts about _________.  You might have unfavorable thoughts 
about ________. Or, you might have some of each.  We would like to ask you first about any 
favorable thoughts you might have about this issue. Then, in a moment, we will ask you 
some separate questions about any unfavorable thoughts you might have. 
Objective Ambivalence Questions (CCES and PAS 3) 
 
First, do you have ANY favorable thoughts about _______, or do you NOT have any? 
1 – Yes, I have favorable thoughts 
0 - No, I do not have any favorable thoughts 
 
How favorable are your favorable thoughts about ________? 
 4 – Extremely favorable 
 3 – Very favorable 
 2 – Moderately favorable 
 1 – Slightly favorable 
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Now we would like to ask about any unfavorable thoughts you have about ________. 
Do you have ANY unfavorable thoughts about _____, or do you not have any? 
1 – Yes, I have unfavorable thoughts 
0 - No, I do not have any unfavorable thoughts 
 
How unfavorable are your unfavorable thoughts about ________? 
 4 – Extremely unfavorable 
 3 – Very unfavorable 
 2 – Moderately unfavorable 
 1 – Slightly unfavorable 
 
How important is the issue of ________ to you? 
Issue Importance (CCES and PAS 3) 
 5 – Very important 
 4 – Important 
 3 – Somewhat important 
 2 – Somewhat unimportant 
 1 – Unimportant 
 0 – Not at all important 
 
Scale Reliability Coefficients for Personality Trait Indices: 
Personality Traits  
 
Personality Factor PAS 3 CCES 2008 
Openness α: .35 α: .33 
Conscientiousness α: .52 α: .55 
Extraversion α: .73 −− 
Agreeableness α: .42 −− 
Neuroticism α: .63 α: .64 
 
Personality Inventory Items: 
Here are a number of personality traits that may or may not apply to you. For each question, 
please rate the extent to which the pair of traits applies to you, even if one characteristic 
applies more strongly than the other. 
 
1. I see myself as: Extraverted, enthusiastic (E+) 
2. I see myself as: Critical, quarrelsome (A-) 
3. I see myself as: Dependable, self-disciplined (C+) 
4. I see myself as: Anxious, easily upset (N+) 
5. I see myself as: Open to new experiences, complex (O+) 
6. I see myself as: Reserved, quiet (E-) 
7. I see myself as: Sympathetic, warm (A+) 
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8. I see myself as: Disorganized, careless (C-) 
9. I see myself as: Calm, emotionally stable (N-) 
10. I see myself as: Conventional, uncreative (O-) 
 
Liberal Groups: 
Feeling Thermometer (PAS 3) 
• People on welfare (Liberal +) 
• Gays (Liberal +) 
• Democrats (Liberal +) 
• Liberals (Liberal +) 
• Labor Unions (Liberal +) 
• Poor people (Liberal +) 
• Feminists (Liberal +) 
• The Elderly (Liberal +) 
 
Conservative Groups: 
• Conservatives (Conservative +) 
• The Military (Conservative +) 
• Christian Fundamentalists (Conservative +) 
• Catholics (Conservative +) 
• Southerners (Conservative +) 
• Rich people (Conservative +) 
• Gun owners (Conservative +) 
• Republicans (Conservative +) 
 
Cronbach’s α reliability coefficient for the Egalitarianism items: .84   
Egalitarianism Items (PAS 3) 
 
1. Our society should do whatever is necessary to make sure everyone has equal 
opportunity to succeed. 
2. We have gone too far pushing equal rights in this country. 
3. One of the big problems in this country is that we don’t give everyone an equal 
chance. 
4. This country would be better off if we worried less about how equal people are. 
5. It is not really that big a problem if some people have more of a chance in life than 
others. 
6. If people were treated more equally in this country we would have fewer problems. 
 
Cronbach’s α reliability coefficient for the Moral Traditionalism items: .61  
Moral Traditionalism Items (PAS 3) 
  
1. People in society should adjust their views to a changing world. 
2. Newer lifestyles are causing societal breakdown. 
3. Society should be more tolerant of different moral standards. 
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4. There should be more emphasis on traditional family ties. 
 
Would you say your political discussion partners share your political views all of the time, 
most of the time, sometimes, or never? 
Discussion Partners (PAS 3) 
 
1. How many seats are in the U.S. House of Representatives? 
Political Information (α: .61) (PAS 3) 
2. Who nominates judges for federal district courts? 
3. How many justices must agree to hear a case before the Supreme Court will issue of 
writ of certiorari? 
4. Who currently serves as the Speaker of the House? 
5. Who currently serves as the Senate Majority Leader? 
6. Who currently holds the office of Secretary of State? 
 
 3 – Strong Democrats/Republicans 
Partisan Strength (CCES and PAS 3) 
 2 – Democrats/Republicans 
 1 – Weak Democrats/Republicans 
 0 -  Independents 
 
 1 – Very Liberal, Liberal, Slightly Liberal 
Liberals (CCES and PAS 3) 
0 – Other (Moderates and Conservatives) 
 
 1 – Very Conservative, Conservative, Slightly Conservative 
Conservatives (CCES and PAS 3) 
0 – Other (Moderates and Liberals) 
 
1 – Did not complete high school 
Education Level (CCES) 
2 – High School diploma 
3 – Some College 
4 – 2-year degree 
5 – 4-year degree 
6 – Post-grad  
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2008 CCES—Correlation Matrices 
Objective Ambivalence: Privatization of Social Security 
 
 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 
1. Social Security 
Privatization 
1.00         
2. Neuroticism .13 1.00        
3. Openness -.11 -.31 1.00       
4. Conscientious -.04 -.33 .24 1.00      
5. Issue Importance -.10 .01 -.05 -.07 1.00     
6. Liberal -.15 -.08 .10 -.08 -.08 1.00    
7. Conservative .10 -.08 -.10 .16 .10 -.42 1.00   
8. Partisan 
Strength 
-.13 -.03 -.02 .05 .04 .15 .10 1.00  
9. Education -.09 -.18 .18 .06 -.05 .12 -.06 -.06 1.00 
 
 
Objective Ambivalence: Same-Sex Marriage 
 
 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 
1. Same-Sex 
Marriage 
1.00         
2. Neuroticism .10 1.00        
3. Openness -.09 -.27 1.00       
4. Conscientious -.10 -.38 .24 1.00      
5. Issue Importance -.17 -.07 -.03 .06 1.00     
6. Liberal -.05 .09 .11 -.09 -.18 1.00    
7. Conservative -.01 -.08 -.06 .12 .40 -.38 1.00   
8. Partisan 
Strength 
-.04 .00 -.03 .09 .00 .21 .13 1.00  
9. Education -.05 -.11 .06 .01 -.07 .15 -.07 -.02 1.00 
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Objective Ambivalence: Mandatory Health Insurance 
 
 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 
1. Mandatory 
Health Insurance 
1.00         
2. Neuroticism .03 1.00        
3. Openness -.06 -.32 1.00       
4. Conscientious -.04 -.35 .23 1.00      
5. Issue Importance -.05 .09 .14 -.08 1.00     
6. Liberal -.03 -.07 .11 -.09 .30 1.00    
7. Conservative -.08 -.10 -.10 .16 -.41 -.42 1.00   
8. Partisan 
Strength 
-.12 -.01 .00 .05 .04 .15 .11 1.00  
9. Education -.01 -.15 .19 .05 .09 .13 -.08 .07 1.00 
 
 
Objective Ambivalence: Stem Cell Research 
 
 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 
1. Stem Cell 
Research 
1.00         
2. Neuroticism .14 1.00        
3. Openness -.14 -.27 1.00       
4. Conscientious -.16 -.38 .25 1.00      
5. Issue Importance -.31 -.13 .13 .06 1.00     
6. Liberal -.01 .09 .10 -.10 .12 1.00    
7. Conservative -.02 -.08 -.04 .14 -.04 -.38 1.00   
8. Partisan 
Strength 
-.05 .00 -.04 .09 .07 .21 .13 1.00  




Fall 2011 PAS 3—Correlation Matrices 
Objective Ambivalence: Social Security Privatization 
 
 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 
1. Social Security 
Privatization 
1.00               
2. Neuroticism .03 1.00              
3. Openness -.00 -.11 1.00             
4. Extraversion -.00 -.13 .33 1.00            
5. Conscientious -.08 -.08 -.02 .02 1.00           
6. Agreeableness .05 -.13 .11 .06 .14 1.00          
7. Issue Importance -.09 .04 -.05 -.07 -.07 -.03 1.00         
8. Group Affect 
Conflict 
.14 -.04 .00 -.11 -.03 .14 .05 1.00        
9. Value Conflict .08 -.04 -.11 -.03 .07 .02 .06 .29 1.00       
10. Partisan 
Strength 
-.04 -.03 -.04 .09 .02 -.06 -.11 -.20 -.11 1.00      
11. Discussion 
Partners 
-.06 .01 .10 .05 .02 -.02 -.00 -.18 -.03 .12 1.00     
12. Liberal -.10 .02 .01 -.05 -.05 -.02 -.03 -.13 -.23 -.34 .15 1.00    
13. Conservative .09 -.01 -.03 .06 .04 -.07 -.07 -.05 .19 .48 -.04 -.67 1.00   
14. Political 
Information 
-.02 -.04 -.03 .05 .12 .02 -.13 -.11 -.12 .07 .17 .13 -.05 1.00  
15. Competing 
Considerations 










Objective Ambivalence: Stem Cell Research 
 
 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 
1. Stem Cell 
Research 
1.00               
2. Neuroticism -.06 1.00              
3. Openness -.02 -.11 1.00             
4. Extraversion -.12 -.10 .32 1.00            
5. Conscientious .11 -.07 .02 .03 1.00           
6. Agreeableness .15 -.16 .13 .07 .15 1.00          
7. Issue Importance -.16 .09 .05 .01 -.08 -.14 1.00         
8. Group Affect 
Conflict 
.11 -.06 -.03 -.14 -.03 .13 -.10 1.00        
9. Value Conflict .04 -.07 -.10 -.03 .06 -.00 -.14 .32 1.00       
10. Partisan 
Strength 
.09 -.01 -.03 .10 .07 -.05 .04 -.23 -.08 1.00      
11. Discussion 
Partners 
.03 .02 .08 .06 .01 .03 -.12 -.18 -.03 .16 1.00     
12. Liberal -.20 .04 .02 -.05 -.07 .01 .06 -.14 -.25 -.35 .11 1.00    
13. Conservative .19 -.03 -.02 .07 .07 -.09 .05 -.03 .20 .48 -.02 -.68 1.00   
14. Political 
Information 
-.08 -.04 -.03 .06 .10 .00 .00 -.10 -.13 .01 .14 .16 -.06 1.00  
15. Competing 
Considerations 











Objective Ambivalence: Same-Sex Marriage 
 
 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 
1. Same-Sex 
Marriage 
1.00               
2. Neuroticism .0 1.00              
3. Openness .00 -.09 1.00             
4. Extraversion -.02 -.11 .30 1.00            
5. Conscientious .01 -.05 .02 .04 1.00           
6. Agreeableness -.04 -.13 .10 .07 .14 1.00          
7. Issue Importance -.24 -.05 .22 .08 -.02 .06 1.00         
8. Group Affect 
Conflict 
.04 -.07 -.07 -.13 -.04 .11 -.15 1.00        
9. Value Conflict .17 -.03 -.11 -.04 .08 .01 -.31 .33 1.00       
10. Partisan 
Strength 
.09 .00 .02 .09 .04 -.04 .05 -.25 -.12 1.00      
11. Discussion 
Partners 
.01 .05 .09 .04 -.00 -.01 .02 -.17 -.01 .14 1.00     
12. Liberal -.22 .00 .02 .00 -.05 -.01 .21 -.14 -.23 -.30 .12 1.00    
13. Conservative .23 .01 -.01 .01 .04 -.08 -.21 -.03 .18 .45 .01 -.67 1.00   
14. Political 
Information 
-.04 -.07 .00 .07 .09 .02 .00 -.12 -.15 .01 .16 .18 -.04 1.00  
15. Competing 
Considerations 











Objective Ambivalence: Health Care Reform 
 
 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 
1. Health Care 
Reform 
1.00               
2. Neuroticism .04 1.00              
3. Openness -.09 -.10 1.00             
4. Extraversion -.09 -.09 .31 1.00            
5. Conscientious -.09 -.05 .01 .04 1.00           
6. Agreeableness .10 -.13 .11 .05 .15 1.00          
7. Issue Importance -.13 -.06 .15 .12 .10 .08 1.00         
8. Group Affect 
Conflict 
.14 -.07 -.07 -.16 -.04 .10 -.17 1.00        
9. Value Conflict .13 -.06 -.12 -.04 .08 .02 -.22 -.35 1.00       
10. Partisan 
Strength 
-.06 -.01 .02 .13 .05 -.03 .15 -.24 -.09 1.00      
11. Discussion 
Partners 
-.00 .05 .08 .06 -.02 -.00 .02 -.18 -.03 .15 1.00     
12. Liberal -.11 .00 .04 -.03 -.04 -.03 .05 -.16 -.25 -.31 .11 1.00    
13. Conservative .08 -.01 -.00 .06 .01 -.09 -.01 -.05 .20 .45 -.01 -.67 1.00   
14. Political 
Information 
-.01 -.07 -.00 .05 .08 .00 .13 -.10 -.10 -.01 .14 .16 -.04 1.00  
15. Competing 
Considerations 











Objective Ambivalence: Setting a Timetable for Withdrawal of U.S. Troops from Afghanistan 
 
 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 
1. Troop 
Withdrawal - AFG 
1.00               
2. Neuroticism -.06 1.00              
3. Openness -.10 -.09 1.00             
4. Extraversion -.04 -.09 .28 1.00            
5. Conscientious -.00 -.04 .02 .05 1.00           
6. Agreeableness .01 -.14 .10 .05 .12 1.00          
7. Issue Importance -.12 -.17 .20 .16 .01 .03 1.00         
8. Group Affect 
Conflict 
.12 -.08 -.06 -.12 -.06 .11 -.07 1.00        
9. Value Conflict -.07 -.07 -.12 -.02 .07 .01 -.11 .34 1.00       
10. Partisan 
Strength 
.07 -.00 .02 .10 .05 -.03 .04 -.22 -.09 1.00      
11. Discussion 
Partners 
-.04 .05 .09 .03 .00 .01 -.02 -.16 -.05 .13 1.00     
12. Liberal -.12 .01 .02 -.03 -.05 -.03 .04 -.16 -.26 -.31 .12 1.00    
13. Conservative .04 .02 .01 .04 .04 -.05 -.00 .01 .21 .45 -.02 -.67 1.00   
14. Political 
Information 
.04 -.05 -.01 .06 .08 .02 .08 -.10 -.12 -.00 .15 .18 -.04 1.00  
15. Competing 
Considerations 
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